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Introduction
1.1 Introduction and overview
Cooperation plays a fundamental role in fostering developments of human society. The
study of cooperation is thus meaningful. Like economic agents mainly have competitive
behavior and cooperative behavior, game theory, a mathematical theory that designs
and uses tools to study interactions among decision makers, deals with both models
of competition and cooperation as well. Especially, the cooperative side of the body
of the theory involves issues like how coalitions of players form, how they behave, and
in particular how they bargain over their joint choice of actions, and how they solve
the problem of sharing the joint gains of cooperation. Especially this last issue is vital
to strengthen cooperation itself. The reason is simple, without a well justi¯ed sharing
rule, cooperation can hardly form or continue. Cooperative game theory comprises
many di®erent models, the most popular of which is the model of transferable utility
games introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). One can think of a
transferable utility game as a surplus sharing problem in which an amount of money
(as the net maximal pro¯t for the group of players) is to be divided and where one
abstracts from the fact that the players involved might put di®erent values on the
monetary payo®s they may receive.
Compensation is a speci¯c aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives
for agents to sacri¯ce their own interests for a moment to obtain higher payo®s for the
coalition as a whole. In such a way, the compensation problem can be analysed within
a cooperative game theoretic framework. In the real world, providing a reasonable
amount of compensation to such players is part of a practical strategy for getting the
necessary resources to attain e±ciency for the whole group. However, compensation
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is not explicitly studied in the existing literature and sometimes completely neglected.
For instance, the classical work on the issue of externality concentrates on the e±ciency
problem but cannot serve as the (normative) answer to the question how to compensate
the agents who are negatively a®ected by the others.
Since cooperation can be facilitated by providing compensations to players, one
can apply this idea to practice. In a political economy perspective, transition by
compensation becomes a prominent approach because a transition process can be
viewed as a kind of cooperation of the whole society and compensating agents to
buy their support for the reforms helps to realize the process while keeping social
stability.
Therefore, the three topics of cooperation, compensation, and transition are well
linked to each other, and will be treated in three corresponding parts (six chapters
besides this chapter) of this monograph.
The ¯rst part (chapters 2 and 3) focuses on solution concepts for cooperative games.
A new solution concept for transferable utility games, the consensus value, is intro-
duced in chapter 2. Chapter 3 generalizes it to partition function form games.
Chapter 2, based on the paper \The consensus value: a new solution concept for
cooperative games" (Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004)), introduces the consensus value. We
characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satis¯es e±ciency, sym-
metry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property,
a second characterization is provided. By de¯ning the stand-alone reduced game, a
recursive formula for the value is established. In addition, it is shown that this value
is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution. We also discuss
a possible generalization. Furthermore, we apply the consensus value to the issue of
merger incentives in network industries with essential facilities.
A generalization of the consensus value to the class of partition function form
games is studied in chapter 3 that is a chapter based on the paper \The consensus
value for games in partition function form" (Ju (2004)). The concepts and axioms,
related to the consensus value (Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004)), are extended. This value
is characterized as the unique function that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the
quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second
characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that this value satis¯es individual
rationality under a certain condition, and well balances the tradeo® between coalitional
e®ects and externality e®ects. By modifying the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive
formula for the value is established as well. A further generalization of the consensus1.1. Introduction and overview 3
value is discussed. Moreover, two applications of the consensus value are given: one
is for oligopoly games in partition function form and the other is about participation
incentives in free-rider situations.
The second part (chapters 4 and 5) is devoted to the theme of compensation while it
also studies new models of cooperation. Chapter 4 develops a general framework about
cooperation and compensation, the so-called project-allocation situations, and further
investigates the applications of the consensus value to problems of compensating losses
and sharing surpluses. Chapter 5 constructs a new model to study externalities and
the associated compensation problem. Speci¯c solution concepts are proposed.
By introducing the notions of projects and shares, chapter 4 (based on the pa-
per \Compensating losses and sharing surplus in project-allocation situations" by Ju,
Ruys and Borm (2004)) studies a class of economic environments, the so-called project-
allocation situations, in which society may pro¯t from cooperation, e.g., by reallocating
the initial shares of projects among agents. This chapter mainly focuses on the associ-
ated issues of compensation of losses and surplus sharing arising from the reallocation
of projects. For this purpose, we construct and analyse an associated project-allocation
game and a related system of games that explicitly models the underlying coopera-
tive process. We further argue that the consensus value ¯ts well in the framework of
project-allocation situations.
Di®ering from the classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970))
and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) that associate the externality
problem with e±ciency, chapter 5 stresses the compensation problem and the nor-
mative compensation rules in the context of externality. By taking players' absolute
stand-alone situations into consideration, this chapter constructs a new game-theoretic
framework: primeval games. It shows that primeval games well capture the features
of inter-individual externalities and help to analyse the associated compensation prob-
lems. This chapter introduces several solution concepts which may serve as bench-
marks for solving such problems. Firstly, the Shapley value is generalized to this
framework and a modi¯ed Shapley value is obtained. By taking a bilateral perspective
on the consequences of externalities, the consensus value for primeval games is de¯ned.
Characterizations of the two solution concepts are provided. A generalization of the
consensus value is discussed. Moreover, that chapter suggests a more context-speci¯c
solution concept, the primeval value, which seems more appropriate for this class of
games. Special properties of this value are studied. Finally, possible connections
between this framework and classical cooperative games are discussed.4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The third part (chapters 6 and 7) is an application of the ¯rst two parts into the
study of some compensation issues in transition economies. Chapter 6 analyses the
gradualist transition reform in China and points out that China actually adopted an
approach of \experimentation" for the transition process. Chapter 7 proposes to adopt
from now on an alternative approach, namely \transition by compensation".
Chapter 6, based on the paper \The river, the stones and the gradualist reform
in China's banking sector" (Ju (2003)), analyses that as a miniature of the whole
economic reform and transition in China, the reforms in the banking sector well re-
°ect the basic ideas and features of China's transition model: gradualism in process,
experimentalism in method, pragmatism in attitude, and evolutionism in nature. By
brie°y retrospecting and discussing the reform measures and process in the banking
sector, chapter 6 provides a window to look into the unique philosophy behind China's
reform and transition and summarizes the \transition by experimentation" approach.
Meanwhile, a practical role that the chapter can play is to provide the background
(knowledge) for chapter 7 which argues that the experimentation approach might not
be appropriate for the new situations in the transition process and proposes an alter-
native approach, namely, \transition by compensation", based on the analysis of the
compensation problems in China's transition period.
Chapter 7 is devoted to the policy implications of the theoretical studies in the pre-
vious chapters to China's transition reforms. Generally, the transition of an economy
from one state to another can hardly be implemented without proper compensation
of parties that have to bear losses or give up some privileges, outdated rights, or es-
tablished interests. We argue that the approach of \transition by compensation" is
particularly suitable for the transition process in China at this moment. Based on
solution concepts for cooperative games, we propose fair compensation rules and anal-
yse the necessary elements to establish an e®ective compensation system. The analysis
focuses on a study of the demolition and eviction in China but implications are derived
for the whole economy.
1.2 Preliminaries on cooperative game theory
Game theory is a mathematical framework for modelling and analysing con°ict sit-
uations that involve decision makers or agents, called the players of the game, with
possibly diverging interests.
The foundation of game theory was laid by von Neumann (1928). However, it was1.2. Preliminaries on cooperative game theory 5
not until the publication of the seminal book \Theory of Games and Economic Behav-
ior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) that game theory received widespread
attention. Since then, game theory has evolved into an important tool for modelling
and analysing in economics and other social sciences as well as in evolutionary biology.
Cooperative game theory concentrates on cooperative behavior by analysing the
negotiation process within a group of individuals in establishing a contract on a joint
plan of activities, including an allocation of the correspondingly generated revenues.
In particular, the possible levels of collaboration and the revenues of each possible
coalition (a subgroup of cooperating players) are taken into account so as to allow for
a better comparison of each player's role and impact within the group as a whole, and
to settle on a compromise allocation in an objectively justi¯able way.
A systematic description of the outcomes that may emerge in a family of games
is called a solution. In cooperative game theory, there is no single solution concept
dominating the ¯eld as much as the Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative game theory
(Nash (1951), for a survey, see van Damme (2000)), although the core and the Shapley
value are frequently considered as such. Solution concepts in cooperative game theory
formulate requirements regarding payo®s. In general, cooperative solutions suggest
how the total value of the grand coalition can be split among all the players in a
satisfactory way.
Below we provide preliminaries on cooperative game theory. For a comprehensive
treatment of game theory in general, we refer to Myerson (1991).
Cooperative game theory primarily deals with joint payo®s that can be obtained
by groups of players if they coordinate their actions. In some situations these joint
pro¯ts are freely transferable among the players (i.e., there exist no restrictions on the
division of joint pro¯ts among the players) whereas in other situations they are not.
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU game (in characteristic function
form), is a pair (N;v), where N denotes the set of players and v : 2N ¡! R is the
characteristic function, assigning to every coalition S ½ N of players a value, or worth,
v(S), representing the total payo® to this coalition of players when they cooperate. N
is called the grand coalition. By convention, v(;) = 0. Here, the term of transferable
utility (cf. Friedman (1977, 1986)) means that for each S ½ N, the scalar value v(S)
can be freely apportioned among the members of S. We denote the class of all TU
games with player set N by TUN. Where no confusion can arise, we sometimes denote
a game (N;v) by v.6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A game (N;v) is called superadditive if for every pair of disjoint coalitions the value
of the union of the coalitions is at least the sum of the values of the two coalitions
separately:
v(S [ T) ¸ v(S) + v(T)
for all S;T ½ N with S \ T = ;.
A game (N;v) is called subadditive if
v(S [ T) · v(S) + v(T)
for all S;T ½ N with S \ T = ;.
A solution (concept) for TUN is a map f that assigns to each game v 2 TUN a
subset f(v) of RN. If for every game v 2 TUN the set f(v) is a singleton, then we call
f a one-point solution (concept).
Cooperative game theory usually analyses adequate divisions of the worth of the
grand coalition. Two well-known requirements of an allocation x 2 RN for a game
v 2 TUN are
(i) E±ciency:
P
i2N xi = v(N);
(ii) Individual rationality: xi ¸ v(fig) for all i 2 N.
Allocations satisfying (i) and (ii) are called imputations.
















xi ¸ v(S) for all S 2 2
N
)
So, core elements are imputations which are stable against coalitional deviations: no
coalition has an incentive to split o® from the grand coalition, since for each coali-
tion S what it is allocated in total according to x (i.e.,
P
i2S xi) is at least what it can
obtain by forming S (i.e., v(S)). However, the core of a cooperative game can be empty.
Given a game v 2 TUN, for any coalition S ½ N and any player i 2 NnS, we call
v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S.1.2. Preliminaries on cooperative game theory 7
Let ¦(N) denote the collection of orderings or permutations on N. The marginal
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The Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)) of a game v 2 TUN, ©(v), is de¯ned as the












jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!
(v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S))
for all v 2 TUN and i 2 N.
This in fact provides a probabilistic interpretation of the Shapley value for a player
as his expected marginal contribution (cf. Myerson (1991)).
It is readily seen that the Shapley value satis¯es the following properties:
² E±ciency: For all v 2 TUN,
P
i2N ©i(v) = v(N);
² Symmetry: For all v 2 TUN and for any two players i;j 2 N such that v(S [
fig) = v(S [ fjg) for any S ½ Nnfi;jg, we have ©i(v) = ©j(v);
² Dummy: For all v 2 TUN and a player i 2 N such that v(S[fig) = v(S)+v(fig)
for all S ½ Nnfig, we have ©i(v) = v(fig);
² Additivity: ©(v1 + v2) = ©(v1) + ©(v2) for all v1;v2 2 TUN, where v1 + v2 is
de¯ned by (v1 + v2)(S) = v1(S) + v2(S) for all S ½ N.
Theorem 1.2.1 (Shapley (1953)) The Shapley value © is the unique one-point solu-
tion concept on TUN that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, dummy, and additivity.Chapter 2
The consensus value: a new
solution concept for cooperative
games
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter1, we study the problem of sharing the joint gains of cooperation and try
to ¯nd a solution concept which can not only be axiomatically characterized but is also
constructive (based on an explicit process of sharing gains of cooperation). Following
a simple and natural way of generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into
n-person cases, we obtain a new solution concept for TU games: the consensus value.
The consensus value is related to two well established solution concepts: the equal
surplus solution (cf. Moulin (2003)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)).
The equal surplus solution, also known as the CIS-value (Center of Imputation Set
value, cf. Driessen and Funaki (1991), van den Brink and Funaki (2004)), assigns to
every player her individual value, and distributes the remainder of the value of the
grand coalition equally among all players. Thus, the equal surplus solution is a central
solution concept in terms of egalitarianism. Moreover, it is particularly useful for a
class of games where the only possible ¯nal outcomes are either the complete coop-
eration of all players or the complete breakdown of cooperation2. However, since the
equal surplus solution rules out the consideration on partial cooperation, it fails to
explain the interaction between coalitions and leaves the evolution process from com-
1This chapter is based on Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004).
2Another possible interpretation could be that we only have information about the two extreme
ends of a game: the individual values and the value of the grand coalition; or simply when we do not
care about partial cooperation.
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plete breakdown to complete cooperation as a blackbox. Consequently, this solution
concept seems insu±cient for general n-person cooperative games but could well serve
as a speci¯c benchmark.
The Shapley value, on the other hand, takes all coalitional values into account and
somehow corresponds to the players' expected marginal contributions. Moreover, the
Shapley value is characterized as the unique function that satis¯es e±ciency, symme-
try, the dummy property and additivity. Although the Shapley value serves as the
central solution concept for TU games, there is still critique. For instance, Luce and
Rai®a (1957) criticize the e±ciency postulate and the additivity postulate. A recent
critique on the e±ciency postulate can be found in Maskin (2003). In this chapter,
the justi¯cation of the dummy property is considered. Generally speaking, there may
exist two extreme opinions about the gain of a dummy player. From the individualist
point of view, we do get the classical dummy property requiring that a dummy player
obtains exactly her own value v(fig). However, from the egalitarian or collectivistic
perspective, one can argue that all members of a society including dummies should
share the joint surplus equally among them. This distinction opens up the possibility
to relax this postulate. In this spirit we introduce and discuss a so-called quasi dummy
property.
In addition, in our opinion, the constructive interpretation of the Shapley value,
i.e., the marginal contribution approach, is not so convincing. Here, the terminology
of \marginal contribution" is somewhat misleading. In fact, the marginal contribution
is jointly created by the existing coalition of players and the entrant, but not by the
entrant solely. Following this reasoning, it seems too much to give a later entrant
the whole marginal value in superadditive games. Similarly, this rule is hard to im-
plement if the marginal contribution is less than the entrant's individual value if the
loss is caused by the interaction between the entrant and the incumbents. Of course,
those aspects are smoothed out in some sense by taking the average of the marginal
contributions over all di®erent orders.
Although basically we follow the same line as the Shapley value to study the prob-
lem of sharing gains of cooperation, i.e., using an average serial method, we propose
to modify the allocation of marginal contributions by a method which is based on the
standard solution for 2-person games. Given an ordering of players, we take a bilateral
perspective3 and consider that any surplus is the joint contribution between an existing
3This is the key feature of the constructive sharing procedure of the consensus value. One may ¯nd
an alternative interpretation of the Shapley value from Maskin (2003) that is based on a sequential
bargaining approach. However, it is still a unilateral perspective.2.2. The consensus value 11
coalition of players (i.e., the incumbents) and an entrant. By taking the incumbents
as one party and the entrant as a second party, the standard solution for 2-person
games can be applied all the way with consensus. That is, all the joint surpluses are
always equally split between the corresponding two parties. Since no speci¯c order-
ing is pre-determined, we average over all possible permutations. Such a constructive
process is helpful to solve practical problems. In chapter 4, we apply it to study loss
compensation and surplus sharing problems in project-allocation situations.
We characterize the consensus value as the unique one-point solution concept for
TU games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additiv-
ity. By means of the transfer property, an alternative characterization for the consen-
sus value is provided. We also establish a recursive formula for the consensus value
by de¯ning a stand-alone reduced game. Moreover, surprisingly, we ¯nd that the
consensus value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.
Furthermore, by introducing a share parameter on the splitting of joint surpluses, we
obtain a generalization of the consensus value. In particular, the Shapley value and
the equal surplus solution are the two polar cases of these generalized consensus values.
In section 2, we formally de¯ne the consensus value and establish a recursive for-
mula. As an illustration we consider glove games. In section 3, we characterize the
consensus value in an axiomatic way and discuss the properties under consideration.
Moreover, it is shown that the consensus value is the average of the Shapley value and
the equal surplus solution. An alternative characterization using the transfer property
is provided. We then discuss a possible generalization of the consensus value in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 further extends the idea of de¯ning the consensus value by means
of an alternative approach to share surpluses, i.e., based on the comparison between
coalitions' sizes, which results in another solution concept. The ¯nal section applies
the consensus value to the issue of merger incentives, which is based on a model of
network industries with essential facilities (cf. Jeon (2003)).
2.2 The consensus value
Let us consider an arbitrary 2-person cooperative TU game with player set N = f1;2g
and characteristic function v determined by the values: v(f1g), v(f2g) and v(f1;2g).
A reasonable solution is that player 1 gets
v(f1g) +
v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g)
212 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
and player 2 gets
v(f2g) +
v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f2g) ¡ v(f1g)
2
:
That is, the (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between player 1 and 2,
v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g), is equally shared between the two players. This solu-
tion is called the standard solution for 2-person cooperative games.
Now, we provide a generalization of the standard solution for 2-person games into
n-person cases. It follows the following line of reasoning.
Consider a 4-person game (N;v) with player set N = f1;2;3;4g. Assume we
have the order (1;2;3;4): player 1 shows up ¯rst, player 2 second, then player 3, and
¯nally player 4. When player 2 joins player 1, we in fact have a 2-person situation, and
following the principles of the standard solution, the surplus v(f1;2g)¡v(f1g)¡v(f2g)
will be equally split among them.
Next player 3 enters the scene, who would like to cooperate with player 1 and 2.
Because coalition f1;2g has already been formed before she enters the game, player 3
will actually cooperate with the existing coalition f1;2g instead of simply cooperating
with 1 and 2 individually. If f1;2g agrees to cooperate with 3 as well, the coalitional
value v(f1;2;3g) will be generated. Now, the question is how to share it?
Again, following the standard solution for 2-person games, one can argue that both
parties should get half of the joint surplus v(f1;2;3g)¡v(f1;2g)¡v(f3g) in addition
to their individual values. The reason is simple: coalition f1;2g can be regarded as one
player instead of two players because they have already formed a cooperating coalition.
Internally, 1 and 2 will receive equal shares of the surplus because this part is obtained
extra by the coalition f1;2g cooperating with coalition f3g.
In order to clearly illustrate this idea, we discuss the situation where a fourth player
appears. Now, player 4 is collaborating with coalition f1;2;3g as a whole since those
three players have formed into one cooperating coalition before 4 enters. According to
the standard solution for 2-person games, coalition f1;2;3g gets
v(f1;2;3g) +
v(f1;2;3;4g ¡ v(f1;2;3g) ¡ v(f4g))
2
:
Since this amount is obtained by the cooperation between coalition f1;2g and player







¡ v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f3g))
2
:2.2. The consensus value 13
Finally, players 1 and 2 share this amount in the same fashion.
One can also tell this story in the reverse way, yielding the same outcome in terms
of surplus sharing. Here, a 3-person case su±ces to show the idea. Initially, three
players cooperate with each other and v(f1;2;3g) is obtained. We now consider players
leaving the existing coalition one by one in the opposite order (3;2;1). So, player 3
leaves ¯rst. By the standard solution for 2-person games, player 3 should get half of
the joint surplus plus her individual payo®, i.e.,
v(f3g) +
v(f1;2;3g) ¡ v(f3g) ¡ v(f1;2g)
2
;
as 1 and 2 remain as one cooperating coalition f1;2g. Thus, the value left for coalition
f1;2g, which we call the standardized remainder (the value left for the corresponding
remaining coalition) for f1;2g, is
v(f1;2g) +
v(f1;2;3g) ¡ v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f3g)
2
:







¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g)
2
;
when player 2 leaves the coalition f1;2g next.
Extending this argument to an n-person case, we obtain a general method, which
can be understood as a standardized remainder rule since we take the later entrant
(or earlier leaver) and all her pre-entrants (or post-leavers) as two parties and apply
the standard solution for 2-person games all the way. Furthermore, since no ordering
is pre-determined for a TU game, we will average over all possible orderings.
Formal de¯nitions are provided below. For an ordering ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2
f1;2;:::;jNjg we de¯ne S¾
k = f¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(k)g ½ N and S¾












2 if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g;
where r(S¾
k) is the standardized remainder4 for coalition S¾
k: the value left for S¾
k after
allocating surpluses to earlier leavers NnS¾
k.
4Obviously, the standardized remainder not only depends on S¾
k but also on ¾ and v. Since no
confusion can arise and for notational simplicity, we use r(S¾
k).14 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
We then construct the individual standardized remainder vector s¾(v), which cor-
responds to the situation where the players leave the game one by one in the order
(¾(jNj);¾(jNj ¡ 1);:::;¾(1)) and assign to each player ¾(k), besides her individual











2 if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
r(S¾
1) if k = 1:
De¯nition 2.2.1 For every v 2 TUN, the consensus value °(v) is de¯ned as the








Hence, the consensus value can be interpreted as the expected individual standard-
ized remainder a player can get by participating in coalitions.
Following the process of obtaining the consensus value, a more descriptive name
for this solution concept could be the average serial standardized remainder value5.
Example 2.2.2 Consider the 3-person TU game described below.
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g f1;2;3g
v(S) 10 0 0 18 23 0 30
With ¾ : f1;2;3g ¡! N de¯ned by ¾(1) = 2, ¾(2) = 1 and ¾(3) = 3, which is





¾(3)(v)) = v(f3g) +
1
2





¾(2)(v)) = v(f1g) +
1
2





¾(1)(v)) = r(f2g) = v(f2g) +
1
2
(r(f1;2g) ¡ v(f2g) ¡ v(f1g)) = 7:
5In the same spirit, an alternative name for the Shapley value could be the average serial marginal
contribution value.2.2. The consensus value 15
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To further illustrate the consensus value, we consider glove games.
Example 2.2.3 (A glove game)
Let N = f1;2;3g be the set of players. Player 1 has one left hand glove. Player 2
and 3 have one right hand glove each. A single glove is worth nothing. A (left-right)
pair is worth 1 Euro. The corresponding TU game (N;v) is determined by the values:
v(fig) = 0 for all i in N, v(f2;3g) = 0, and v(f1;2g) = v(f1;3g) = v(f1;2;3g) = 1.








In the more general case where jNj > 3 but there is still only one left hand glove
player while all the others have one right hand glove each, the consensus value yields
that the left hand glove player gets 1
2 and each right hand glove player gets 1
2(jNj¡1).
Next it is shown that the consensus value satis¯es the basic property of relative
invariance with respect to strategic equivalence.
Lemma 2.2.4 The consensus value ° is relative invariant with respect to strategic
equivalence, i.e. for ® > 0, ¯ 2 RN and v 2 TUN, we have
°i(®v + ¯) = ®°i(v) + ¯i
for all i 2 N, where ®v := ®v(S) for all S ½ N.
6The fact that two permutations like (123) and (213) yield the same payo® vector only holds for
the class of all 3-person TU games.16 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE






k ¯i for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
For k = jNj, this is obvious.





































































¾(k)(®v + ¯) = ®s¾
¾(k)(v) + ¯¾(k) for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.


















































For k = 1, this is obvious.
From claim 1 and claim 2 it immediately follows that
°i(®v + ¯) = ®°i(v) + ¯i
for all i 2 N.
Lemma 2.2.4 will facilitate the discussion about the following example, a variation
of glove games.2.2. The consensus value 17
Example 2.2.5 (A super player)






j2S v(fjg) if i = 2 S P
j2S v(fjg) + ® if i 2 S;S 6= fig
v(fig) if S = fig
where ® 2 R.
Using the fact that the consensus value is relative invariant with respect to strategic




























The consensus value can be reformulated by means of a recursive formula, adopting
the same technique as in the paper by O'Neill (1982) for the so-called Run to the Bank
rule. The basic idea may be described as follows. As we aim to ¯nd the ¯nal gains
of individual players in the grand coalition of a TU game, we focus on individual
players' collaborating behavior as well. One can see that there are mainly two types of
collaborating behavior possible for a player in a game: either joining in sub-coalitions
or cooperating with all the others based on herself (stand-alone). If a player chooses
stand-alone cooperation, her payo® will be determined by the 2-person game standard
solution as we take all the others as one integrated/cooperating party. By assigning the
rest of the wealth, one de¯nes a reduced game for the group of players Nnfig. Then,
a solution concept f is said to satisfy the stand-alone recursion if, when applying
to all reduced games, the average of the sum of the corresponding payo®s and the
stand-alone payo® is the same as the payo® in the original game.
Formally, let f : TUN ¡! RN be a solution concept. Let (N;v) be a TU game. For




v(S) if S $ Nnfig
v(Nnfig) +
v(N)¡v(Nnfig)¡v(fig)
2 if S = Nnfig18 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
and call v¡i the stand-alone reduced game of (N;v) with respect to player i.
We say that f satis¯es stand-alone recursion if for every TU game (N;v) with
jNj ¸ 3 we have
fi(N;v) =
P







for all i 2 N.
One can readily check that the consensus value is the unique one-point solution
concept on the class of all n-person TU games with n ¸ 2 which is standard for
2-person games and satis¯es stand-alone recursion.
2.3 Characterizations




i2N fi(v) = v(N) for all v 2 TUN;
² Symmetry: for two players i;j 2 N, if v(S [ fig) = v(S [ fjg) for any S ½
Nnfi;jg, we have fi(v) = fj(v) for all v 2 TUN;
² The quasi dummy property: if for some player i 2 N, v(S [fig) = v(S)+v(fig)














for all v 2 TUN;
² Additivity: f(vi + v2) = f(v1) + f(v2) for all v1;v2 2 TUN.
The properties of e±ciency, symmetry, and additivity are clear by themselves. The
quasi dummy property is a modi¯cation of the classical dummy property.
As is argued in the introduction, the classical dummy property is utilitarianism
oriented, or, put di®erently, individualism oriented. However, from the egalitarian
point of view or from the collectivistic perspective, one can argue that all members of
a society including dummies should share the joint surplus equally among them. Thus,




jNj can be viewed as2.3. Characterizations 19
consequences of two contrastive viewpoints. Concerning the tradeo® between these
two extreme cases7, we make a fair compromise and take the average as the gain of a
dummy player, which results in the so-called quasi dummy property.
We show that the consensus value is the unique one-point solution concept that
satis¯es these four properties.
Theorem 2.3.1 Let f : TUN ¡! RN. Then, f equals the consensus value if and
only if it satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.
Proof.
We ¯rst show that the consensus value satis¯es those four properties.
(i) E±ciency is obvious since, by construction, s¾(v) is e±cient for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(ii) Now, let us check symmetry. Let i;j be two symmetric players in game v 2 TUN.
Consider ¾ 2 ¦(N), and set, without loss of generality, ¾(k) = i, ¾(l) = j, where
k;l 2 f1;:::;jNjg. Let ¹ ¾ 2 ¦(N) be the permutation which is obtained from ¾ by





¾(m) if m 6= k;l
i if m = l
j if m = k:
As ¾ 7! ¹ ¾ is bijective, it su±ces to prove that s¾
i (v) = s¹ ¾
j(v).
Case 1: 1 < k < l.
By de¯nition, we know
s
¾
i (v) = s
¾






















k¡1) ¡ v(f¹ ¾(k)g)
¢
Note that, v(f¾(k)g) = v(fig) = v(fjg) = v(f¹ ¾(k)g), S¾
k¡1 = S¹ ¾
k¡1, and thus v(S¾
k¡1) =
v(S¹ ¾
k¡1). It remains to show that r(S¾
k) = r(S¹ ¾
k).
Clearly, r(S¾
m) = r(S¹ ¾
m) for m ¸ l. Recursively, we can show that r(S¾
l¡t) = r(S¹ ¾
l¡t) for




























l¡t) ¡ v(f¹ ¾(l ¡ t + 1)g)
¢
:
7Cultural and philosophical factors may a®ect the propensity or choice between the two polar
opinions.20 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
Here, we also use the fact that ¾(l¡t) = ¹ ¾(l¡t). Moreover, since S¾
l¡tnfig = S¹ ¾
l¡tnfjg,
and we know that v(S¾
l¡t) = v(S¹ ¾
l¡t).






























Case 2: 1 < l < k. The proof is analogous to Case 1.













¹ ¾(1)(v) = r(S
¹ ¾
1):
What remains is identical to Case 1.
Case 4: 1 = l < k. Analogously to Case 3.
(iii) As for additivity, it is immediate to see that s¾
¾(k)(v1 + v2) = s¾
¾(k)(v1) + s¾
¾(k)(v2)
for all v1;v2 2 TUN and for all k 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
(iv) By relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence (Lemma 2.2.4), it
su±ces to prove that the consensus value ° satis¯es the quasi dummy property for
zero-normalized games. Let v 2 TUN be zero-normalized and i 2 N a dummy in v. It
su±ces to show that °i(v) =
v(N)
2jNj.


























































































l ) if k = 1:
Let i 2 N be a dummy player in v. Let ¾(k) = i. Then,
s
¾











if k ¸ 2
r(S¾














































































































































A general expression is
s
¾




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :















l ) if k = 122 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
Consider a class P of jNj permutations in ¦(N) such that for ¾;¿ 2 P it holds that






That is, given an ordering of the players Nnfig, let the dummy player i move from the
end to the beginning without changing the other players' relative positions. Summing
















































Conversely, let f : TUN ¡! RN satisfy e±ciency, symmetry, and the quasi dummy
property. It easily follows that f is uniquely determined for (multiples of) unanimity
games. Hence requiring a solution f to be additive too, it follows that f is uniquely
determined for any game in TUN, since the class of unanimity games constitutes a
basis of TUN.
Note that the quasi dummy property can be reformulated as fi(v) = 1
2©i(v)+1
2Ei(v)
for all v 2 TUN and every dummy player i in v. Here, ©(v) is the Shapley value of




jNj for all i 2 N.
In fact, this property carries over to all players as is seen in Theorem 2.3.2.








Proof. It is readily shown that f(v) := 1
2©(v)+ 1
2E(v) satis¯es the four characterizing
properties: e±ciency, symmetry, quasi dummy property and additivity.2.3. Characterizations 23
We now provide an alternative characterization for the consensus value by means
of the transfer property.
The transfer property (Dubey (1975)) in some sense substitutes for additivity. It is
de¯ned as follows. For any two games v1;v2 2 TUN, we ¯rst de¯ne the games (v1_v2)
and (v1^v2) by (v1_v2)(S) = maxfv1(S);v2(S)g and (v1^v2)(S) = minfv1(S);v2(S)g
for all S ½ N. Let f : TUN ¡! RN be a solution concept on the class of TU games.
Then, f satis¯es the transfer property if f(v1 _ v2) + f(v1 ^ v2) = f(v1) + f(v2) for
all v1;v2 2 TUN. Dubey (1975) characterized the Shapley value as the unique value
on the class of monotonic simple games satisfying e±ciency, symmetry, the dummy
property, and transfer property. Feltkamp (1995) generalized this result to the class
of all TU games. More speci¯cally, the Shapley value is the unique value on the class
of TU games satisfying e±ciency, symmetry, the dummy property and the transfer
property (cf. Feltkamp (1995, p.134, Theorem 9.1.5)).
We now have an alternative characterization of the consensus value for TU games.
Theorem 2.3.3 The consensus value is the only one-point solution on the class of TU
games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and the transfer
property.
Proof. A solution concept f : TUN ¡! RN satisfying additivity on TUN also sat-
is¯es the transfer property on TUN. To prove this, take v1;v2 2 TUN. Then, using
additivity,
f(v1 _ v2) + f(v1 ^ v2) = f(v1 _ v2 + v1 ^ v2)
= f(v1 + v2)
= f(v1) + f(v2):
Therefore, the consensus value satis¯es the transfer property. In addition, requiring
a solution concept f : TUN ¡! RN to satisfy e±ciency, symmetry, and the quasi
dummy property, it easily follows that f is uniquely determined for (multiples of)
unanimity games. Moreover, by Feltkamp (1995, Lemma 9.1.4), it follows that if the
solution concept f satis¯es the transfer property too, it is uniquely determined for any
game in TUN.
We want to notice that despite the fact that the quasi dummy property balances
those two extreme opinions, namely, utilitarianism (individualism) and egalitarianism
(collectivism), it is still in favor of non-dummy players in terms of aggregate share of24 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
joint surplus in superadditive games. For instance, even if in the extreme cases where
an n-person game may have n ¡ 2 dummies while only 2 non-dummies, non-dummy
players will get (n+2)=2n of the joint surplus v(N)¡
P
i2N v(fig), which is still greater
than half of it.
As we know the consensus value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal
surplus solution, it may be interesting to see under what condition those solution
concepts are equivalent.
We call a game v 2 TUN zero-symmetric if in the zero-normalization of v all players
are symmetric. Now, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.4 Let (N;v) be a TU game. If v is zero-symmetric then °(v) = ©(v).
Moreover, if jNj · 3 then °(v) = ©(v) implies that v is zero-symmetric.
Proof. The ¯rst part follows straightforward from ° and © satisfying symmetry and
being relative invariant with respect to strategic equivalence. To prove the second
part, consider a three-player game with player set N = f1;2;3g, and let v be zero-
normalized. Since °(v) = ©(v) , E(v) = ©(v), it easily follows that ©1(v) = ©2(v) =
©3(v). From the expression of the Shapley value and the game being zero-normalized,




















respectively. Similar expressions can be found for players 2 and 3. These expressions
yield the following equalities: ©1(v) = ©2(v) , v(f1;3g) = v(f2;3g) and ©1(v) =
©3(v) , v(f2;3g) = v(f1;2g). So, all worths of the two-player coalitions are equal
and thus all players are symmetric in the zero-normalized game v. The result for
three player games then follows from ° and © being relative invariant with respect to
strategic equivalence. For one- and two-player games the result is obvious.
However, we could not get the similar result as the second part in Theorem 2.3.4
for games with more than three players. Consider the four-player game (N;v) with2.4. A generalization of the consensus value 25
N = f1;2;3;4g and characteristic function v is given by
v(S) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if jSj = 1
1 if S 2 ff1;3g;f1;4g;f2;3g;f2;4g;f3;4gg
2 if S = f1;2g
5 if S 2 ff1;2;3g;f1;2;4gg
51
2 if S 2 ff1;3;4g;f2;3;4gg
14 if S = N:
The Shapley value and the consensus value of this game are equal to each other, and








, but the game is not zero-symmetric.
2.4 A generalization of the consensus value
By relaxing the way of sharing remainders, we get a generalization of the consensus
value: the generalized consensus value.
Let v 2 TUN. For given µ 2 [0;1], we de¯ne the generalized remainder, with














k) ¡ v(f¾(k + 1)g)
¢
if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g:
Correspondingly, the individual generalized remainder vector s¾















if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
rµ(S¾
1) if k = 1:
De¯nition 2.4.1 For every v 2 TUN and µ 2 [0;1], the generalized consensus value









Note that the consensus value corresponds to the case µ = 1
2.
Similar to the consensus value, the generalized consensus value can also be refor-
mulated by means of a recursive formula.26 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
As mentioned in section 3, dependent on the degree to which individualism or
collectivism is preferred by society, the dummy property can be generalized. De¯ning









for all v 2 TUN and every dummy player
i 2 N with respect to v, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.2 (a) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique one-point solu-
tion concept on TUN that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the µ-dummy property and
additivity.
(b) For any v 2 TUN, it holds that
°µ(v) = µ©(v) + (1 ¡ µ)E(v):
(c) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique function that satis¯es e±-
ciency, symmetry, the µ-dummy property and the transfer property over the class of
TU games.
The expression of the generalized consensus value as provided in part (b) of The-
orem 2.4.2 is in the same spirit as the so-called compound measures in the context
of digraph competitions (cf. Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2002)) and the ®-
egalitarian Shapley value (cf. Joosten (1996)).
Finally, we want to note that, in particular, for µ = 1, the generalized consensus
value is actually the Shapley value: the average serial remainder value turns to be the
average serial marginal contribution value. When µ = 0, the generalized consensus
value equals to the equal surplus solution.
Consequently, we have the following characterizations for the equal surplus solution.
Corollary 2.4.3 (a) The equal surplus solution E is the unique one-point solution
concept that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the 0-dummy property and additivity.
(b) The equal surplus solution E is the unique one-point solution concept that sat-
is¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the 0-dummy property and transfer property.
The above corollary suggests an interesting result: the equal surplus solution can
be indirectly obtained through an average serial method, which implies that even if
taking the partial cooperation into consideration we can still get the equal surplus
solution. Meanwhile, it is also an intuitive result as Corollary 2.4.3 can be understood
as a mathematical annotation for the well known adage \One for all, all for one."2.5. Discussion: the coalition-size-based consensus value 27
That is, if altruism is accepted as a common principle by all players in a game so that
all that they do is just helping the others, then ¯nally every one equally bene¯ts from
the joint cooperation.
Another insight we get from this corollary, or more precisely, from Theorem 2.4.2 is
that how much is allocated to a dummy player plays a prominent role for determining
the gains of all players and thereby is crucial for characterizing a solution concept.
The classical dummy property is actually an individualist dummy property while the 0-
dummy property is a collectivistic or egalitarian dummy property, and as a hybrid case
or taking a mean course, the quasi dummy property is a compromise dummy property.
Then, we may say that in some sense the quasi dummy property well balances the
tradeo® between e±ciency and equity, which would make the consensus value socially
and morally acceptable.
2.5 Discussion: the coalition-size-based consensus
value
If one takes the size of the incumbent party S into consideration, one can argue on the
basis of a proportional principle that given an ordering of players the entrant should
get 1
jSj+1 of the joint surplus while the incumbents as a whole get a share of
jSj
jSj+1. This
results in another solution concept, namely, the coalition-size-based consensus value.
Let v 2 TUN. We de¯ne the coalition-size-based remainder for coalition S¾
k, with

















k) ¡ v(f¾(k + 1)g)
¢
if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g:
Correspondingly, the coalition-size-based individual remainder vector ¹ s¾(v) is the vec-















if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
¹ r(S¾
1) if k = 1:
De¯nition 2.5.1 For every v 2 TUN, the coalition-size-based consensus value ¹ °(v)
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The coalition-size-based consensus value can be reformulated by means of a recur-
sive formula. Let f : TUN ¡! RN be a solution concept. For a TU game (N;v) and




v(S) if S $ Nnfig
v(Nnfig) +
jNj¡1
jNj (v(N) ¡ v(Nnfig) ¡ v(fig)) if S = Nnfig
and call ¹ v¡i the coalition-size-based stand-alone reduced game of (N;v) with respect
to player i.
We say that a solution concept f satis¯es coalition-size-based stand-alone recursion
if for every game (N;v) with jNj ¸ 3 we have
fi(N;v) =
P







for all i 2 N.
One can readily check that the coalition-size-based consensus value is the unique
one-point solution concept on the class of all n-person TU games with n ¸ 2 which is
standard for 2-person games and satis¯es coalition-size-based stand-alone recursion.
To further illustrate the value, we consider the game speci¯ed in Example 2.2.2
and the glove game in Example 2.2.3.
Example 2.5.2 (a) Consider the 3-person TU game described in Example 2.2.2. For





¾(3)(v)) = v(f3g) +
1
3





¾(2)(v)) = v(f1g) +
1
2





¾(1)(v)) = ¹ r(f2g) = v(f2g) +
1
2
(¹ r(f2;1g) ¡ v(f2g) ¡ v(f1g)) = 8:
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. In a more general case where jNj > 3 but there still exists only
one left hand glove player while all the others have one right hand glove each, ac-

























2.6 An application: the consensus value and merger
incentives
In this section, we apply the consensus value to analyse the issue of merger incentives
in the network industries that are characterized by essential facilities. However, one
should not view this section as a motivation for developing the consensus value, but
should take it as an application only or somehow a separate study.
Jeon (2003) constructs a cooperative game theoretical framework to analyse the
issue of merger incentives in the network industries with essential facilities. More
speci¯cally, those essential facilities are provided by one upstream operator for a num-
ber of downstream operators who supply ¯nal services for end-users. The examples
of such industries are the Internet, cable, telecommunications, gas, and electricity in-
dustries. Essential bottleneck facilities in the relevant industries are backbones for
Internet Service Providers, channel providers for local cable system operators, Local
Exchange Carriers for long-distance telecom operators, distribution pipes for local gas
suppliers, transmission grids for local electricity ¯rms.
Assuming Shapley bargaining over access charges, Jeon ¯nds that the main condi-
tion for mergers, either vertical or horizontal, to be bene¯cial to the merging parties
is that the aggregate pro¯t function of a coalition is concave in the size of the network
that the coalition covers, i.e., that the network industry exhibits decreasing returns
to network size. This is an interesting result. However, as Jeon himself remarks, the
Shapley value is one of many bargaining solution concepts despite that it has been
given many justi¯cations, so it is worthwhile to check whether the results obtained in
his paper are robust to other bargaining solutions. In this section, we use the same
model (but more elaborate) and examine his results under the consensus value.
From the above sections, we know that the consensus value is featured by its con-
structive process for sharing the joint gains and is characterized as the unique one-point30 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
solution concept for TU games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy
property and additivity. By the quasi dummy property, the consensus value well bal-
ances the tradeo® between utilitarianism/individualism and egalitarianism/collectivism.
Therefore, this solution concept might be appropriate for analysing, among other,
intra-¯rm issues. Consider the example/application of intra-¯rm wage bargaining (cf.
Stole and Zwiebel (1996)) mentioned in Jeon (2003). It seems reasonable that a dummy
player gets a share in the joint pro¯t.
Consider a network industry that is composed of a set of operators N = f0;1;2;:::;n¡
1g where 0 is an upstream operator and all the others form the set of downstream op-
erators K = f1;2;:::;n ¡ 1g. The upstream operator, i.e., operator 0, provides the
essential facilities or inputs for downstream operator i 2 K which supplies ¯nal ser-
vices for end-users. Thus, there are jNj operators in such an industry. Operator i 2 N
covers a network with size mi. The size of the network may represent the number
of end-users or service areas. Here, we assume that the upstream operator has no
direct end-users, i.e. m0 = 0. Then, the size of the whole network in the industry
is M ´
Pn¡1
i=1 mi. Let u(M) be the net bene¯t per end-user. It is assumed that
u0(M) > 0 due to network externalities and u(0) = 0 by convention. Generally, let
u(m) be the net bene¯t per end-user with respect to network size m where 0 · m · M.
We assume that u0(m) = 0 when m = 0 and u0(m) > 0 otherwise. Each downstream
operator i 2 K pays access charge ai to operator 0 for the use of the essential facilities.
Hence, if all operators pay for access, operator i obtains net pro¯t after paying the
charge, miu(M)¡ai. By assuming that the costs of facilities investment are sunk, we
see that operator 0's pro¯t is
Pn¡1
i=1 ai.
De¯ning the characteristic function v(S) as
v(S) =
½
0 8S ½ N such that 0 = 2 S P
i2S mi ¢ u(
P
i2S mi) otherwise;
i.e. any coalition's value is the aggregate of its members' pro¯ts in case only all






i2S mi ¢ u(
P
i2S mi) for all S ½ N such that 0 2 S. Then,
since ¼(m) ´ m ¢ u(m), ¼(0) = 0 and ¼0(m) > 0.
Along the same line as Jeon (2003), we do not explicitly model the process of
bargaining over access charges but directly focus on the speci¯c solution concepts. By
assuming that each operator gets its share according to the consensus value °, the2.6. An application: the consensus value and merger incentives 31




ai and °i(v) = miu(M) ¡ ai for all i 2 K:






































for all i 2 N: (2.1)
For any two operators i;j 2 N, if they merge into one operator, we then denote
the merged operator by i+ j. Correspondingly, we have a well de¯ned new game vi+j
derived from the original game v. Then, we use °i+j(vi+j) (similar for the Shapley value
©i+j(vi+j) and the equal surplus solution Ei+j(vi+j)) to denote the merged operator's
consensus value in the new game vi+j while °i(v) and °j(v) denote i and j's consensus
values in the original game v. The merger is said to be bene¯cial for the merging
parties if °i+j(vi+j) > °i(v)+°j(v). Below we will check the merger incentives both in
the case of vertical merger and horizontal merger. Considering the representative case
of a vertical merger between the upstream operator 0 and a downstream operator, say
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Similarly, for the representative case of a horizontal merger between two downstream














jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 2)!
(jNj ¡ 1)!
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We make the following assumption.




i2S0 mi, 8S;S0 ½ K.
This assumption implies that there do not exist dominant downstream operators whose
network sizes are considerably larger than others.
Theorem 2.6.2 Here and below, let v be given. Then
(a) with Assumption 2.6.1, we have
for all m; ¼
00(m) < 0 ) ©0+1(v0+1) > ©0(v) + ©1(v);
for all m; ¼
00(m) > 0 ) ©0+1(v0+1) < ©0(v) + ©1(v):
(b)




) E0+1(v0+1) > E0(v) + E1(v);




) E0+1(v0+1) < E0(v) + E1(v):
Proof. Theorem 2.6.2 (a) is due to Jeon (2003). Now we prove part (b). From
equation (2.1), we know
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Since ¼0(m) > 0, if M < jNjm1, then ¼(M) < ¼(jNjm1). Moreover ¼00(m) < 0 )
¼(jNjm1) < jNj¼(m1). Therefore, ¼(M) < jNj¼(m1). So, E0+1(v0+1) > E0(v)+E1(v).
Similarly, we can prove the case of E0+1(v0+1) < E0(v) + E1(v).
With the above theorem and since °0+1(v0+1) ¡ (°0(v) + °1(v)) = 1
2(©0+1(v0+1) ¡
(©0(v) + ©1(v))) + 1
2(E0+1(v0+1) ¡ (E0(v) + E1(v))), we then readily get the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.6.3 With Assumption 2.6.1, for all m ¸ 0, we have
(a)




) °0+1(v0+1) > °0(v) + °1(v);
(b)




) °0+1(v0+1) < °0(v) + °1(v):
Corollary 2.6.3 (a) shows that under the consensus value the main condition for
vertical mergers to be bene¯cial (costly) to the merging parties is that the aggre-
gate pro¯t function of a coalition is concave (convex) in the size of the network that
the coalition covers, i.e., that the network industry exhibits decreasing (increasing)
returns to network size. Moreover, the size of the involved downstream merging op-
erator should be su±ciently large, exactly speaking, larger than the average size M
jNj.
Basically, this result is consistent with the result obtained by Jeon (2003) for the case
of the Shapley value. In addition, if adopting the generalized consensus value °µ, one
can ¯nd that we will get the same result as this corollary.
Under the consensus value, we have the following result on costly horizontal merger.
Theorem 2.6.4 For all m, ¼00(m) > 0 and ¼000(m) ¸ 0 ) °1+2(v1+2) < °1(v)+°2(v).
Proof. One can readily check that










That is, if applying the equal surplus solution, downstream operators will always prefer
to stay apart. Moreover, Jeon (2003) shows that under the conditions of the theorem,34 CHAPTER 2. THE CONSENSUS VALUE
©1+2(v1+2) < ©1(v) + ©2(v), so clearly, °1+2(v1+2) < °1(v) + °2(v) as well.
From the above analysis, we have the following results. In the case of vertical
mergers, if adopting the consensus value, the main conditions for the mergers to be
bene¯cial (costly) to the merging parties are that the network industry exhibits de-
creasing (increasing) returns to network size and the size of the involved downstream
merging operator should be su±ciently large. Although another (weaker) condition is
introduced, the results here are basically consistent with the results obtained by Jeon
(2003) for the case of the Shapley value. In the case of horizontal mergers, we ¯nd
that if adopting the consensus value the main conditions for the mergers to be costly
to the merging parties are the same as in Jeon (2003).
Therefore, we can conclude that despite the minor modi¯cations, the results ob-
tained in Jeon (2003) are also the main conditions for the merger incentives under the
consensus value, which implies that those results are robust.Chapter 3
The consensus value for games in
partition function form
3.1 Introduction
The problem of sharing the joint gains of cooperation is well captured by cooperative
game theory. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) has been proven to be the most
studied and widely used single-valued solution concept for cooperative games with
transferable utility in characteristic function form as it satis¯es some desirable proper-
ties. In some sense, the value captures the expected outcome of a game, and represents
a distinct approach to the problems of complex strategic interactions that game theory
seeks to illuminate (Roth (1988)).
However, considering an economy with externalities one cannot easily recommend a
division of the joint pro¯ts in the same way as the ¯nal pro¯ts depend on the coalition
structure which has been formed. This feature was ¯rst captured by Thrall and Lucas
(1963) by the concept of partition function form games: A partition function assigns a
value to each pair consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which includes that
coalition. The advantage of this model is that it takes both internal factors (coalition
itself) and external factors (coalition structure) that may a®ect cooperation outcomes
into account and allows to go deeper into cooperation problems. Thus, it is closer to
real life although more complex to analyse.
Values for such games can be found in Myerson (1977), Bolger (1989), Feldman
(1994), Potter (2000), and Pham Do and Norde (2002). All of them are in some way
extensions of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) for cooperative TU games in char-
acteristic function form. Myerson (1977) introduced a value based on the extensions
of the three axioms in the Shapley's original paper. Bolger's value assigns zero to
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dummies and assigns nonnegative values to players in monotone simple games. Potter
(2000) added another axiom, coalitional symmetry, and reformed the regular de¯ni-
tion of the dummy player such that the dummy player can get nonnegative worth.
But note that a null player de¯ned in this chapter still gets zero worth by Potter's
value. When jNj = 3, Potter's value coincides with the values introduced by Bolger
and Feldman. But they are di®erent when jNj > 3. The di®erence is due to the fact
that Potter de¯ned the worth of each embedded coalition as the average worth. Pham
Do and Norde (2002) studied another extension of the Shapley value for the class of
partition function form games, which is the average of a collection of marginal vectors.
Fujinaka (2004) provided alternative characterizations for the Shapley value de¯ned by
Pham Do and Norde (2002) based on a marginality axiom and a monotonicity axiom.
Moreover, he found an error in the proof of the axiomatization which is based on the
axiom of additivity in Pham Do and Norde (2002) and amended it in his paper.
This chapter1 takes a di®erent perspective and aims to derive a solution concept
which not only satis¯es \reasonable" properties but also has a constructive sharing
procedure. Following a simple and natural way of generalizing the standard solution
for 2-person partition function form games into n-person cases, a new solution con-
cept for partition function form games is obtained: the consensus value. It is, in fact,
a natural extension of the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function
form introduced in chapter 2. This value di®ers from all the previous values as it
is characterized to be the unique function that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symme-
try, additivity and the quasi-null player property. The ¯rst three requirements are
relatively weak, especially the property of complete symmetry is a natural and obvi-
ous requirement. A quasi-null player is a player who has zero payo® in the complete
breakdown situation (every player stands alone) and whose marginal contributions to
all non-empty coalitions are also zero. Instead of the \regular" marginal contribution
perspective requiring zero payo® to a quasi-null player (we may call it the marginal
quasi-null player property) which is implicitly speci¯ed by the Shapley value in Pham
Do and Norde (2002), this chapter introduces the so-called quasi-null player property
based on the positive or negative externalities that the quasi-null player might bene¯t
or su®er from.
One may argue that the e±ciency2 postulate and the marginal quasi-null player
property seem to be contradictory to each other when considering solution concepts
1This chapter is based on Ju (2004).
2A more general criticism on the e±ciency postulate can be traced back to Luce and Rai®a (1957);
and, more recently, is seen in Maskin (2003).3.1. Introduction 37
for partition function form games because a quasi-null player, given the positive ex-
ternalities she might enjoy, can hardly participate in coalitions where she contributes
nothing and will get zero payo®. More generally, we have no reason to ignore the ex-
ternality e®ect in partition function form games while the marginal quasi-null player
property rules out the considerations on externalities and completely favors coalitions.
That is, from the positive externality point of view, any quasi-null player could obtain
nonnegative worth when standing alone, and analogously, she might get nonpositive
worth in the presence of negative externality, which opens up the possibility to relax
the marginal quasi-null player postulate. In this spirit, the quasi-null player property
is introduced and discussed.
By de¯ning the expected stand-alone value, we can determine, in some sense, the
maximum and minimum that a quasi-null player might get in a game due to the positive
and negative externalities3, respectively. In order to balance the tradeo® between those
two contrastive opinions, i.e. emphasizing coalitions or focusing on externalities, we
make a fair compromise and take the average as the value for a quasi-null player,
resulting in the quasi-null player property. At the same time, introducing the quasi-
null player property actually a®ects all other players in the same way such that any
player's value is determined by her contributions to coalitions and the externalities
imposed on her if stand-alone, which is further con¯rmed by the general formula of
the consensus value: It is the average of the Shapley value introduced by Pham Do
and Norde (2002) and the expected stand-alone value.
A novel feature of the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function form
is its underlying sharing process. It is shown in this chapter that such a process is
particularly suitable for the settings of games in partition function form because, given
a coalition structure, the standard solution for 2-person partition function form games
can be well implemented. Here, given an ordering of players, we also take a bilateral
perspective and consider to allocate the joint surplus of an existing coalition of players
(i.e., the incumbents) and an entrant, which means that the unilateral viewpoint like
the marginal contribution approach focusing on entrants is abandoned. By taking the
incumbents as one party and the entrant as a second party, the standard solution
for 2-person games can be applied all the way with consensus. That is, all the joint
surpluses are always equally split between the corresponding two parties. Since no
speci¯c ordering is pre-determined, we average over all possible permutations. Hence,
3More strictly, since the externalities from di®erent coalitions imposed on a player could be both
positive and negative in a game, the expected stand-alone value is just a value focusing on externalities,
in contrast with the value derived from the contributions to coalitional values.38 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
by this rule, not only the concern of all the possible orderings but also what happens
in each ordering are mutually accepted: Consensus is obtained.
By means of the transfer property, a second characterization for the consensus value
is provided. Based on a modi¯cation of the stand-alone reduced game introduced in
Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004) and a related recursive formula, the consensus value for
partition function form games is reformulated. Furthermore, by introducing a share
parameter on the splitting of joint surpluses, a generalization of the consensus value is
obtained. In particular, the Shapley value and the expected stand-alone value are the
two polar cases of the generalized consensus value. Accordingly, characterizations for
the expected stand-alone value are obtained. A special case of the partition function
form games is that any player's stand-alone values are the same as that in the complete
breakdown situation. Then, the consensus value is equivalent to that in TU games in
characteristic function form, which equals to the average of the Shapley value and the
equal surplus solution.
In addition to this section introducing the chapter and reviewing the seminal works
brie°y, the remaining part proceeds as follows. In the next section, we brie°y recall
the basic features of partition function form games. In section 3, we address 2-person
partition function form games and take the corresponding solutions as a standardiza-
tion and de¯ne the consensus value for partition function form games. The consensus
value is characterized in an axiomatic way in section 4. It is shown that the consensus
value is the average of the Shapley value for partition function form games and the
expected stand-alone value. Section 5 discusses a generalization of this solution con-
cept. The ¯nal section shows the applications of the consensus value by providing two
illustrative examples: one is about oligopoly games in partition function form and the
other is about the participation incentives in free-rider situations.
3.2 Preliminaries
This section, based on Pham Do and Norde (2002), recalls some basic de¯nitions and
notations related to games in partition function form.
A partition · of the player set N, a so-called coalition structure, is a set of mutually
disjoint coalitions, · = fS1;:::;Smg, so that their union is N. Let P(N) be the set of
all partitions of N. For any coalition S ½ N, the set of all partitions of S is denoted
by P(S). A typical element of P(S) is denoted by ·S. Note that two partitions will3.2. Preliminaries 39
be considered equal if they di®er only by the insertion or deletion of ;. That is,
ff1;2g;f3gg = ff1;2g;f3g;;g.
A pair (S;·) consisting of a coalition S and a partition · of N to which S belongs





N £ P(N)jS 2 ·
ª
:
De¯nition 3.2.1 A mapping
w : E(N) ¡! R
that assigns a real value, w(S;·), to each embedded coalition (S;·) is called a partition
function. By convention, w(;;·) = 0 for all · 2 P(N). The ordered pair (N;w) is a
partition function form game. The set of partition function form games with player
set N is denoted by PGN.
The value w(S;·) represents the payo® of coalition S, given the coalition struc-
ture · forms. For a given partition · = fS1;:::;Smg and a partition function w, let
¹ w(S1;:::;Sm) denote the m-vector (w(Si;·))
m
i=1. It will be convenient to economize
brackets and suppress the commas between elements of the same coalition. Thus,
where no confusion can arise, we will write, for example, w(fi;j;kg;ffi;j;kg;fl;hgg)
as w(ijk;fijk;lhg), and ¹ w(fi;j;kg;fl;hg) as ¹ w(ijk;lh). For a partition · 2 P(N) and
i 2 N, we denote the coalition in · to which player i belongs by S(·;i).
The typical partition which consists of singleton coalitions only, · = ff1g;:::;fngg,
is denoted by [N], whereas the partition, which consists of the grand coalition only is
denoted by fNg. For any subset S ½ N, let [S] denote the typical partition which
consists of the singleton elements of S, i.e., [S] = ffjgjj 2 Sg
De¯nition 3.2.2 A solution concept on PGN is a function f, which associates with
each game (N;w) in PGN a vector f(N;w) of individual payo®s in RN, i.e.,
f(N;w) = (fi(N;w))i2N 2 R
N:
Since the consensus value for partition function form games is related to the Shapley
value de¯ned by Pham Do and Norde (2002), it is necessary to recall that de¯nition.40 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
For a given ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2 f1;:::;jNjg, we de¯ne the partition ·¾
k associated




k := f¾(1);:::;¾(k)g, and ·¾
0 = [N]. So,
in ·¾
k the coalition S¾
k has already formed, whereas all other players still form singleton
coalitions.












for all ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
De¯nition 3.2.3 (Pham Do and Norde (2002)) The Shapley value ©(w) of the par-








3.3 The consensus value
One may notice that the Shapley value for partition function form games de¯ned by
Pham Do and Norde (2002) actually ignores all the new information provided in a
partition function form game compared to a TU game in characteristic function form.
For instance, this value is in dependent of w(fig;(·Nnfig)[ffigg) for all i 2 N and for
all ·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig) such that ·Nnfig 6= [Nnfig]. Put di®erently, partition functions
play no role here and the Shapley value de¯ned above does not take externality into
account.
The idea to de¯ne the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function form
(cf. chapter 2) well ¯ts the settings of partition function form games: It takes a bilateral
perspective and allocates payo®s based on a fair compromise between coalition e®ect
and externality e®ect. Hence, it re°ects the role of coalition structures in determining
players' ¯nal payo®s.
To illustrate the idea, we ¯rst consider an arbitrary 2-person partition function
form game with player set N = f1;2g and partition function w determined by the
values: w(1;f1;2g), w(2;f1;2g) and w(12;f12g). Note that, as mentioned in section
2, here we use shortcut notations, for example, w(1;f1;2g) is for w(f1g;ff1g;f2gg),
and w(12;f12g) is for w(f1;2g;ff1;2gg). A reasonable solution is that player 1 gets
w(1;f1;2g) +
w(12;f12g) ¡ w(1;f1;2g) ¡ w(2;f1;2g)
23.3. The consensus value 41
and player 2 gets
w(2;f1;2g) +
w(12;f12g) ¡ w(2;f1;2g) ¡ w(1;f1;2g)
2
:
That is, the (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between player 1 and 2,
w(12;f12g) ¡ w(2;f1;2g) ¡ w(1;f1;2g);
is equally shared between the two players. This solution is called the standard solution
for 2-person partition function form games.
Then, we consider a generalization of the standard solution for 2-person games into
n-person cases. It follows the following line of reasoning.
Consider a 3-person game (N;w) with player set N = f1;2;3g. Suppose we have
the ordering (1;2;3): player 1 shows up ¯rst, then player 2, and ¯nally player 3. When
player 2 joins 1, we in fact have a 2-person situation where the surplus sharing problem
is solved by the standard solution. Next, player 3 enters the scene, who would like to
cooperate with player 1 and 2. Because coalition f12g has already been formed before
she joins, player 3 will actually cooperate with the existing coalition f12g instead of
simply cooperating with 1 and 2 individually. If f12g agrees to cooperate with player
3 as well, the value of the grand coalition, w(123;f123g) will be generated. Now, the
question is how to share it?
Again, following the standard solution for 2-person games, one can argue that both
parties should get half of the joint surplus
w(123;f123g) ¡ w(12;f12;3g) ¡ w(3;f12;3g)
in addition to their stand-alone payo®s. The reason is simple: coalition f12g should
be regarded as one player instead of two players because they have already formed
a cooperating coalition. Internally, 1 and 2 will receive equal shares of the surplus
because this part is obtained extra by the coalition f12g cooperating with coalition
f3g.
One can also tell the story in a reverse way, which yields the same outcome in terms
of surplus sharing. Initially, three players cooperate with each other and w(123;f123g)
is obtained. We now consider players leaving the existing coalitions one by one in the
opposite order (3;2;1). So player 3 leaves ¯rst. By the standard solution for 2-person
games, player 3 should get half of the joint surplus plus her stand-alone payo®, i.e.
w(3;f12;3g) +
w(123;f123g) ¡ w(3;f12;3g) ¡ w(12;f12;3g)
2
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as 1 and 2 remain as one cooperating coalition f12g. Thus, the value left for coalition
f12g, which we call the standardized remainder (the value left for the corresponding
remaining coalition) for f12g, is
w(12;f12;3g) +
w(123;f123g) ¡ w(12;f12;3g) ¡ w(3;f12;3g)
2
:
In the same fashion, the standardized remainder for f1g will be
w(1;f1;2;3g)+
w(123;f123g)+w(12;f12;3g)¡w(3;f12;3g)
2 ¡ w(1;f1;2;3g) ¡ w(2;f1;2;3g))
2
:
Extending this argument to an n-person case, we then have a general method,
which can be understood as a standardized remainder rule since we take the later
entrant (or earlier leaver) and all her pre-entrants (or post-leavers) as two parties
and apply the standard solution for 2-person games all the way. Furthermore, since
no ordering is pre-determined for a partition function form game, we will average all
possible orderings.















2 if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g;
where r(S¾
k) is the standardized remainder for coalition S¾
k: the value left for S¾
k after
allocating surplus to later entrants (earlier leavers) NnS¾
k. Note that for notational
simplicity we still use the same notation, i.e. r(S¾
k), as that for TU games in charac-
teristic function form.
We construct the individual standardized remainder vector s¾(w), which corre-
sponds to the situation where the players enter the game one by one in the or-
der ¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(jNj) (or leave the game one by one in the order ¾(jNj);¾(jNj ¡
1);:::;¾(1)) and assign each player ¾(k), besides her stand-alone payo® w(f¾(k)g;·¾
k¡1),
half of the net surplus from the standardized remainder r(S¾
k). Formally, it is the vector














2 if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
r(S¾
1) if k = 1:3.3. The consensus value 43
De¯nition 3.3.1 The consensus value °(w) of the partition function form game (N;w)








Hence, the consensus value can be interpreted as the expected individual standard-
ized remainder that a player can get by participating in coalitions.
Example 3.3.2 This game is from Pham Do and Norde (2002). Consider the parti-
tion function form game (N;w) de¯ned by
¹ w(1;2;3) = (0;0;0);
¹ w(12;3) = (2;0); ¹ w(13;2) = (2;1); ¹ w(23;1) = (3;2);
¹ w(123) = (10):
With ¾ : f1;2;3g ¡! N de¯ned by ¾(1) = 2, ¾(2) = 1 and ¾(3) = 3, which is






w(123;f123g) ¡ w(12;f12;3g) ¡ w(3;f12;3g)
2
= 4:










































whereas the Shapley value of this game (Pham






. One can verify that the value introduced




4) for this game as when jNj = 3 the value introduced by Potter coincides44 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
with Bolger's value (Potter (2000)). The di®erence between the consensus value and
the others stems from the way to share joint surpluses and the fact that the external-
ities of players are taken into account. The Shapley value still focuses on marginal
vectors and rules out externality e®ects. As for Bolger's value, it considers a di®erent
collection of marginal vectors. Potter's value is obtained by considering the sum of an
\average worth" of coalitions.
Similar to the stand-alone recursion of the consensus value for TU games in char-
acteristic function form, we can reformulate the consensus value for partition function
form games by modifying the stand-alone reduced game and de¯ning a corresponding
recursive formula.
Formally, let f : PGN ¡! RN be a solution concept. For any partition function
form game (N;w) and i 2 N, we introduce the game (Nnfig;w¡i) de¯ned by for all










2 if S = Nnfig
and call w¡i the stand-alone reduced game of w with respect to player i.
We say that a solution concept f satis¯es the stand-alone recursion if and only if















w(N;fNg) ¡ w(Nnfig;fNnfigg [ ffigg) + w(fig;fNnfigg [ ffigg)
2
for all i 2 N.
One can readily check that the consensus value is the unique one-point solution
concept on the class of all n-person partition function form games with n ¸ 2 which is
standard for 2-person partition function form games and satis¯es stand-alone recursion.3.4. Characterizations 45
3.4 Characterizations
This section characterizes the consensus value for partition function form games in an
axiomatic way.
De¯nition 3.4.1 In a partition function form game w 2 PGN, two players i and j
are completely symmetric if for all ·Nnfi;jg 2 P(Nnfi;jg) and S 2 ·Nnfi;jg,
w(S[fig;(·Nnfi;jgnS)[ffjgg[fS[figg) = w(S[fjg;(·Nnfi;jgnS)[ffigg[fS[fjgg)
and
w(fig;(·Nnfi;jgnS)[ffigg[fS [fjgg) = w(fjg;(·Nnfi;jgnS)[ffjgg[fS [figg):
De¯nition 3.4.2 In a partition function form game w 2 PGN, player i is a null
player if for all ·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig) and S 2 ·Nnfig,
w(S;·Nnfig [ ffigg) = w(S [ fig;(·NnfignS) [ fS [ figg):
So, a null player always makes zero marginal contributions to any coalition and obtains
zero payo® when standing alone. Moreover, we de¯ne a quasi-null player as follows.
De¯nition 3.4.3 In a game w 2 PGN, player i is a quasi-null player if for all
·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig) and S 2 ·Nnfig such that S 6= ;,
w(S;·Nnfig [ ffigg) = w(S [ fig;(·NnfignS) [ fS [ figg)
and
w(fig;[N]) = 0:
Thus, a quasi-null player i will be a null player if w(fig;·Nnfig [ ffigg) = 0 for all
·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig).
By De¯nition 3.2.3, one can ¯nd that ©i(w) = 0 for all w 2 PGN and for any
quasi-null player i in (N;w), which implies that the Shapley value is not so convinc-
ing: If a quasi-null player can get positive payo®s due to positive externalities, i.e.,
w(fig;·Nnfig [ffigg) > 0 for all ·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig), why would she join the others to
form the grand coalition and obtain zero payo® ¯nally?46 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
In order to ¯nd how much a quasi-null player should obtain, we ¯rst introduce the
concept of expected stand-alone value. For a partition function form game w 2 PGN







jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!






jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 2)!
jNj!
w(fjg;[Nn(S [ fig)] [ fS [ figg):
The expected stand-alone value tells us how much a player may obtain in a parti-
tion function form game (N;w) when we focus on the stand-alone side of the game4.
Since we rule out the consideration on coalition values, immediately, a reference point
could be that the value of the grand coalition is equally shared among players, i.e.
w(N;fNg)
jNj . Focusing on stand-alone situations implies that we take externality as the
only determinant. Given a player i 2 N, she has two choices concerning externalities,
either choosing stand-alone and enjoying the externalities from coalitions consisting of
other players or joining some coalitions generating externalities to the players standing
alone. Thus, the second term in the above expression corresponds to the ¯rst choice
and can be understood as player i's expected gain from the externalities of all possible
coalitions without containing i, where the distribution of coalitions is such that any
ordering of the players is equally likely. The last term, corresponding to the second
choice, is player i's expected loss due to joining coalitions, which is expressed as the
other players' gain from the externalities of coalitions containing i.
One can ¯nd that in the case that any player has identical stand-alone payo®s in
a partition function form game, the expected stand-alone value is comparable to the
equal surplus solution for TU games in characteristic function form. Let TUN denote
the set of all TU games in characteristic function form with player set N. The equal




jNj for all v 2 TUN and
for all i 2 N.
4Or directly in some special situations that people have no information about the values of coali-
tions but only know players' stand-alone values and the value of the grand coalition, we then could
get such a sharing rule, which is actually an equal-surplus-solution style value in partition function
form games.3.4. Characterizations 47
Proposition 3.4.4 For a game w 2 PGN, if w(fig;fSg [ [Nn(S [ fig)] [ ffigg) =







for all i 2 N.
Proof. By the de¯nition of the expected stand-alone value and since w(fig;fSg [




jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!




















jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 2)!
jNj!






Hence, what remains is obvious.
Therefore, the equal surplus solution E for TU games in characteristic function














for all v 2 TUN and for all i 2 N. Here, the second term is the expected gain as being
a stand-alone player while the last term is the expected loss due to joining coalitions.
Let f : PGN ¡! RN be a one-point solution concept. We consider the following
properties.48 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
² E±ciency:
P
i2N fi(w) = w(N;fNg) for all w 2 PGN;
² Complete symmetry: fi(w) = fj(w) for all w 2 PGN, and for all completely
symmetric players i;j in (N;w);





for all w 2 PGN and for any quasi-null player i in (N;w);
² Additivity: f(w1 + w2) = f(w1) + f(w2) for all w1;w2 2 PGN, where w1 + w2 is
de¯ned by (w1 + w2)(S;·) = w1(S;·) + w2(S;·) for every (S;·) 2 E(N).
The properties of e±ciency, complete symmetry, and additivity are clear by them-
selves. Here, it is necessary to stress the new property: the quasi-null player property.
Let us ¯rst discuss the marginal quasi-null player property that assigns zero payo®
to a quasi-null player, which is implicitly speci¯ed by the Shapley value introduced by
Pham Do and Norde (2002). Requiring a solution concept for partition function form
games satisfying both e±ciency and this marginal quasi-null player property seems
inappropriate. For instance, a quasi-null player i who may obtain positive payo® due
to the positive externality from coalition Nnfig has to accept zero payo® in the game
according to this marginal quasi-null player property. Then, it is hard to imagine that
player i could have any incentive to join the grand coalition. As a consequence, it is
di±cult to justify the e±ciency axiom. More generally, the players who may enjoy
extremely high positive externalities from other coalitions will choose stand-alone as
those e®ects are not well re°ected by the solution concepts that adopt a marginal
contribution approach. So, the externality has to be taken into consideration.
As we know, the marginal quasi-null player property favors coalitions while it
biases against the outside individuals. In order to give a fair treatment to both sides,
we have to balance the coalition e®ect and the externality e®ect. More speci¯cally, to
assign a quasi-null player 0 or ei(w) can be viewed as consequences of two contrastive
viewpoints. Concerning the tradeo® between these two extreme opinions5, an impartial
decision could be choosing the average as the gain of a quasi-null player, which results
in the so-called quasi-null player property.
5Cultural and philosophical factors may a®ect the propensity or choice between the two extreme
opinions.3.4. Characterizations 49
In addition, one can see that a null player, as a special quasi-null player, could
still get positive worth as long as her expected loss from externalities is less than the
average value
w(N;fNg)
jNj . This observation implies that the quasi-null player property
also has the °avor of egalitarianism or collectivism. The justi¯cation is similar to that
for the consensus value for TU games in characteristic function form in Ju, Borm and
Ruys (2004).
It is shown that the consensus value is the unique function that satis¯es these four
properties.
Theorem 3.4.5 The consensus value satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the quasi-
null player property and additivity.
Proof.
(i) E±ciency: Clearly, by construction, s¾(w) is e±cient for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(ii) Complete symmetry: Let i;j be two completely symmetric players in a partition
function form game w 2 PGN. Consider ¾ 2 ¦(N), and without loss of generality,
¾(k) = i, ¾(l) = j, where i;j 2 N. Let ¹ ¾ 2 ¦(N) be the permutation which is





¾(m) if m 6= k;l
i if m = l
j if m = k
As ¾ 7! ¹ ¾ is bijective, it su±ces to prove that s¾
i (w) = s¹ ¾
j(w).
Case 1: 1 < k < l.
By de¯nition, we know
s
¾



















































k¡1 = S¹ ¾
k¡1, and apparently w(S¾
k¡1;·¾
k¡1) = w(S¹ ¾
k¡1;·¹ ¾
k¡1). It remains to show that
r(S¾
k) = r(S¹ ¾
k).
Clearly, r(S¾
m) = r(S¹ ¾
m) for m ¸ l. Recursively, we can show that r(S¾
l¡t) = r(S¹ ¾
l¡t) for

















l¡t) ¡ w(f¾(l ¡ t + 1)g;·
¾
l¡t)























Here, since ¾(l ¡ t) = ¹ ¾(l ¡ t) and S¾
l¡tnfig = S¹ ¾
l¡tnfjg, by complete symmetry, we
know w(S¾
l¡t;·¾
l¡t) = w(S¹ ¾
l¡t;·¹ ¾
l¡t).
Then, it immediately follows that r(S¾











































Case 2: 1 < l < k. The proof is analogous to Case 1.













¹ ¾(1)(w) = r(S
¹ ¾
1):
What remains is identical to Case 1.
Case 4: 1 = l < k. The proof is analogous to Case 3.




¾(k)(w2) for all w1;w2 2 PGN and for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
(iv) The quasi-null player property: By de¯nition, we know for a partition function













































































































l ) ¡ w(f¾(l + 1)g;·¾
l )) if 1 · k · jNj ¡ 1:
Let player i 2 N be a quasi-null player in game w. Let ¾(k) = i. Then, by de¯nition,
this quasi-null player's individual standardized remainders in ¾, s¾









































































































































































> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
1
2w(fig;·¾















k¡1) if 2 · k · jNj ¡ 1
r(S¾
1) if k = 1:
Consider a class P of jNj permutations ¾ 2 ¦(N) such that for ¾;¿ 2 P it holds that






That is, given an ordering of the players Nnfig, let quasi-null player i move from the
end to the beginning without changing the other players' relative positions. Summing



























































































jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!








jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 2)!
jNj!





Before proving the uniqueness of the consensus value, we ¯rst check the relationship
between the consensus value and the Shapley value for partition function form games
de¯ned by Pham Do and Norde (2002). Since the Shapley value assigns zero worth to
a quasi-null player, one can see that the quasi-null player property can be reformulated
as fi(w) = 1
2©i(w) + 1
2ei(w) for all w 2 PGN and quasi-null player i in (N;w). In
fact, interestingly, introducing this property in°uences all the players in the same way:
Each player ¯nally gets an average of her Shapley value and the expected stand-alone
value. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.6 The consensus value is the average of the Shapley value and the ex-








Proof. Similar to part (iv) in the proof for Theorem 3.4.5, one can show that for











i (w) + ei(w)
1
A
for all i 2 N.54 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
In order to prove6 that the consensus value is the unique solution that satis¯es
e±ciency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity, one needs
to consider the \standard" basis of partition function form games. Let E0(N) be the
set of all (S;·) 2 E(N) such that S 6= ;. That is, E0(N) = f(S;·) 2 E(N) : S 6= ;g.





1 if (S0;·0) = (S;·)
0 otherwise:
We call ±(S;·) the Dirac game with respect to (S;·). One can see that the set of all
Dirac games,
©
±(S;·) : (S;·) 2 E0(N)
ª
, forms a basis of partition function form games.










Lemma 3.4.7 Let c 2 R, (S;·) 2 E0(N) and i = 2 S, and f be a solution on PGN


















if S(·;i) = fig;







c if (S0;·0) = (S;·)
c if (S0;·0) = (S [ fig;(·nS) [ fS [ figg)
0 otherwise:
Proof. Let c 2 R, (S;·) 2 E0(N) and i = 2 S.
Case 1: S(·;i) 6= fig. Here, one can readily verify that i is a quasi-null player of game










Case 2: S(·;i) = fig. Since we can write w = c±(S;·) + c±(S[fig;(·nS)[fS[figg), and
i is a quasi-null player in w, by additivity and the quasi-null player property, we
have fi(w) = 1



















6We want to note that the proof for the uniqueness is in the same line as Fujinaka (2004).3.4. Characterizations 55
Theorem 3.4.8 There is a unique solution on PGN satisfying e±ciency, complete
symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. This solution is the consensus
value.
Proof. From Theorem 3.4.5, it follows that the consensus value ° satis¯es e±ciency,
complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity.
Conversely, suppose a solution concept f satis¯es these four properties. We have
to show that f = °. By additivity, it su±ces to show that for any c 2 R and any













is de¯ned as follows. If S 6= N and












if jSj = 1
0 otherwise;
for all i 2 N because all players are quasi-null players; if · = fSg [ [NnS], by Theo-












2 ¢ c ¢
(jSj¡1)!(jNj¡jSj)!





































= jNj, then c±(S;·) = c±(N;fN;fNgg). One can readily check that for all










jNj. E±ciency and complete














. We then complete the ¯rst step for the induction argument.
















































. Let i = 2 S, there
are two cases:






















= 0 = °i
¡
c±(S;·)
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. Let i 2 S.




= 0 and all players in S are completely

































































































k!(jNj ¡ k ¡ 1)!
jNj!
:













































































2 ¢ c ¢
k!(jNj¡k¡1)!
jNj! and all players in S are completely symmetric in c±(S;·), by e±ciency and


































We now provide an alternative characterization for the consensus value by means
of the transfer property, which is in the same spirit as that for the Shapley value for
the case of TU games in characteristic function form (cf. Feltkamp (1995)).
The transfer property, introduced by Dubey (1975), that in some sense substi-
tutes for additivity, is de¯ned as follows. For any two partition function form games
w1;w2 2 PGN, we ¯rst de¯ne the games (w1 _w2) and (w1 ^w2) by (w1 _w2)(S;·) =
maxfw1(S;·);w2(S;·)g and (w1 ^ w2)(S;·) = minfw1(S;·);w2(S;·)g for all S 2 ·
and · 2 P(N). Let f : PGN ¡! RN be a solution concept on the class of partition
function form games. Then, f satis¯es the transfer property if f(w1_w2)+f(w1^w2) =
f(w1) + f(w2) for all w1;w2 2 PGN.
In order to characterize the consensus value on the class of all partition function
form games by the transfer property, we need the following lemma. Here, the zero
game in PGN that is de¯ned by w(S;·) = 0 for all (S;·) 2 E(N) is denoted by 0.58 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
Lemma 3.4.9 Let f be a solution on PGN satisfying the transfer property, with7





Proof. We prove in three steps that equation (3.1) holds.
Step 1: For the class of all non-negative games w the proof is by induction on
k(w) := jfSj(S;·) 2 E(N) and w(S;·) > 0gj:
Here, a game w is non-negative if w(S;·) ¸ 0 for all (S;·) 2 E(N).
If k(w) = 0, then w = 0, so f(w) = 0 =
P
(S;·)2E0(N) f(w(S;·)±(S;·)).
Take k > 0 and suppose equation (3.1) holds for all non-negative games w with
k(w) < k. For a non-negative game w with k(w) = k, choose an embedded coalition
(S0;·0) 2 E(N) such that w(S0;·0) > 0. Then k(w ¡ w(S0;·0)±(S0;·0)) = k ¡ 1, (w ¡
w(S0;·0)±(S0;·0))_(w(S0;·0)±(S0;·0)) = w and (w¡w(S0;·0)±(S0;·0))^(w(S0;·0)±(S0;·0)) = 0.
Hence, using the induction hypothesis and the transfer property, we obtain




























Step 2: For non-positive games one proves analogously (interchanging the operations
^ and _) that equation (3.1) holds.
Step 3: For an arbitrary game w, split the game into its non-negative part v _ 0 and
its non-positive part v ^ 0. The transfer property and steps 1 and 2 imply
f(w) = f(w) + f(0)









7Note that f(0) = 0 is a weak requirement because any solution concept satisfying e±ciency and
(complete) symmetry yields this outcome.3.4. Characterizations 59
Hence equation (3.1) holds for all partition function form games.
Note that the converse is also true: If a solution concept f on PGN satis¯es
equation (3.1) for all games w 2 PGN, then f satis¯es the transfer property and
f(0) = 0.
Below we introduce a lemma which is similar to Lemma 3.4.7.
Lemma 3.4.10 Let c 2 R, (S;·) 2 E0(N) and i = 2 S, and f be a solution on PGN



















if S(·;i) = fig;
where w is de¯ned in Lemma 3.4.7.
Proof. Let c 2 R, (S;·) 2 E0(N) and i = 2 S. The proof is the same as that for
Lemma 3.4.7 except for the case when S(·;i) = fig. Since here we can write w =
c±(S;·) _ c±(S[fig;(·nS)[fS[figg), by the transfer property, we have
f(c±(S;·) _ c±(S[fig;(·nS)[fS[figg)) + f(c±(S;·) ^ c±(S[fig;(·nS)[fS[figg))
= f(w) + f(0)
= f(c±(S;·)) + f(c±(S[fig;(·nS)[fS[figg)):








. Moreover, since i is a quasi-null












Using Lemma 3.4.9 and Lemma 3.4.10, we now prove the following.
Theorem 3.4.11 The consensus value is the only one-point solution on the class of
partition function form games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi-null player
property and the transfer property.
Proof. First of all, we claim that a solution concept f : PGN ¡! RN satisfying
additivity on PGN also satis¯es the transfer property on PGN. To prove this, take
w1;w2 2 PGN. Then, using additivity,
f(w1 _ w2) + f(w1 ^ w2) = f(w1 _ w2 + w1 ^ w2)
= f(w1 + w2)
= f(w1) + f(w2):60 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
Therefore, the consensus value satis¯es the transfer property.
By Lemma 3.4.10 and using the same technique in the proof for Theorem 3.4.8,
one can readily see that requiring a solution concept f : PGN ¡! RN to satisfy e±-
ciency, complete symmetry, and the quasi-null player property, it easily follows that f is
uniquely determined for (multiples of) Dirac games. Moreover, based on Lemma 3.4.9,
we know that a solution f satisfying the transfer property is uniquely determined for
any game in PGN, since the class of Dirac games forms a basis of PGN.
Similarly, we can characterize the Shapley value for partition function form games
introduced by Pham Do and Norde (2002) by means of this transfer property.
Theorem 3.4.12 The Shapley value is the only one-point solution on the class of par-
tition function form games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the null player property
(or the marginal quasi-null player property) and the transfer property.
One may notice that a nice feature of the consensus value for partition function
form games lies in the individual rationality.
First, we de¯ne superadditivity for partition function form games. A partition
function form game w 2 PGN is called superadditive if it satis¯es
w(S [ T;fS [ Tg [ ·Nn(S[T)) ¸ w(S;fSg [ fTg [ ·Nn(S[T))
+ w(T;fSg [ fTg [ ·Nn(S[T))
for all S;T ½ N and ·Nn(S[T) 2 P(Nn(S [ T)) with S \ T = ;.
Theorem 3.4.13 If a partition function form game w 2 PGN is superadditive and
with nonnegative externalities on individual players, i.e. w(fig;·Nnfig) ¸ w(fig;[N])
for all i 2 N and ·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig), then the consensus value satis¯es individual
rationality, that is, °i(w) ¸ w(fig;[N]) for all i 2 N.
Proof. By De¯nition 3.3.1, it is easy to see that in any superadditive game with
nonnegative externalities on individual players, the individual standardized remainder
s¾
i (w) is greater than or equal to the stand-alone value w(fig;[N]) for all i 2 N and
¾ 2 ¦(N).
This is a very reasonable property. However, not all solution concepts satisfy it.
See the following example where the game is taken from Cornet (1998).3.5. A generalization of the consensus value 61
Example 3.4.14 Let the game (N;w) be given by N = f1;2;3g and
¹ w(1;2;3) = (0;0;0);
¹ w(12;3) = (0;3); ¹ w(13;2) = (0;3); ¹ w(23;1) = (3;0);
¹ w(123) = (4):
As the game is superadditive and with nonnegative externalities on individual players,
the consensus value satis¯es individual rationality. Indeed, one can check that the con-
sensus value of this game °(w) = (1
3; 11
6 ; 11
6 ), which coincides with the Shapley value
de¯ned by Pham Do and Norde (2002) in this game, is greater than (0;0;0). However,
the Myerson value is (¡5
3; 17
6 ; 17
6 ); the Feldman value as well as the Bolger's and Pot-
ter's value are (¡1
6; 25
12; 25




3.5 A generalization of the consensus value
By relaxing the way of sharing remainders, we get a generalization of the consensus
value: the generalized consensus value, which is in the same spirit as section 4 of
chapter 2.
We de¯ne the generalized remainder, with respect to an order ¾ 2 ¦(N), for given







w(N;fNg) if k = jNj
w(S¾
k;·¾




k) ¡ w(f¾(k + 1)g;·¾
k)) if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g:
The generalized remainder is the value left for S¾
k after allocating surplus to later
entrants NnS¾
k according to share parameter µ. Correspondingly, the individual gen-
eralized remainder vector s¾

















if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
rµ(S¾
1) if k = 1:
De¯nition 3.5.1 For any w 2 PGN, the generalized consensus value, °µ(w), µ 2








µ(w):62 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
Note that the consensus value corresponds to the case µ = 1
2.
As mentioned in section 4, dependent on the degree to which that the coalition
e®ect or externality e®ect is preferred by a society, the quasi-null player property
can be generalized. De¯ning the µ-quasi-null player property of a one-point solution
concept f : PGN ¡! RN by fi(w) = (1¡µ)ei(w) for all w 2 PGN and any quasi-null
player i 2 N for w, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.2 For µ 2 [0;1]:
(a) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique one-point solution concept on
PGN that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the µ-quasi-null player property and
additivity.
(b) For any w 2 PGN, it holds that
°µ(w) = µ©(w) + (1 ¡ µ)e(w)
(c) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique one-point solution concept on
PGN that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the µ-quasi-null player property and
the transfer property.
Proof. Following the same way to prove Theorem 3.4.5, Theorem 3.4.6, Theorem 3.4.8,
and Theorem 3.4.11, it is easily established.
In particular, for µ = 1, the generalized consensus value is the Shapley value de¯ned
by Pham Do and Norde (2002); for µ = 0, the generalized consensus value equals the
expected stand-alone value.
Corollary 3.5.3 (a) The expected stand-alone value is the unique one-point solution
concept on PGN that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the 0-quasi-null player
property and additivity.
(b) The expected stand-alone value is the unique one-point solution concept on PGN
that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the 0-quasi-null player property and the
transfer property.
The proof is omitted as it is obvious.
The idea of de¯ning the consensus value can also be adapted. If taking the size of
the incumbent party S into consideration, we can argue on a basis of a proportional3.6. Some applications of the consensus value 63
principle that given an ordering of players the entrant should get 1
jSj+1 of the joint
surplus while the incumbents get a share of
jSj
jSj+1, which results in another solution
concept, namely, the coalition-size-based consensus value for partition function form
games.
3.6 Some applications of the consensus value
3.6.1 Application to oligopoly games
Along the same line as Pham Do and Norde (2002), this section ¯rst applies the
consensus value to oligopoly games in partition function form.
Let us focus on a linear oligopoly market of a homogeneous good with asymmetric
costs, no ¯xed costs and no capacity constraints. Such an oligopoly is de¯ned by the
vector (b;c) 2 R
n+1
+ , where b > 0 is the intercept of the inverse demand function,
c = (c1;c2;:::;cn) ¸ 0 is the marginal cost vector. Without loss of generality, assume





n+1 > cn. Note that this assumption is equivalent to the
requirement of positive market shares at the equilibrium for all players (Zhao (2001)).
For each supply (input) vector x = (x1;x2;:::;xn), the price is p(x) = b ¡
Pn
i=1 xi,
whereas player i's cost and pro¯t (payo®) are Ci(xi) = cixi and








respectively. Player i's reaction curve is implicitly de¯ned by the ¯rst order condition:
@¼i(x)
@xi
= p(x) ¡ xi ¡ ci = 0; or xi =





A Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a vector such that each player's action xi is a best
response to the complementary choice x¡i = (x1;:::;xi¡1;xi+1;:::;xn). This equilibrium
is graphically the intersection point of all reaction curves and algebraically the solution

















(b ¡ n ¢ ci +
P
j6=i cj)2
(n + 1)2 :64 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
Now suppose that after su±cient communication, some players may agree to coop-
erate (for example, players intend to adjust negative externalities which are caused by
decreasing returns to inputs). In such a situation a coalition structure might form, in
which, however, the payo® of coalition S depends on the behavior of the players outside
S, and visa versa. Notice that the payo® for coalition S under one coalition structure
is di®erent from that under another coalition structure if the number of coalitions is
di®erent. Assume that the marginal cost of coalition S is cS = mini2Sci, that is, the
most e±cient technology in a coalition can be costlessly adopted by all players in that
coalition. Moreover, if a coalition structure · = fS1;:::;Skg is formed, then, in equi-
librium each coalition S in · will choose the total (input) quantity levels to maximize
the sum of its members' pro¯ts, given the total inputs of the other coalitions in ·.
Let xSj =
P
i2Sj xi denote the total input level for a coalition Sj and ¼Sj(x) denote
the pro¯t of coalition Sj under coalition structure ·,








Coalition Sj's reaction curve under coalition structure · is also implicitly de¯ned by
the ¯rst order condition:
@¼Sj(x)
@xSj
= p(x) ¡ xSj ¡ cSj = 0; or xSj =





The unique equilibrium under coalition structure · with quantities x¤ = (x¤
S1;:::;x¤
Sk),











(b ¡ k ¢ cSj +
P
i6=j cSi)2
(k + 1)2 :
The oligopoly game in partition function form (N;w) is determined for every (Sj;·)
by w(Sj;·) = ¼Sj(x¤), where x¤ is the equilibrium vector under coalition structure ·.
To get further illustration of how the consensus value can be used we specify the
3-person oligopoly game in partition function form (N;w). The partition function
form game is given by ¹ w(1;2;3) = (a1;a2;a3), ¹ w(12;3) = (a12;b3), ¹ w(13;2) = (a13;b2),3.6. Some applications of the consensus value 65
















































Given the ordering of marginal costs, one can easily see that a1 ¸ a2 ¸ a3, and
a12 ¸ a13 = b1 ¸ a23 = b2 ¸ b3.








2a1 ¡ a2 ¡ a3 +










2a2 ¡ a1 ¡ a3 +









(2a3 ¡ a1 ¡ a2 + b3 ¡ a12):
Note that if players have identical costs, then a1 = a2 = a3 and a12 = a13 = a23 =




Consider the following example for further illustration.
Example 3.6.1 The game (cf. Pham Do and Norde (2002)) in partition function
form (N;w) associated with a linear oligopoly market (b;c), where b = 20, c = (1;3;4),
is given by
¹ w(1;2;3) = (36;16;9);
¹ w(12;3) = (53:78;18:78); ¹ w(13;2) = (49;25); ¹ w(23;1) = (25;49);
¹ w(123) = (90:25):
The consensus value for this game is °(w) = (46:833;24:833;18:583), whereas the
Shapley value is ©(w) = (46:70;24:71;18:83).66 CHAPTER 3. VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
3.6.2 Free-rider, sharing rule and participation incentive
Since the partition function form games can well capture externalities, they provide
a suitable framework to analyse the associated issues such as the free-rider problem.
Below we will investigate the e®ects of di®erent solution concepts on the participation
incentives of the players who may free-ride in a game.
Consider the following partition function form game (N;w) (we may call it a
free-rider game) de¯ned by ¹ w(1;2;3) = (0;0;0), ¹ w(12;3) = (1;1), ¹ w(13;2) = (1;1),
¹ w(23;1) = (0;0), ¹ w(123) = 1. This game can be interpreted as follows: Three players
are considering to set up a joint project. Each player has two choices: participate
or stand by. The success of the project depends on the players' participation. Here,
obviously, player 2 and 3 are possible free-riders.
Since both player 2 and 3 are prone to standing by, it is very likely that the project
will fail in the end. Thus, everybody becomes a loser due to their \sel¯sh rationality".
Given the di®erent sharing rules, which one is better for increasing the possible free-
riders' incentive to contribute instead of standing idle? We now check the following
solution concepts and compare their in°uences on players' choices.
1 2 3


















Now we ¯rst discuss the e®ect of the Shapley value on the free-riders's participation
incentive. Given the Shapley value as the solution concept for the above game, we know
the three players will play the following strategic game.
If player 1 chooses participating, the payo® matrix is provided as below. (Here,
the payo®s in each cell are listed in the order of player 1, 2 and 3.)








2 stand by 1
2;1; 1
2 0;0;0
While if player 1 chooses standing by, all of them will get zero payo® no matter
what strategies player 2 and 3 will choose.
3 participate 3 stand by
2 participate 0;0;0 0;0;0
2 stand by 0;0;0 0;0;03.6. Some applications of the consensus value 67
So, obviously, choosing participating is the weakly dominant strategy for player 1.
One can easily check this game has three pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (1 stands by, 2
stands by, 3 stands by), (1 participates, 2 participates, 3 stands by) and (1 participates,
2 stands by, 3 participates); and another equilibrium which involves mixed strategies
of players 2 and 3: (1 participates, 2 participates with probability 3
8 and stands by
with probability 5
8, 3 participates with probability 3
8 and stands by with probability
5
8). We may call such an equilibrium semi mixed-strategy equilibrium as player 1 still
plays a pure strategy.
Similarly, one can check the results due to the implementation of the values by
Bolger, Feldman or Potter. The corresponding three pure-strategy equilibria are the
same as above, while the third equilibrium is di®erent: (1 participates, 2 participates
with probability 2
5 and stands by with probability 3
5, 3 participates with probability 2
5
and stands by with probability 3
5).
Now we check the consensus value in this game. Despite the fact that the three
pure-strategy equilibria are the same as above, the semi mixed-strategy equilibrium
is di®erent: (1 participates, 2 participates with probability 3
7 and stands by with
probability 4
7, 3 participates with probability 3





8; and the corresponding expected payo® due to the consensus
value is also greater than the others: 1 8
49 > 1 3
25 > 1 5
64.
Therefore, from the semi mixed-strategy equilibrium, we can see that the consensus
value helps to increase the participation incentives of the possible free-riders.Chapter 4




This chapter1 has two aims. Firstly, it develops a general framework for studying a class
of economic environments in which coalitions of agents are optimally reassigned to some
bundles of projects: project-allocation situations. Secondly, since this reassignment
causes some agents losing jobs or positions, we analyse the problems associated with
valuating such reshu²ing, such as compensation for losses and sharing surpluses arising
from the enhanced e±ciency.
In an economy characterized by changing capabilities and preferences of agents and
changing technology embodied in projects, people need to continuously adapt their po-
sitions to obtain e±ciency. That is how our societies have evolved into prosperity. Ev-
ery change in the production structure requires a reshu²ing of responsibilities, which
is hard or impossible to implement if possible \losers" are not su±ciently compensated
to cooperate. Only when all parties gain from the reassignment, is it a win-win sit-
uation. Examples are abundant. Similarly, when extra pro¯t is generated simply by
cooperation after reshu²ing, a surplus sharing problem occurs.
Obviously, solving the problems of compensation and surplus sharing is essential for
creating and maintaining °exibility and creating e±ciency in an economy. However,
generally speaking, the two concepts are not well distinguished in theoretical research
so that the corresponding practical problems cannot be treated adequately. In a strict
1This chapter is based on Ju, Ruys and Borm (2004).
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sense, compensation refers to a ¯nancial remuneration to an agent for the loss caused
by her being removed from some project. On the other hand, surplus sharing deals with
the extra bene¯ts created by cooperation among agents assigned to some combination
of projects, which bene¯ts are in excess of the sum of individual payo®s. Hence, if
the compensation is not properly distinguished from surplus sharing, some individuals
may lose on the whole after a reshu²ing. Those individuals will strongly oppose and
obstruct such a reshu²ing. If there exists an authority who can impose reassignments
from above, without minding too much about individual sacri¯ces, the overall approach
is su±cient. But even then there are several value concepts available that have a
characteristic in°uence on the outcome. That will be our point of departure.
One may observe that trade unions have forced ¯rms to adopt generic rules for
laborers that include some compensation for lay-o®s in a ¯rm, as well as labor laws
and other safety nets on the macro-level. This chapter focuses on the micro-level.
We assume that gains and losses for every particular situation can be endogenously
speci¯ed and may serve as a basis for the issues of compensation of losses and surplus
sharing.
Consider, for example, a restaurant and a boat company, working independently,
both situated on the shore of the same lake. The restaurant, project A, is operated
by agent 1 who can be understood as a group of managers, waiters and kitchen sta®.
Agent 2, a group of people as well, manages project B, the boat company. They are
considering collaboration and have two proposals. The ¯rst one is simply setting up a
joint lunch-sightseeing program, f1A;2Bg, that will bene¯t both parties. The second
proposal is more involved and induces a reshu²ing of the two projects, i.e. the restau-
rant and the boat company. Since agent 2 has excellent expertise in both travelling
and restaurant management, much more pro¯t will be generated if the restaurant is
also managed by her. The technical possibilities in this situation are represented in
the following diagram.
f1Ag f2Bg f1A;2Bg f1;2A;Bg
5 10 18 26
Note that the two types of cooperation, f1A;2Bg and f1;2A;Bg are di®erent in
nature: the former corresponds to the ¯rst proposal where those two agents have their
own projects and coordinate with each other; the latter can be understood as that
agent 1 renders A to agent 2 and then works with 2 (just on his human capital).
Whereas the ¯rst proposal only entails a surplus sharing problem, the second one is
further complicated by the problem of compensating agent 1 for giving up his access4.1. Introduction 71
or user rights of the restaurant project.
This chapter analyses both the loss compensation and surplus sharing problem
as illustrated by the second proposal in the above example from a cooperative game
theoretic point of view. In our framework, the value of some coalition of agents cru-
cially depends on the involvement of the agents in this coalition in a well-de¯ned set
of projects. The involvement is measured by the notion of an agent's shares in the
projects. That de¯nes a so-called project-allocation situation (in short, P-A situation)
and an associated project-allocation game (in short, P-A game). The value function of
the project-allocation game is derived from the underlying pro¯t functions for every
coalition given a speci¯c share pro¯le of the projects. So, in particular, the value func-
tion of this game can be viewed as a generalization of the neoclassical pro¯t function,
with labor and capital as inputs and with prices given.
Naturally, any speci¯c solution concept for a cooperative TU game may of course
be applied to solve project-allocation games, and implicitly solve the combined loss
compensation and surplus sharing problems. (The combined compensation and surplus
sharing problem corresponding to the second proposal in the above example can be
modelled as a TU game in which v(f1;2g) equals 26, the joint value generated by
the cooperation between agent 1 and agent 2 after agent 1 transferred the restaurant
project to agent 2.) We restrict our attention to two additive one-point solution
concepts: the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the consensus value (cf. chapter 2).
Arguments for the suitability of these rules in this speci¯c context are provided.
However, since P-A games are just a partial abstraction of P-A situations, this
traditional approach is incapable of disentangling all necessary details to adequately
model the basic mechanisms concerning the physical reallocation of projects (loss com-
pensation) and cooperation in joint projects (surplus sharing). In fact, the process to
realize the maximal gain of a coalition is a blackbox. Therefore, in order to make
the framework operational for solving practical problems, one further step has to be
made. By explicitly incorporating an underlying cooperative structure in terms of
project reallocation and cooperation afterwards, we devise two di®erent stages in such
a way that the loss compensation due to project reallocation and the sharing of extra
surplus from cooperation can be clearly and logically distinguished. Hence, this two
stage approach makes voluntary acceptance of a reshu²ing and a bottom up approach
possible, and is even more compelling if reassignment means that agents are laid o®
and have no chance to participate in the bene¯t sharing. For each of the two stages,72 CHAPTER 4. LOSS COMPENSATION AND SURPLUS SHARING
a game is constructed.2 Consistently, the same solution concept is applied to each of
the stage games. Thus, following a general stage approach, also a solution concept for
the combined problem is obtained.
Although there exists some fundamental work that is helpful for our research, it
seems that the problem of compensating losses has largely been ignored in economic
research. The analysis of cost sharing situations (cf. Moulin (1987), Tijs and Branzei
(2002)) and linear production situations (Owen (1975)) is in the same spirit but does
not explicitly discriminate between the problems of surplus sharing and loss compen-
sation. An exception in a somewhat di®erent context is the work on sequencing games
(Curiel et al (1989), Hamers (1995), Klijn (2000)). In this framework, time slots could
be considered as projects. Agents change the initial order (shares or rights on time
slots) into an optimal one so that the individual payo®s are changed and compensation
is needed. Moreover, since joint total costs decrease as well, also the issue of surplus
sharing becomes prominent.
In addition to this section introducing the problem and reviewing the literature
brie°y, the remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section,
we present the main analytical framework by formally introducing project-allocation
situations and de¯ne project-allocation games. Section 3 addresses the possible so-
lution concepts. Section 4 distinguishes stages to explicitly solve the problems of
compensation and surplus sharing in project-allocation situations separately. Section
5 provides an example of public-private partnerships, which indicates an interesting
application of the framework into real economic issues. The ¯nal section concludes the
chapter by discussing the cases that the set of feasible share pro¯les is restricted.
4.2 Project-allocation situations and games
Consider a situation in which there exists a ¯nite set N of agents/players who can
operate a ¯nite set M of projects. We use the word \project" in this chapter in a
very general sense. A project is a speci¯c entity that can be exploited or operated
for some purpose(s) (and mostly for value-creation). It can be a machine, a research
2The combined problem in the above example can be decomposed into two stages. The ¯rst stage
considers project reallocation such that agent 1 only renders his A project to agent 2 but does not
make further cooperation. The second stage may correspond to a new situation: imagine that agent
1 does not have any project while agent 2 has both A and B; now agent 2 would like agent 1 to work
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project, a ¯rm, or a public utility, etc. Generally, a project can either be divisible or
indivisible. A project is divisible if it is capable of being separated into parts and can
be partially operated or owned by some party, without loss of its original function. For
instance, a tree farm as a project can be perfectly divided among agents. Indivisibility
means that for the purpose of value-creation, a project can only be completely owned
or exploited as a whole. A truck is then an indivisible project because it will lose the
basic function if divided into parts. Since divisibility is a context-dependent concept
which may imply physical divisibility, operational divisibility or ownership divisibility,
we have to point out that this chapter focuses on the operational divisibility.
The basic idea of a project-allocation situation is that individual agents from the
set N have received user rights to operate individual projects from the set M. Each
such agent-project combination results in an outcome, called a payo®. Agents may
also cooperate and form a coalition that operates a bundle of projects. Since both
the agents and the projects are specialized, some agent-project combinations may
generate a higher payo® than other combinations. So, for a given assignment of user
rights over agents, each coalition of agents operates a speci¯c bundle of projects, which
generates a payo®. When, however, some coalition would perform better when it is
assigned another bundle of projects, then a feasible reshu²ing of coalitions of agents
may increase the e±ciency of the situation.
This problem of project-allocation is formalized as follows. Each agent receives a
share in each project, which is a real number ½i;k between 0 and 1, indicating3 the
fraction of project k that agent i may use or operate. If the agent has an exclusive
right the share equals 1, and if he has no right on the project his share equals 0. If
the agent has to share rights with other agents in N, and the project is divisible, the
fraction corresponds with the distribution of the project over the agents, satisfying
the feasibility restriction
P
i2N ½i;k · 1. For instance, one agent may own half of a
project, the share is then 0:5. If the project is not divisible and assigned to a coalition
S of agents, then the project is - ¯ctitiously - equally distributed among the agents in
S. So in that case the individual share ½i;k equals 1=jSj, for all i 2 S. This allows for
describing each agent's share in any indivisible project and for solving the problems of
loss compensation and surplus sharing in such cases mathematically. That is, despite
3However, we do not restrict the implications of shares. Put di®erently, we do not give a de¯nite
economic interpretation but only care about how the shares (in a general sense) in projects that
agents have will a®ect cooperation or even determine compensation and surplus sharing. It may have
di®erent meanings in di®erent contexts. For example, it can also represent the ownership/property
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that an indivisible project can not be divided in itself, the value generated from it can
be shared among the agents who jointly own it in some way.
The assignment of individual user rights for operating individual projects to the
agents in N is thus speci¯ed by an N £ M matrix4 ½, called a share pro¯le. The set







½i;k · 1; for all k 2 M
)
(4.1)
A share pro¯le determines feasible agent-project combinations. Feasibility is inte-
grated with technical performance by the following function. The map f½ : 2N ¡! R,
assigning for any share pro¯le ½ in R, to any coalition S in N, a real number - the
payo® - is called the payo® function under share pro¯le ½. So f½(S) is the payo® of
coalition S under share pro¯le ½. An empty coalition has a zero payo®. Specializa-
tion implies that an arbitrary bundle of agent-project combinations may neither be
optimal: other combinations may perform better; nor feasible: according to the given
share pro¯le it may not have access to projects required for a performance, in which
case the payo® equals 0.
Thus, feasible reshu²ing of a share pro¯le is required to obtain optimality or e±-
ciency. For that purpose we de¯ne the concept of a feasible allocation. Let an initial
share pro¯le ½0 in R be given. For any coalition S ½ N, a reallocation of shares
within coalition S is called feasible for S, if the sum of initially allocated shares in
each project to the agents in S equals the sum of the reallocated shares in each cor-
responding project to the agents in S, while the other agents in N keep their initial
shares. So, the set of feasible allocations or feasible share pro¯les for coalition S with

















For notational simplicity, we use F(S) if there is no confusion about ½0. Thus,
feasibility means that agents can re-arrange their shares in projects subject to the
capacity determined by the initial share pro¯le within the coalition they participate
in, without a®ecting the allocations outside the coalition.
Based on the above description, we are able to de¯ne a project-allocation situation.
4Given agent set N of size n and project set M of size m, ½ is in fact an n £ m matrix. We use
N £ M to emphasize that ½ is a matrix associated with an agent set and a project set. The same
explanation applies in cases of other matrices, for instance, when we say that ½S is an S £M matrix.4.2. Project-allocation situations and games 75
De¯nition 4.2.1 A project-allocation situation P(½0) is a tuple (N;M;½0; ff½g½2R),
where N is the set of agents, M is the set of projects, R is the set of share pro¯les,
½0 is the initial share pro¯le, and f½ : 2N ¡! R is the payo® function under a share
pro¯le ½ 2 R.
For analytical convenience, we use the following assumptions at di®erent stages.
Assumption 4.2.2 (continuity)
for any S 2 2N, f½(S) is continuous with respect to the share pro¯le ½ 2 R.
So a small change in the share pro¯le has only a small e®ect on the value distribu-
tion.
Assumption 4.2.3 (no externality among coalitions)
f½1(S) = f½2(S),
for all S 2 2N, whenever ½1
S = ½2
S.
Here ½S is the S £ M submatrix of ½. It follows that the distribution of values
within a coalition is independent from the share pro¯le outside that coalition.
Assumption 4.2.4 (gains from cooperation)
f½(S [ T) ¸ f½(S) + f½(T),
for all ½ 2 R and for all S;T 2 2N with S \ T = ;.
Assumption 4.2.5 (ordinary cooperation)





for all ½1;½2 2 R and for all S 2 2N.
The last assumption means that if a share pro¯le is preferable for a coalition of
players in cooperation, then the corresponding stand-alone situation is also preferable
in terms of the sum of their individual payo®s. It can be understood as a type of
consistency between cooperation and its stand-alone basis.
The class of all project-allocation situations with player set N and project set M
and the payo® functions satisfying the above assumptions is denoted by PASN;M.
The project-allocation situation P(½0) provides room for reshu²ing and optimizing
the initial share pro¯le ½0. This reallocation situation can be described as a TU game,
in which the value of a coalition is de¯ned as the maximal payo® that this coalition
can achieve by means of feasible share pro¯le.76 CHAPTER 4. LOSS COMPENSATION AND SURPLUS SHARING
Given a project-allocation situation P(½0) = (N;M;½0;ff½g½2R) 2 PASN;M, the





for all coalitions S in N with v(;) = 0, is called a project-allocation (P-A) game.
A share pro¯le ½ 2 F(S) with f½(S) = v(S) is called an optimal share pro¯le for
coalition S, denoted by ½¤(S).
The P-A games in this chapter satisfy the following property.
Proposition 4.2.6 Under the Assumptions 4:2:2¡4:2:4, project-allocation games are
superadditive.
Proof. Let P(½0) = (N;M;½0;ff½g½2R) be a project-allocation situation and let the
corresponding P-A game be given by (N;v). We need to show v(S[T) ¸ v(S) + v(T)
for all S;T ½ N with S \ T = ;.
Consider optimal share pro¯les ½¤(S [T), ½¤(S) and ½¤(T) for coalitions S [T, S,
T, respectively. Since S \ T = ;, we can construct a new share pro¯le ~ ½ 2 F(S [ T)
such that ~ ½S = ½¤
S(S) and ~ ½T = ½¤
T(T). Then, by de¯nition and Assumptions 4:2:3
and 4:2:4, we have
v(S [ T) = f
½¤(S[T)(S [ T)
¸ f
~ ½(S [ T)
¸ f





= v(S) + v(T):
4.3 Solution concepts for project-allocation games
In this section, we consider two related solution concepts: the well known Shapley
value © and the consensus value ° (see chapter 2).
When we go over the de¯nition and the properties of the Shapley value, we can
¯nd that it may not be entirely adequate to analyse the project-allocation situations
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Firstly, the Shapley value relies on the basic notion of marginal vectors. Here,
given some ordering of players entering a game, the payo®s are determined by the
marginal contributions, which is not satisfying in a constructive or bargaining type of
physical setting since a later entrant gets the whole surplus. In a superadditive game,
the incumbents will not accept such an arrangement as their contributions are not
re°ected. While if a game is subadditive, the entrant will not accept such a contract.
Apparently, in the practice of a project-allocation situation, a marginal vector is even
harder to implement as it may involve reshu²ing of projects by current incumbents.
Secondly, the dummy property does not seem too imperative in P-A situations.
Rather, this purely utilitarian requirement assigning nothing more than the individual
value to a dummy player may hinder the possible collaborations in a P-A situation.
Payo®s can only be veri¯ed after actual project reallocations. Each agent can be a
dummy player, while no one would like to pay e®ort for nothing. Furthermore, the
balance in tradeo® between utilitarianism and egalitarianism is also critical in real life
situations.
We propose an alternative solution concept for TU games: the consensus value.
This rule follows from a natural and simple idea to share coalition values. For more
information including an axiomatic characterization of this solution concept, we refer
to chapter 2.
One can ¯nd the di®erence between those two values from the following P-A situ-
ation example.
Example 4.3.1 Consider a P-A situation P(½0) = (N;M;½0;ff½g½2R) 2 PASN;M












½(f1g) = 10½1;A + 1½1;B + ½1;A½1;B
f
½(f2g) = 8½2;A + 3½2;B + ½2;A½2;B
f





























































It is easy to see that these payo® functions satisfy Assumptions 4:2:2 ¡ 4:2:5. The
corresponding P-A game is given by
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g f1;2;3g














It is our opinion that the consensus value ¯ts quite well in the reshu²ing process
and the admission structure of the P-A situations. Consider an existing coalition S and
a new entrant i. Ex ante, S is a well formed coalition: they had reallocated projects
with each other and now cooperate well; they also share the joint surplus in some
way. Now, player i would join this coalition. What happens? Obviously, i could not
work with any sub-coalition of S but only with S as a whole since S has already been
formed over there, comparable to the case that two players cooperate. The immediate
(standard) and also a practical solution is then to share the extra revenues from the
cooperation equally between S and i.
However, the approach to model the whole P-A situation as one cooperative game
is not completely satisfying: P-A games do not take all practical features of P-A
situations into account. The underlying process of realizing and allocating the maximal
gain of the grand coalition f½¤(N)(N) starting from the individual payo®s is still a
blackbox.4.4. The two stage approach: compensation and surplus sharing 79
4.4 The two stage approach: compensation and
surplus sharing
We now focus on an underlying process of obtaining and redistributing the maximal
payo® of the grand coalition f½¤(N)(N) in a project-allocation situation P(½0).






(fig); for i = 1;:::;n:
Reallocation of shares not only changes this individual value distribution based on
stand-alone activities, but also the payo® generated by new combinations of coalitions:
the surplus generated by cooperation. For determining the boundaries of individual
compensation, we focus on the stand-alone situations and compare the initial stand-
alone value with the stand-alone value generated by the optimal share distribution5





½¤(N)(fig); for i = 1;:::;n:
If the di®erence (¯¤
i ¡¯0
i ) is positive, it indicates the stand-alone gain from realloca-
tion, which is also the maximal compensation agent i is willing to pay to other agents.
If it is negative, it gives the stand-alone loss from reallocation, which is the minimal
compensation agent i is asking from other agents for agreeing with the reallocation of
shares.
Taking ¯¤ as a watershed, we can distinguish two stages in the reshu²ing process.
The ¯rst stage considers the compensation issue while the second one focuses on surplus
sharing. In order to further illustrate why we take ¯¤ as the critical point and divide
the whole P-A situation into two stages, let us consider the following time line which
might happen in a P-A situation. At time 1, agents with initial share pro¯le ½0 consider
cooperation. Due to various constraints or simply because they are only interested in
the exchanges of projects at this moment, those agents only reallocate shares of projects
to get a better share pro¯le, say, ½¤, in terms of the total welfare of the whole group,
but put other types of cooperation aside. At time 2, based on the new share pro¯le ½¤,
5As noted in section 2, there may exist multiple optimal share pro¯les for N. For simplicity, in
this chapter, we focus the analysis on the cases with a unique optimal share pro¯le. For coalitions we
do not have to impose such a condition because by Assumption 4.2.5 possible multiplicity does not
play a role in the procedure, which will be further explained in this section.80 CHAPTER 4. LOSS COMPENSATION AND SURPLUS SHARING
they are going to work together. Combining those two cases together yields exactly the
same outcome as modelled by the corresponding P-A game. However, in a practical
situation like the above, the two cases should be treated separately. Moreover, even if
we do not explicitly distinguish the two cases based on the time line, one would still
like to clarify the share based contribution from the specialization based contribution,
while the former is related to project reallocation and the latter corresponds to the
cooperation based on a share pro¯le.
² Stage 1: The compensation game (N; ¹ w)
This stage consists of project reallocation towards the optimal share pro¯le ½¤(N)
for the grand coalition N and ¯nally yields ¯¤. To determine agents' true values in this
reallocation stage, we construct a stand-alone game, in which not only the stand-alone
values for the grand coalition are taken into account, but also the stand-alone values
generated by other coalitions. Given a P-A situation P(½0), the stand-alone game
(N;w) is de¯ned by w(S) =
P
i2S f½¤(S)(fig), where ½¤(S) = argmax½2F(S;½0) f½(S).
So, in particular, w(fig) = ¯0




Here, we want to note that w(S) is well de¯ned.
Let P(½0) = (N;M;½0;ff½g½2R) be a project-allocation situation. For a coalition











i2S f½¤2(S)(fig). By Assumption 4:2:5, it
follows that
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Hence, w(S) is well de¯ned.
Proposition 4.4.1 Stand-alone games are superadditive.4.4. The two stage approach: compensation and surplus sharing 81
Proof. Let P(½0) = (N;M;½0;ff½g½2R) be a project-allocation situation and let the
corresponding stand-alone game be given by (N;w). We need to show w(S [ T) ¸
w(S) + w(T) for all S;T ½ N with S \ T = ;.
Let ½¤(S [ T), ½¤(S) and ½¤(T) be the optimal share pro¯les for coalitions S [ T,
S, T, respectively. Let ~ ½ 2 F(S [ T) be such that ~ ½S = ½¤
S(S) and ~ ½T = ½¤
T(T). Then,
we have




























= w(S) + w(T):
Here, the inequality follows from the fact that f½¤(S[T)(S [ T) ¸ f ~ ½(S [ T) and As-
sumption 4:2:5.
In general, ¯¤ 6= ¯0; and apparently, the agents who incurred losses due to project
reallocation need to be compensated. To explicitly determine compensations, we will
consider solutions of the associated compensation game (N; ¹ w) de¯ned by






Note that ¹ w(N) = 0. The speci¯c values of compensation depend on the solution
concept to be chosen, such as the Shapley value ©( ¹ w) or the consensus value °(¹ w).
² Stage 2: The surplus sharing game (N; ¹ !)
This stage considers cooperation after the reallocation in the ¯rst stage, i.e. co-
working on projects based on the optimal share pro¯le ½¤(N). This type of cooperation
yields a co-working game (N;!) de¯ned as the project-allocation game corresponding
to the project-allocation situation where its initial share pro¯le is its optimal share
pro¯le, i.e., (N;M;½¤(N);ff½g½2R).
Proposition 4.4.2 Co-working games are superadditive.82 CHAPTER 4. LOSS COMPENSATION AND SURPLUS SHARING
Proof. Co-working games are superadditive as they are project-allocation games.
Indeed, this game still takes project reallocation into consideration so that agents
are allowed to reallocate shares before joint production. However, the initial share pro-
¯le itself in this situation is the optimal share pro¯le and !(N) = v(N) = f½¤(N)(N),
players do not reallocate projects in the grand coalition any more (although it may
happen in theory within sub-coalitions) but directly work with each other with their
current shares. So no compensation is needed. What entails is only surplus sharing.
For this aspect, we consider solutions of the associated surplus sharing game (N; ¹ !)




It is obvious that the two stage approach decomposes the maximal payo® of the
grand coalition into three elements: v(N) =
P
i2N ¯¤
i + ¹ w(N) + ¹ !(N).
The above description on the two stages in a project-allocation situation implies a
natural and reasonable way to share the maximal payo® f½¤(N)(N). Firstly, an agent
i has her stand-alone value after reallocation, ¯¤
i , due to optimal project reallocation.
In addition, to determine the compensations, one solves the compensation game ¹ w;
and to solve the surplus sharing problem, one solves the surplus sharing game ¹ !. A
player's ¯nal payo® is the sum of these three parts.
Solving both games with the same one-point solution concept yields a (stage-based)




¤ + Ã( ¹ w) + Ã(¹ !)
where Ã : TUN ¡! RN is a one-point solution concept for TU games.
Generally, it will be the case that the immediate application of Ã to the P-A
game v will yield a di®erent solution, i.e., Ã¤(P(½0)) 6= Ã(v). Moreover, we know
for a P-A situation, the corresponding P-A game v is well de¯ned. Therefore, the
application of Ã to v will yield a unique solution no matter which optimal share pro¯le
is adopted and implemented. In contrast to the one stage approach based on the
P-A game, for di®erent optimal share pro¯les, the two stage approach based on the
distinction between compensation for share changes and surplus sharing for joint work
might generate di®erent solutions because there are di®erent surplus sharing games.
Hence, this approach discovers the role of project reallocation in measuring agents'
contributions in P-A situations, which seems consistent with our intuition: based on
di®erent reallocation pro¯les, agents could make di®erent contributions to the value of
the grand coalition, and thereby di®erent rewards are required.4.5. An example: disintegration in the water sector 83
One may wonder under which conditions the equality holds and both the one stage
and the two stage approach give the same result. We require two weak conditions on
Ã, i.e., Ã(0) = 0 and translation invariance Ã(v + b) = Ã(v) + b for all v 2 TUN and
b 2 RN (b is an additive game), and strengthen Assumption 4:2:4 in the following way.
Assumption 4.4.3 f is additive with respect to disjoint coalitions, i.e. f½(S [ T) =
f½(S) + f½(T) for all ½ 2 R and for all S;T ½ N with S \ T = ;.
Now we can show the following.
Proposition 4.4.4 With Assumption 4:4:3, if Ã satis¯es translation invariance and
Ã(0) = 0, then Ã¤
i(P(½0)) = Ãi(v), for all i 2 N, where Ã, P(½0) and v are de¯ned as
above.
Proof. Clearly, Assumption 4:4:3 implies that f½¤(N)(N) =
P
i2N f½¤(N)(fig). Conse-
quently, w(S) = v(S) for all S in N and ¹ !(S) = 0 for all S ½ N. What remains is
obvious: Ã¤(P(½0)) = Ã(v).







i + ©i(¹ w) + ©i(¹ !) for all i 2 N:







i + °i( ¹ w) + °i(¹ !) for all i 2 N:
One may also, in principle, choose a solution concept for the compensation game
that is di®erent from the solution concept for the surplus sharing game.
4.5 An example: disintegration in the water sector
Let us look at an example considering the reform of disintegration and reallocation
in the water sector. In this setting, we have three players N := f1;2;3g: player 1 is
a provincial government, 2 is a local government, and 3 is a company; two projects:
water business (A) and related business (B) such as a golf club or recreation park built84 CHAPTER 4. LOSS COMPENSATION AND SURPLUS SHARING
on the water source land. So, M := fA;Bg. Initially, both projects are owned by the










Unlike the for-pro¯t project B, water business is usually seen as a public utility. So,
the payo® of running the water project can be interpreted as the social welfare instead
of individual pro¯t. Moreover, we assume that the company has speciality in operating
a commercial business while the provincial government may create higher social value
if she controls the water project. However, they do have some relative weaknesses.
For example, the private company is not good at running public utilities. This type
of situation is modelled by the corresponding payo® functions, which are provided in
Example 4:3:1.
Without cooperation, players' individual payo®s come from two parts: the stand-
alone payo®s generated from project A or B and the payo® due to the cross-subsidy
e®ect between the two projects. With cooperation, in addition to players' individual
payo®s, there are some extra gains from cooperation, which, for instance, is expressed






in the payo® function of coalition f2;3g.




































One readily checks that ¯0 := (0;12;0), and ¯¤ = (10;0;5).
Moreover, beside the project-allocation game (N;v) for the whole situation in this
example, we have a compensation game and a surplus sharing game:
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g f1;2;3g
v(S) 0 12 0 19 0 17 27
¹ w(S) ¡10 12 ¡5 3 ¡15 8 0
¹ !(S) 0 0 0 3 8 2 124.6. Discussion: restricted set of feasible share pro¯les 85
The solutions based on the Shapley value or the consensus value can be found in
























































Hence, according to the consensus value, the local government is compensated by
the provincial government and the company with a total amount of 131
6 due to project
reallocation, and obtains 3 1
12 from the joint surplus generated by joint production
based on the new share pro¯le.
4.6 Discussion: restricted set of feasible share pro-
¯les
The above sections deal with the problems of compensating losses and sharing surpluses
in the general project-allocation situations where no restriction is imposed on the set
of share pro¯les. More speci¯cally, the set of feasible share pro¯les plays a crucial role
in determining the games associated with the two stage approach and the combined
approach. Here, according to equation (4.2) and the de¯nitions of those games, given
an initial share pro¯le ½0, any reallocation scheme in F(S) can be carried out.
However, in the real world, there are many cases that the optimal share pro¯le (or
more generally, some pro¯les) can not be implemented to attain e±ciency due to a
number of practical reasons and hence, for instance, a suboptimal reallocation scheme
(or an arbitrary reallocation pro¯le which is available) is popular. We now brie°y
discuss a possible way to model such a situation and apply the two stage approach to
solve the associated loss compensation and surplus sharing problem.
We call F 0(S) ½ F(S) a subset of feasible share pro¯les for coalition S. Given
a project-allocation situation P(½0), we can de¯ne a restricted P-A game (N;v0) by
v0(S) := max½2F0(S) f½(S) for all S ½ N.86 CHAPTER 4. LOSS COMPENSATION AND SURPLUS SHARING
For such cases, one can ¯nd an easy way to reestablish the analysis as above by
de¯ning ½¤(S) = argmax½2F0(S;½0) f½(S).
Here, we want to note that there could exist a special class of restricted set of





f½0(N)g if S = N
F(S;½0) otherwise;
where ½0(N) 2 F(N;½0)nfargmax½2F(N;½0) f½(N)g. Or more directly, sometimes we are
interested in the loss compensation and surplus sharing problem under an arbitrary
reallocation pro¯le ½0(N) (6= ½¤(N)) for the grand coalition which is not optimal. For
such situations, one could simply take ½0(N) as the critical point to separate the two
stages. The compensation game for the ¯rst stage solves the compensation problem
arising from the project reallocation ½0 ! ½0. In the same spirit, the surplus sharing
game for the second stage can be readily constructed.
Finally, we propose a possible way to apply the two stage approach to the P-
A situations where Assumption 4:2:5 is relaxed. That is, with the absence of the








where ½¤ is still the optimal share pro¯le for N, i.e., ½¤ = argmax½2F(N) f½(N). One
may observe that in such cases a stand-alone game could be subadditive. However, it
provides a basis for measuring how much the agents should sacri¯ce for obtaining the
e±ciency in the next stage. The sum of the losses and gains from the two stages plus




This chapter focuses on the issue of externality and the associated compensation prob-
lem. Externalities arise whenever an (economic) agent undertakes an action that has
an e®ect on another agent. When the e®ect turns out to be a cost imposed on the
other agent(s), it is called a negative externality. When agents bene¯t from an activity
in which they are not directly involved, the bene¯t is called a positive externality. An
associated fundamental question in real life is how to compensate the losses incurred
by the negative externalities.
Pigou (1920) suggests a solution that involves intervention by a regulator who
imposes a Pigovian tax. An alternative solution, known as the Coase theorem (Coase
(1960)), involves negotiation between the agents. Coase claims that if transactions
costs are zero and property rights are well de¯ned, agents should be able to negotiate
their way to an e±cient outcome. A third class of solutions, associated with Arrow
(1970), involves setting up a market for the externality. If a ¯rm produces pollution
that harms another ¯rm, then a competitive market for the right to pollute may allow
for an e±cient outcome. In a relatively recent study, Varian (1994) designs the so-
called compensation mechanisms for internalizing externalities which encourage the
¯rms to correctly reveal the costs they impose on the other.
In fact, all solutions and approaches above try and solve the ine±ciency problems
arising from externalities, whereas they can not be viewed as normative answers in
terms of fairness. Put di®erently, one may say that those solutions do provide the
normative answers but from a utilitarian perspective. However, this indicates that the
study of the \general" externality problem is not adequate. In particular, the theories
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can not answer a basic question like how much a household should be compensated by
a polluting ¯rm. Therefore, we are still in search of basic normative solutions which
might serve as benchmarks to determine adequate compensations in environments that
are featured by externalities.
Solving an externality-incurred compensation problem boils down to recommending
solutions for pro¯t/cost sharing problems with externalities. A ¯rst model to solve this
problem was developed by Thrall and Lucas (1963) by the concept of partition function
form games: A partition function assigns a value to each pair consisting of a coalition
and a coalition structure which includes that coalition. Values for such games can be
found in Myerson (1977), Bolger (1986), Feldman (1994), Potter (2000), Pham Do and
Norde (2002), and Ju (2004). For more details, we refer to chapter 3.
However, one may observe that the framework of partition function form games
does not model the externalities among individuals but restrict to speci¯c coalitional
e®ects. The reason is simple: The partition function form games as well as the cooper-
ative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form always assume all
the players in the player set N are present even if they do not form a coalition. Consider
a partition function form game and a player i in this game. What we know about the
values with respect to i has the following three cases only: complete breakdown, i.e.,
all the players in this game do not cooperate with each other; partial cooperation, i.e.,
i participates in some coalition or i stands alone while some other players cooperate;
complete cooperation, i.e., all the players form a grand coalition. In fact, the exter-
nalities among individual players (inter-individual externalities) are \internalized" or
\incorporated" from the very beginning because there is no distinction between the
case when only one player is in the game and the case when all appear.
The task attempted in this chapter is essentially twofold. First, it takes players'
initial situations (no other players, in an absolute stand-alone sense) into account
and constructs a new class of games which model the externalities among individual
players. Second, it discusses several solution concepts which can actually serve as
di®erent benchmarks to solve the compensation issue related to externality problems.
The model of so-called primeval games has a °avor of TU games but is more alike
as the partition function form games in structure. The two basic di®erences from
the classical cooperative games are that primeval games do not consider cooperation,
and primeval games take into account the situations in which only one player exists.
Meanwhile, they also consider all other possible cases where other players appear. In
this way, all possible externalities among players are modelled.5.2. An example: a village with three households 89
We introduce several solution concepts for primeval games: a modi¯cation of the
Shapley value for TU games (Shapley (1953)), the consensus value, and a more context-
speci¯c solution concept: the primeval value. The ¯rst two solution concepts are
axiomatically characterized. Properties of the primeval value and the comparison be-
tween it and the other two values are discussed.
In addition to this section introducing the chapter brie°y, the remaining part pro-
ceeds as follows. The next section presents an example that motivates the approach
and the model. In section 3, we lay out the general model: primeval games. Section
4 de¯nes three solution concepts for primeval games. Section 5 introduces unanim-
ity games for the class of primeval games which facilitates the characterizations of
the solution concepts satisfying the additivity property. The Shapley value and the
consensus value are characterized in an axiomatic way in section 6. Properties of
the primeval value are discussed although it is not characterized in this chapter. By
comparison, it is shown that the primeval value is more appropriate for the class of
primeval games and is therefore easier to be implemented in practice. A generalization
of the consensus value is discussed in section 7. Taking cooperation into consideration,
the ¯nal section brie°y introduces a possible way to connect primeval games with TU
games and suggests some solution concepts.
5.2 An example: a village with three households
Consider an example of three players, a, b, and c. One can assume that they are three
households living in the same district; or more generally, some (economic) agents in a
certain situation. To be more speci¯c, consider the following ¯gure.
slot 1 (a)
slot 2 (b) slot 3 (c)
Figure 5.1: A three-household village
Figure 5.1 can be thought of as a village in a geographic sense, which is divided
into three parts or slots. Each household lives in one slot, as shown above. In the
current structure, without any friendly cooperating behavior or any hostile competing
behavior among them, the utilities of a, b, and c are given as 8, 2 and 2, respectively.90 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
It is quite common that one household may generate positive or negative externali-
ties to the others. For instance, a's utility is not only dependent on a himself, but may
also depend on the activities of b and c. That is, the realization of 8 is the outcome
of every household's activities in the current structure. It could be higher or lower
if some other household were absent or would stop any possible activities that may
generate externalities to a.
Therefore, it is necessary and interesting to go \back" to see the \primeval" situ-
ations of the current structure.
In the case that only household b lives in the village, or equivalently, in the case
that b comes into this village ¯rst while a and c are not present the utility for b would
be 3 instead of 2. This case is described by the second column in the following table.
There are also some other cases, for instance, the ¯fth column implies that when both
a and c live in the village while b is not present, a and c's utilities would be 5 and 1,
respectively. All the other possible cases are provided as well.
(a) (b) (c) (a;b) (a;c) (b;c) (a;b;c)
(5) (3) (2) (8;2) (5;1) (3;0) (8;2;2)
From the above table, one can easily see that a is in fact a bene¯ciary from the ex-
ternality point of view while b is somehow a loser. Naturally, some associated questions
arise: Should b be compensated? If so, how to compensate b? And how much?
5.3 The model: primeval games
To capture all the possibilities of inter-individual externalities and further discuss the
associated compensation problem, we now construct a new model, which has a °avor of
cooperative games, and more appropriately, looks like TU games in partition function
form.
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the ¯nite set of players. A subset S of N, in order to
be distinguished from the usual concept of coalition in cooperative games, is directly
called a group S of individuals (in short, group S). Here, the term of group should be
understood as a neutral concept, which has nothing to do with cooperation or anything
else, but simply means a set of individual players in N.
A pair (i;S) that consists of a player i and a group S of N to which i belongs is
called an embedded player in S. Let E(N) denote the set of embedded players, i.e.
E(N) =
©
(i;S) 2 N £ 2
Nji 2 S
ª
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De¯nition 5.3.1 A mapping
u : E(N) ¡! R
that assigns a real value, u(i;S), to each embedded player (i;S) is an individual-group
function. The ordered pair (N;u) is an individual-group function form game, or a
primeval game1. The set of primeval games with player set N is denoted by PRIN.
The value u(i;S) represents the payo®, or utility, of player i, given all the players
in S come into view (but no cooperation at all) in the absence of any other players.
For a given group S and an individual-group function u, let ¹ u(S) denote the vector
(u(i;S))i2S. We call ¹ u(N) the status quo of a primeval game u; and call u(i;fig) the
Rubinson Crusoe payo® (in short, R-C payo®) of player i in game u.
De¯nition 5.3.2 A solution concept on PRIN is a function f, which associates with
each game (N;u) in PRIN a vector f(N;u) of individual payo®s in RN, i.e.,
f(N;u) = (fi(N;u))i2N 2 R
N:
5.4 Solution concepts
In this section, we introduce several possible solution concepts for primeval games.
5.4.1 The Shapley value
Focusing on one-point solution concepts, one might immediately think of the Shapley
value. We now introduce a modi¯cation of the Shapley value in primeval games.
The idea is based on a general principle that players should not do harm to the
others. If a player's activities do not cause negative e®ect on the others, then he has
no responsibility for the consequences of such activities; otherwise, he must pay for
that as the compensation for the victims. On the other hand, equivalently, if a player's
activities impose positive e®ect on the others, then he has the right to ask them to
pay for that. Meanwhile we need to take the orders that players enter a game into
account and might adopt a practical principle as ¯rst come, ¯rst served. That is, the
player who comes into a game ¯rst should be well protected: Any later entrant must
compensate him if she causes loss on him while he does not have to worry about any
1Since it models inter-individual externalities and aims to solve the associated compensation prob-
lem, an alternative name would be individual externality-compensation game.92 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
possible negative e®ects he could impose on the later entrants, i.e., he has the right
to assume no responsibility for his behavior, irrespective of what consequence it might
cause on the others. Along the same line of reasoning, the second entrant only cares
about the ¯rst player but does not have any responsibility for his successors whereas
all his successors should take care of the ¯rst two entrants' payo®s. More speci¯cally,
given an ordering of players, the early entrants should be well protected such that
the losses due to negative externalities are compensated. Correspondingly, the gains
from positive externalities should be transferred to whom they are produced by. Those
e®ects can be well captured by the so-called marginal values.
The formal de¯nition is provided as follows. For a primeval game u 2 PRIN, we
construct the marginal vector m¾(u), which corresponds to the situation where the
players enter the game one by one in the order ¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(jNj) and where each
player ¾(k) is given the marginal value he creates by entering. Formally, it is the vector

















if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg:
Therefore, player ¾(k) might be involved in four kinds of compensating behavior or
circumstances: compensating the incumbents if he produces negative externalities on
them, being compensated from the incumbents if they bene¯t from his showing up
(i.e., he produces positive externalities on the incumbents), being compensated by the
later entrants if they impose negative externalities on him; paying compensation to
the later entrants if they generate positive externalities on him.












for all t 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
Furthermore, since there is no predetermined ordering of players, we take all pos-
sible permutations into consideration. Thus, the Shapley value ©(u) is de¯ned as the
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Example 5.4.1 Consider the three-household village example.
With ¾ : f1;2;3g ¡! N de¯ned by ¾(1) = b, ¾(2) = a and ¾(3) = c, which is















¾(3)(u)) = u(c;fa;b;cg) + u(b;fa;b;cg)
+ u(a;fa;b;cg) ¡ u(b;fa;bg) ¡ u(a;fa;bg)
= 2 + 2 + 8 ¡ 2 ¡ 8 = 2:





(a b c) 5 5 2
(a c b) 5 6 1
(b a c) 7 3 2
(b c a) 9 3 0
(c a b) 4 6 2
(c b a) 9 1 2






. Thus, in respect of compensation for externalities,
a needs to pay 11
2 to b, and c will pay 1
2 to b.





jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!
Ã
u(i;S [ fig) +
X
j2S
(u(j;S [ fig) ¡ u(j;S))
!
for all i 2 N.
5.4.2 The consensus value
One might oppose the \¯rst come, ¯rst served" idea and rather prefer an equal respon-
sibility based rule. The argument could be as follows: Every player has the right to
enter the game although he could be later. From the bilateral point of view, both par-
ties (the incumbents and the entrant) should be equally responsible for the externality
due to the showing up of the new entrant. Take the village example. In the cases94 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
that player b comes ¯rst, he only takes up slot 2 but has no rights of the other slots.
Suppose player a follows. One possible argument could be as follows. a may deserve
the payo® of 8 as he has the right for slot 1 in any case. Meanwhile we also observe
that b is negatively a®ected. However, not only a but also b should account for the loss
of 1 because it is the outcome of the joint e®ect between a's activities and b's feelings.
An alternative argument could be that the households have the property rights of their
slots. Therefore they equally enjoy the rights to produce externalities on their slots,
irrespective of the timing about entering the village. Then, a 50-50 rule seems more
suitable. Put di®erently and directly, this rule takes a di®erent perspective to de¯ne
the property rights of the externalities, which means that two parties involved should
equally assume the corresponding responsibility.
In order to de¯ne the consensus value for primeval games, we construct the conces-
sion vector C¾(u), which corresponds to the situation where players enter the game u
one by one in an order ¾ 2 ¦(N) and where every new entrant, say ¾(k), ¯rst obtains
the payo® when entering, u(¾(k);S¾
k), and then equally shares with every incumbent
her surplus/loss incurred by the corresponding positive/negative externality imposed
by him, and also equally shares his surplus/loss with all his successors. The word of
concession is used here because players concede to each other and make a compromise
on assuming responsibilities of the externalities.






















Apparently, when a player enters the game u in the very ¯rst place, he has no
concession payo® for the externalities on previous players. Therefore P¾
¾(1)(u) = 0.
Correspondingly, when a player enters a game in the very last place, there is no sub-
sequent externality for him. Hence, S¾
¾(jNj)(u) = 0.
Moreover, the concession payo® from the subsequent externalities for player ¾(k)






25.4. Solution concepts 95
for all k = f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g.





> > > > <
> > > > :
u(¾(1);f¾(1)g) + S¾




¾(k)(u) if k = f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
u(¾(jNj);N) + P¾






> > > > > <
> > > > > :
u(¾(1);N)+u(¾(1);f¾(1)g)





2 if k = f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
u(¾(jNj);N) + P¾
¾(jNj)(u) if k = jNj:






















for all t 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g.








Since basically the concession value is in the same spirit as the consensus value for TU
games (see chapter 2), we might call it the consensus value for primeval games.
Example 5.4.2 Consider the three-household village example.96 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION

































c (u) = u(c;fb;a;cg)
+
(u(b;fb;a;cg) ¡ u(b;fb;ag)) + (u(a;fb;a;cg) ¡ u(a;fb;ag))
2
= 2:





(a b c) 61
2 31
2 2
(a c b) 61
2 4 11
2
(b a c) 71
2 21
2 2
(b c a) 81
2 21
2 1
(c a b) 6 4 2
(c b a) 81
2 11
2 2






. Thus, in respect of compensation for externalities,
a needs to pay 3
4 to b, and c will pay 1
4 to b. Compared to the Shapley value, both a
and c give less compensations to b in this case.
Theorem 5.4.3 The consensus value is the average of the status quo payo® and the








for all i 2 N.
Proof. Given a game u 2 PRIN and ¾ 2 ¦(N), let i = ¾(k), where k 2 f1;2;:::jNjg.5.4. Solution concepts 97
By de¯nition, we know for k 2 f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
C
¾





















































5.4.3 The primeval value
We now propose an alternative solution concept, which is more context-speci¯c and
therefore seems more appropriate for primeval games. The basic idea of this solution
concept is that the losses due to negative externalities should be compensated whereas
the bene¯ts from the positive externalities are enjoyed for free. This is a somehow
general and natural attitude when people face externalities in reality. Thus, the rule
based on this idea might be easy to be accepted and implemented in practice.
The value de¯ned below and corresponding to the above idea can be named as
the chargeable negative (externalities) and free positive (externalities) value. In short
and since we believe that it provides more suitable and practical solution for primeval
games, we may directly call it the primeval value.
For a primeval game u 2 PRIN and an ordering ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg,
we construct the primeval vector B¾(u), which corresponds to the situation where the
players enter the game one by one in the order ¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(jNj) and where each
player ¾(k) compensates the losses of his predecessors but enjoys positive externalities
from his successors freely.
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where a+ = maxf0;ag.
Apparently, when a player enters the game u in the very ¯rst place, he assumes
no responsibility to the others. Therefore L¾
¾(1)(u) = 0. Correspondingly, when a
player enters a game in the very last place, he could not enjoy any subsequent positive
externality from the others. Hence, G¾
¾(jNj)(u) = 0.





> > > > <
> > > > :
u(¾(1);f¾(1)g) + G¾




¾(k)(u) if k 2 f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
u(¾(jNj);N) ¡ L¾
¾(jNj)(u) if k = jNj:
Similar to the consensus value, here one can check that for a primeval game u 2 PRIN






















for all t 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g.








Example 5.4.4 Consider the three-household village example.
With ¾ = (b a c), we get
B
¾
b (u) = u(b;fbg) = 3;
B
¾
a(u) = u(a;fb;ag) ¡ (u(b;fbg) ¡ u(b;fb;ag) = 8 ¡ (3 ¡ 2) = 7;
B
¾
c (u) = u(c;fb;a;cg) = 2:5.5. Unanimity games 99





(a b c) 8 2 2
(a c b) 8 2 2
(b a c) 7 3 2
(b c a) 7 3 2
(c a b) 7 2 3
(c b a) 7 1 4







. Thus, in respect of compensation for exter-
nalities, a needs to pay 1
6 to b and 1
2 to c. Note that in this case c even becomes a
compensation receiver instead of a provider like in the previous two cases. This is due
to the rule that positive externalities are free.
5.5 Unanimity games
This section introduces unanimity games for the class of primeval games as a gener-
alization of unanimity games for the class of TU games. A decomposition theorem is
established, which states that every primeval game can be written in a unique way as
a linear combination of unanimity games.
Recall that the unanimity games f(N;uT)jT 2 2Nnf;gg, where for each T 2





1; if T ½ S
0; otherwise
for all S 2 2N, form a basis for the class of all TU games with player set N. Below we
will de¯ne unanimity games for primeval games.
De¯nition 5.5.1 Let (j;T) 2 E(N) be an embedded player. The unanimity game





1; if j = i and T ½ S
0; otherwise
for every (i;S) 2 E(N).100 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
Example 5.5.2 Consider the three-household village game and denote the player set
with N = f1;2;3g instead of fa;b;cg. The following table gives the values of w(j;T)(i;S)
for all embedded players (j;T) and (i;S).
For saving spaces, we use the following notations. ¿1 = (1;f1g), ¿2 = (2;f2g),
¿3 = (3;f3g), ¿4 = (1;f1;2g), ¿5 = (2;f1;2g), ¿6 = (1;f1;3g), ¿7 = (3;f1;3g), ¿8 =
(2;f2;3g), ¿9 = (3;f2;3g), ¿10 = (1;f1;2;3g), ¿11 = (2;f1;2;3g), ¿12 = (3;f1;2;3g).
(i;S)n(j;T) ¿1 ¿2 ¿3 ¿4 ¿5 ¿6 ¿7 ¿8 ¿9 ¿10 ¿11 ¿12
¿1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿6 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
¿8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
¿9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
¿10 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
¿11 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
¿12 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
We can prove, similar to the case of TU games, that the unanimity games form a
basis for the class of primeval games.
Lemma 5.5.3 If (N;u) is a primeval game, then there exist uniquely determined real





These numbers are given by d(j;T) =
P
(j0;T0):j0=j;T0½T(¡1)jTj¡jT0ju(j0;T 0).
Proof. It su±ces to show for the d(j;T), speci¯ed in the lemma, that u =
P
(j;T)2E(N) d(j;T)w(j;T).5.5. Unanimity games 101


















































1; if S = T 0
0; if S 6= T 0
Therefore, we conclude that
P
(j;T)2E(N) d(j;T)w(j;T)(i;S) = u(i;S) for all (i;S) 2 E(N),
which ¯nishes the proof.
The following example shows the linear expansion of a primeval game (N;u) with
respect to the unanimity games w(j;T).
Example 5.5.4 Consider the primeval game (N;u) in the three-household village ex-
ample. Calculating the numbers d(j;T), we have
d(1;f1g) = 5; d(2;f2g) = 3; d(3;f3g) = 2; d(1;f1;2g) = 3; d(2;f1;2g) = ¡1;
d(1;f1;3g) = 0; d(3;f1;3g) = ¡1; d(2;f2;3g) = 0; d(3;f2;3g) = ¡2;
d(1;f1;2;3g) = 0; d(2;f1;2;3g) = 0; d(3;f1;2;3g) = 3:
Thus, the decomposition of u is given by
u = 5w(1;f1g) + 3w(2;f2g) + 2w(3;f3g) + 3w(1;f1;2g) ¡ w(2;f1;2g) ¡ w(3;f1;3g)
¡ 2w(3;f2;3g) + 3w(3;f1;2;3g):102 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
5.6 Properties and characterizations
This section discusses the possible properties of a solution concept for primeval games,
which are derived from the generally accepted beliefs or speci¯c guide lines applied in
practice. We then provide characterizations using those properties.
As the status quo of a primeval game always exists (in fact, it is the only real
situation that may happen) and we assume that the players have no revenues from
outside of the game, immediately, we have the balanced-budget property for a solution
concept that the sum of all the players' values according to the solution concept can
not be greater than the sum of their status quo payo®s, and should not be less than
that as well (because there is no channel to let the internal payo®s leak outside the
game). For terminological consistency (in the same line as the property for TU games,
etc.) here we still call it the e±ciency property.




i2N u(i;N) for all u 2 PRIN.
A second property is symmetry. For a primeval game (N;u), we say that two
players i;j 2 N are symmetric if for all S ½ Nnfi;jg,
u(i;S [ fig) +
X
k2S




It implies that in terms of total payo®s, the showing up of i has the same e®ect as
that of j for any group of players without i and j.
² Property 2 (Symmetry): fi(u) = fj(u) for all u 2 PRIN, and for all symmetric
players i;j in (N;u).
We now turn to a third property, which focuses on the externality side of a primeval
game.
Given a game u 2 PRIN, a player i 2 N is called an immune player if u(i;S) =
u(i;fig) for all S ½ N and i 2 S. Thus, an immune player is a player who is not
a®ected by the presence of the others.
Given a game u 2 PRIN, a player i 2 N is called an unin°uential player if
u(j;S [fig) = u(j;S) for all S ½ Nnfig and j 2 S. Thus, an unin°uential player is a
player who never a®ects the others.
Given a game u 2 PRIN, a player i 2 N is called a neutral player if it is both an
immune player and an unin°uential player in u.
Here, one can imagine that the third property requires that a neutral player in a
game should get his R-C payo®.5.6. Properties and characterizations 103
² Property 3 (The neutral player property): fi(u) = u(i;fig), for all u 2 PRIN
and for any neutral player i in (N;u).
For any primeval game (N;u), a player i 2 N is called a dummy if
X
j2S




for all S ½ Nnfig.
² Property 4 (The dummy property): fi(u) = u(i;fig), for all u 2 PRIN and for
any dummy player i in (N;u).
We now introduce the following property.
² Property 5 (Additivity): f(u1+u2) = f(u1)+f(u2) for all u1;u2 2 PRIN, where
u1 +u2 is de¯ned by (u1 +u2)(i;S) = u1(i;S)+u2(i;S) for every (i;S) 2 E(N).
Theorem 5.6.1 The Shapley value satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the neutral player
property, the dummy property and additivity.
Proof.
(i) E±ciency: Clearly, by construction, m¾(u) is e±cient for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(ii) Symmetry: Let i1;i2 be two symmetric players in u 2 PRIN. Consider ¾ 2 ¦(N),
and without loss of generality, ¾(k) = i1, ¾(h) = i2, where i1;i2 2 N. Let ¹ ¾ 2 ¦(N)






¾(w) if w 6= k;h
i1 if w = h
i2 if w = k:
As ¾ 7! ¹ ¾ is bijective, it su±ces to prove that m¾
i1(u) = m¹ ¾
i2(u).
Case 1: 1 < k < h.
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Obviously, u(¾(j);S¾
k¡1) = u(¹ ¾(j);S¹ ¾






l=1 u(¹ ¾(l);S¹ ¾
k). Therefore, m¾
i1(u) = m¹ ¾
i2(u).
Case 2: 1 < h < k. The proof is analogous to the above.





¾(1)(u) = u(i1;fi1g) = u(i2;fi2g) = m
¹ ¾
¹ ¾(1)(u) = m
¹ ¾
i2(u):
Case 4: 1 = h < k. Analogously, the proof is easy to be established.
As a consequence, m¾
i1(u) = m¹ ¾
i2(u).
(iii) The neutral player property: If player i is a neutral player in (N;u) then m¾
i (u) =
u(i;fig) for any ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(iv) The dummy property: Obvious.




all u1;u2 2 PRIN and for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
However, the consensus value and the primeval value do not satisfy the dummy
property.
Example 5.6.2 Here, the three-household village game is manipulated into two new
primeval games (N;u1) and (N;u2) with N = fa;b;cg such that player c is a dummy
in game u1 and is a null player2 in game u2.
(a) (b) (c) (a;b) (a;c) (b;c) (a;b;c)
u1 (5) (3) (2) (8;2) (3;4) (4;1) (6;0;6)
u2 (5) (3) (0) (8;2) (3;2) (2;1) (6;0;4)
The solutions for the above two games are given as follows.
©(u1) = (6; 4; 2) ©(u2) = (6; 4; 0)
C(u1) = (6; 2; 4) C(u2) = (6; 2; 2)
³(u1) = (51
2; 2; 41




Theorem 5.6.3 There is a unique solution on PRIN satisfying e±ciency, symmetry,
the dummy property and additivity. This solution is the Shapley value.
2A player is a null player if it is a dummy player and has zero R-C payo®.5.6. Properties and characterizations 105
Proof. From Theorem 5.6.1, it follows that the Shapley value © satis¯es e±ciency,
symmetry, the dummy property and additivity.
Conversely, suppose that a solution concept f satis¯es these four properties. We



















Thus, it su±ces to show that for all (j;T) 2 E(N) and d(j;T) 2 R we have
f(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = ©(d(j;T)w(j;T)):
Let (j;T) 2 E(N) and d(j;T) 2 R. For any i = 2 T, one readily veri¯es that i is a
dummy player of game (N;d(j;T)w(j;T)). Therefore, by the dummy property,
fi(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = ©i(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = 0 for all i = 2 T: (5.1)
Then, for any two players i;k 2 T, we can easily see that i and k are symmetric player
in (N;d(j;T)w(j;T)). By symmetry,
fi(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = fk(d(j;T)w(j;T)) for all i;k 2 T; (5.2)
and similarly,
©i(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = ©k(d(j;T)w(j;T)) for all i;k 2 T: (5.3)
Therefore, e±ciency and (5.1)-(5.3) imply that
fi(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = ©i(d(j;T)w(j;T)) =
1
jTj
d(j;T) for all i 2 T:
Consider the dummy property which takes a marginal contribution perspective and
assigns a dummy player his R-C payo®. As we know, without taking compensation
into account, a dummy player i will get his status quo payo® in game u, i.e., u(i;N).
As u(i;fig) and u(i;N) represent two polar opinions, one may argue that taking the
average could be a fair compromise. Therefore, the so-called quasi dummy property
makes sense.106 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
² Property 6 (The quasi dummy property): fi(u) =
u(i;fig)+u(i;N)
2 , for all u 2 PRIN
and for any dummy player i in (N;u).
Now we introduce the property of adjusted symmetry. Similar to the quasi dummy
property, one may have the following argument. The property of symmetry requires
the same value for symmetric players in a game, which can be denoted as ®(u). Since
symmetric players are not the same, their di®erences should be taken into account.
An immediate and easy way to deal with this problem is to adjust the values by their
status quo payo®s.
² Property 7 (Adjusted symmetry): For any primeval game (N;u), there is an







for all symmetric players i;j 2 N, where ®(u) is called the standard value for
symmetric players in (N;u).
Theorem 5.6.4 The consensus value satis¯es e±ciency, adjusted symmetry, the neu-
tral player property, the quasi dummy property and additivity.
Proof.
(i) E±ciency: Clearly, by construction, C¾(u) is e±cient for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(ii) Adjusted symmetry: By Theorem 5.4.3, the proof is readily established.
(iii) The neutral player property: If player i is a neutral player in (N;u) then C¾
i (u) =
u(i;fig) for any ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(iv) The quasi dummy property: Given a game u 2 PRIN and ¾ 2 ¦(N), let player
i be a dummy player in u and i = ¾(k). By de¯nition, one can readily check that for
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for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
Hence, what remains is obvious.
(v) Additivity: It is immediate, by de¯nition, to see that C¾
¾(k)(u1 +u2) = C¾
¾(k)(u1)+
C¾
¾(k)(u2) for all u1;u2 2 PRIN and for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
Theorem 5.6.5 There is a unique solution on PRIN satisfying e±ciency, adjusted
symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. This solution is the consensus
value.
Proof. From Theorem 5.6.4, it follows that the consensus value C satis¯es e±ciency,
adjusted symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.
Conversely, suppose a solution concept f satis¯es these four properties. We have



















Thus, it su±ces to show that for all (j;T) 2 E(N) and d(j;T) 2 R we have
f(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = C(d(j;T)w(j;T)):
Let (j;T) 2 E(N) and d(j;T) 2 R. For any i = 2 T, one readily veri¯es that i is a
dummy player of game (N;d(j;T)w(j;T)). Therefore, by the quasi dummy property,
fi(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = Ci(d(j;T)w(j;T)) = 0 for all i = 2 T: (5.4)










for all i 2 Tnfjg and some ®C 2 R: (5.6)108 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION








Thus, e±ciency and (5.4)-(5.7) imply that




Before introducing the next property, we ¯rst de¯ne completely symmetric play-
ers. Given a primeval game (N;u), we say that two players i;j 2 N are completely
symmetric if for all S ½ Nnfi;jg,
u(i;S [ fig) = u(j;S [ fjg) and u(i;S [ fjg [ fig) = u(j;S [ fjg [ fig)
and for all k 2 S
u(k;S [ fig) = u(k;S [ fjg):
It is natural to require that two complete symmetric players get the same value
in a primeval game as their emergences generate the same in°uence to other players
while getting the same in°uence from the emergences of the others.
² Property 8 (Complete symmetry): fi(u) = fj(u) for all u 2 PRIN, and for all
completely symmetric players i;j 2 N.
Apparently, the Shapley value and the consensus value satisfy complete symmetry.
Now we discuss another property which pays more attention to the compensation
aspect and therefore seems important in the context of primeval games.
Given a game u 2 PRIN, a player i 2 N is called a harmful player if u(j;S[fig) <
u(j;S) for all S ½ Nnfig and j 2 S. Thus, a harmful player is a player who always
generates negative externalities to others.
Given a game u 2 PRIN, a player i 2 N is called a harmless player if u(j;S[fig) ¸
u(j;S) for all S ½ Nnfig and j 2 S. Thus, a harmless player is a player who never
produces negative externalities to other players.
Given a game u 2 PRIN, a player i 2 N is called an immune-harmful player if it
is both an immune player and a harmful player in u; or is called an immune-harmless
player if it is both an immune player and a harmless player in u.5.6. Properties and characterizations 109
² Property 9 (The immune-harmless player property): fi(u) = u(i;fig), for all
u 2 PRIN and for any immune-harmless player i in (N;u).
Theorem 5.6.6 The primeval value satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the neu-
tral player property and the immune-harmless player property.
Proof.
(i) E±ciency: Clearly, by construction, B¾(u) is e±cient for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(ii) Complete symmetry: Let i1;i2 be two completely symmetric players in u 2 PRIN.
Consider ¾ 2 ¦(N), and without loss of generality, ¾(k) = i1, ¾(h) = i2, where
i1;i2 2 N. Let ¹ ¾ 2 ¦(N) be the permutation which is obtained from ¾ by interchanging





¾(w) if w 6= k;h
i1 if w = h
i2 if w = k:
As ¾ 7! ¹ ¾ is bijective, it su±ces to prove that B¾
i1(u) = B¹ ¾
i2(u).
Case 1: 1 < k < h.
























k) = u(¹ ¾(k);S¹ ¾
k). Moreover, since i1;i2 are completely symmetric
players, L¾
¾(k)(u) = L¹ ¾
¹ ¾(k)(u) and G¾
¾(k)(u) = G¹ ¾
¹ ¾(k)(u). Therefore, B¾
i1(u) = B¹ ¾
i2(u).
Case 2: 1 < h < k. The proof is analogous to the above.





¾(1)(u) = u(¹ ¾(1);f¹ ¾(1)g)+G
¹ ¾
¹ ¾(1)(u) = B
¹ ¾
¹ ¾(1)(u) = B
¹ ¾
i2(u):
Case 4: 1 = h < k. Analogously, the proof is easy to be established.
As a consequence, B¾
i1(u) = B¹ ¾
i2(u).
(iii) The neutral player property: If player i is a neutral player in (N;u) then B¾
i (u) =
u(i;fig) for any ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(iv) The immune-harmless player property: Obvious.
Note that the primeval value does not satisfy symmetry or additivity, as an example
of violating these two properties is easy to be found.110 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
Example 5.6.7 Consider the following two games.
(a) (b) (c) (a;b) (a;c) (b;c) (a;b;c)
u1 (1) (1) (5) (2;3) (2;4) (0;6) (3;4;2)
u2 (6) (4) (7) (10;5) (7;6) (3;6) (11;6;4)













. So players a and b have di®erent primeval
values.
Game u2 is obtained by adding u1 to the three-household village game. The primeval







, which is not equal to the sum of the primeval values of
u1 and the three-household village game.
Comparing the primeval value with the other two solution concepts, one can ¯nd
that the primeval value indeed ¯ts well in the framework of primeval games.
We ¯rst consider the following corollary which discusses the gains of an unin°uential
player according to the primeval value and the Shapley value. The result is consistent
with our intuition: As an unin°uential player, he need not compensate the others while
he could bene¯t from the positive externalities from the others. So, the primeval value
of an unin°uential player is always no less than its Shapley value in a primeval game.
Corollary 5.6.8 For any game u 2 PRIN and any unin°uential player i 2 N, it
holds that
³i(u) ¸ ©i(u) =
X
S½Nnfig
jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!
u(i;S [ fig):
Proof. Given a game u 2 PRIN and let i 2 N be an unin°uential player. Given
¾ 2 ¦(N), let i = ¾(k), it su±ces to show that B¾
i (u) ¸ m¾
i (u). As we know
B
¾




> > > > <
> > > > :
u(i;fig) + G¾
¾(1)(u) if k = 1
u(i;S¾
k) + G¾
¾(k)(u) if k 2 f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
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So, B¾
i (u) ¸ m¾
i (u).
For an immune-harmful player, since he could not get any positive externality but
always does harm to others, he then must pay compensation to the others. So, the
primeval value is equivalent to the Shapley value.
Corollary 5.6.9 For any game u 2 PRIN and any immune-harmful player i 2 N, it
holds that
©i(u) = ³i(u) < Ci(u) < u(i;fig):
Proof. Given ¾ 2 ¦(N), let i = ¾(k) for k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
First, in order to prove ©i(u) = ³i(u), it su±ces to show that m¾
i (u) = B¾
i (u).
Apparently, when k = 1, m¾
i (u) = B¾



















































> 0, we know m¾
i (u) = B¾
i (u) <
u(i;fig) for all k 2 f2;:::;jNjg. Then, ©i(u) = ³i(u) < u(i;fig).


















Corollary 5.6.10 For any game u 2 PRIN and any immune-harmless player i 2 N,
it holds that
©i(u) ¸ Ci(u) ¸ ³i(u) = u(i;fig):112 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
Proof. By de¯nition and analogous to Corollary 5.6.9, the proof is easy to be estab-
lished.
This corollary further describes the appropriateness of the primeval value for solving
the compensation problems in primeval games. Generally, we would expect that an
immune-harmless player obtains his R-C payo®: He does not do anything harmful to
others and then has nothing to do with compensating them. Meanwhile, he need not
any compensation because nobody could a®ect him and his payo® remains the R-C
payo® in all cases. The primeval value is consistent with this belief while the other
two solution concepts may give extra payo® to such a player as they take a di®erent
perspective such that the positive externalities are not free.
Corollary 5.6.11 For any game u 2 PRIN and any harmless player i 2 N with
u(i;N) ¸ u(i;fig), it holds that
³i(u) ¸ u(i;fig):
Proof. For a primeval game u 2 PRIN, let i be a harmless player in u. For an ordering
¾ 2 ¦(N), let i = ¾(k), k 2 f1;:::;jNjg. By de¯nition and since u(i;N) ¸ u(i;fig),
we know G¾
i (u) ¸ 0 if k = 1; L¾





i (u) ¸ u(i;N) ¸ u(i;fig)
for all k 2 f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g. Hence, B¾
i (u) ¸ u(i;fig).
Note that Corollary 5.6.11 can be understood as the property of individual ratio-
nality for harmless players: If a player's presence never does harm to others and his
status quo payo® is greater than his R-C payo®, he should at least get his R-C payo®.
However, the Shapley value and the consensus value do not satisfy this property.
Example 5.6.12 Consider the following game u with three players, a, b and c.
(a) (b) (c) (a;b) (a;c) (b;c) (a;b;c)
(3) (1) (5) (0;1) (0;5) (0;6) (3;1;6)
Here a is a harmless player. His Shapley value is ©a(u) = 21
3 and his consensus value
is Ca(u) = 22
3. Both are less than a's R-C payo® of 3. However, his primeval value is
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5.7 A generalization of the consensus value
By relaxing the way of de¯ning concession, we get a generalization of the consensus
value: the generalized consensus value.
Let u 2 PRIN, we will construct the generalized concession vector C¾(u), which
corresponds to the situation where players enter the game u one by one in an order ¾ 2
¦(N) and where every new entrant, say ¾(k), ¯rst obtains the payo® when entering,
u(¾(k);S¾
k), and then shares the surplus or loss with every incumbent according to
a concession parameter µ 2 [0;1], and also shares his surplus or loss with all his
successors in a consistent way, i.e. according to (1 ¡ µ). That is, µ measures entrants'
rights or responsibilities for the externalities.






























Apparently, when a player enters the game u in the very ¯rst place, he has no
concession payo® for the externalities on previous players. Therefore (P¾
µ )¾(1)(u) =
0. Correspondingly, when a player enters a game in the very last place, there is no
subsequent externality for him. Hence, (S¾
µ )¾(jNj)(u) = 0.
Moreover, the concession payo® from the subsequent externalities for player ¾(k)
can be simpli¯ed as
(S
¾
µ )¾(k)(u) = (1 ¡ µ)(u(¾(k);N) ¡ u(¾(k);S
¾
k))
for all k = f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g.





> > > > <
> > > > :
u(¾(1);f¾(1)g) + (S¾
µ )¾(1)(u) if k = 1
u(¾(k);S¾
k) + (P¾
µ )¾(k)(u) + (S¾
µ )¾(k)(u) if k = f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
u(¾(jNj);N) + (P¾






> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
µu(¾(1);f¾(1)g) + (1 ¡ µ)u(¾(1);N) if k = 1
(P¾
µ )¾(k)(u) + µu(¾(k);S¾
¾(k))
+(1 ¡ µ)u(¾(k);N) if k = f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
u(¾(jNj);N) + (P¾
µ )¾(jNj)(u) if k = jNj:










Example 5.7.1 Consider the three-household village example. Taking µ equal to 2
3,








For a one-point solution concept f : PRIN ¡! RN, de¯ning the µ-dummy property
by fi(u) = (i ¡ µ)u(i;N) + µu(i;fig), for all u 2 PRIN and for any dummy player i
in (N;u); and de¯ning µ-symmetry by there exists an ® 2 R such that
fi(u) = µ® + (1 ¡ µ)u(i;N) and fj(u) = µ® + (1 ¡ µ)u(j;N)
for all u 2 PRIN, and for all symmetric players i;j 2 N, one can readily obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.7.2 For µ 2 [0;1]:
(a) There is a unique solution on PRIN satisfying e±ciency, µ-symmetry, the
µ-dummy property and additivity. This solution is the generalized consensus value.
(b) The generalized concession value is a convex combination of the status quo
payo® and the Shapley value. That is, for any game u 2 PRIN, it holds that
(Cµ)i(u) = (1 ¡ µ)u(i;N) + µ©i(u)
for all i 2 N.5.8. From primeval games to cooperation 115
5.8 From primeval games to cooperation
This section suggests a ¯rst attempt to combine primeval games with TU games.
Here, a major issue is still about the sharing of the joint gains or compensation for
externalities. We introduce the possible situations and the approaches to solve the
associated externality compensation and surplus sharing problems. However, for a
more formal and general analysis, we leave it for future work.
5.8.1 An example: cooperation in the three-household village
To illustrate the possible issues, we consider the three-household village example intro-
duced in the second section, which becomes more complicated by taking cooperative
behavior into account. Imagine that if the three households cooperate they obtain a
joint payo® 20. Then, how to share it among the households a, b, and c?
We may have the following two cases regarding the realization of 20.
² Case 1: Cooperation after the primeval game
This case takes the current structure of the primeval game as a starting point.
That is, a, b, and c, based on their individual values 8, 2, 2, respectively, plan to
cooperate with each other. There could exist many types of cooperation such as
coordination behavior with each other concerning the externalities, working together
for a joint project, and so on. However, we are not interested in the speci¯c types of
cooperation but would focus on the sharing rules of the joint gains. Here, undoubtedly,
the cooperation between two households still may generate externalities to the third
one. Therefore, this case well relates to a partition function form game. Consider the
following table as a numerical example for this case.
(a;b;c) (ab;c) (ac;b) (bc;a) (abc)
(8;2;2) (13;1) (11;3) (4;12) (20)
Figure 5.2: (Case 1) Partition function form cooperation after the primeval game
² Case 2: Cooperation \beyond" the primeval game
Another possible way to get the joint gain of 20 is that those households may
go beyond the primeval game and directly arrive at a cooperating outcome. More
speci¯cally, for instance, in the order of (b;a;c), household b ¯rst enters the village and116 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
gets payo®/utility 3; then a follows and has two options: either directly cooperating
with b and obtaining a joint payo® 12 or standing alone to play the primeval game so
that a gets 8 and b gets 2; ¯nally, c also has two options: either collaborating with b
and a and obtaining the joint value 20 or standing alone so that c gets 1 and fb;ag
together (if they cooperate) get 13 or, if all of them stand alone, c gets 2 while b and
a get 2 and 8, respectively. This situation corresponds to the following table.
a b c a;b a;c b;c a;b;c ab ac bc ab;c ac;b bc;a abc
5 3 2 8;2 5;1 3;0 8;2;2 12 8 5 13;1 11;3 4;12 20
Figure 5.3: (Case 2) Cooperation beyond the primeval game
The obvious next question is how to solve the problems of surplus sharing or com-
pensation for externalities in the presence of cooperation.
5.8.2 Two-stage approach versus combined approach
A two-stage approach is suitable for Case 1. That is, we ¯rst calculate the solution
for the primeval game according to some solution concept; then, solve the associated
partition function form game according to some solution concept; ¯nally, sum up the
two parts and subtract the status quo payo® (because it is calculated twice), which
serves as the ¯nal solution.
This approach has the advantage that it clearly and logically distinguishes the
compensation stage that models the individual externalities and the surplus sharing
stage that models the cooperation and coalitional externalities, which is in the same
spirit as in chapter 4.
To illustrate this approach, consider the consensus value and the Shapley value of
the following example.
Example 5.8.1 The consensus value ° of the partition function form game w which





(a b c) 11 5 4
(a c b) 10 6 4
(b a c) 11 5 4
(b c a) 14 3 3
(c a b) 10 6 4
(c b a) 14 3 35.8. From primeval games to cooperation 117







, which solves the surplus
sharing problem in the cooperation situation. As we know, the primeval value for the







, which solves the externality incurred compensa-








Another possible solution is by the Shapley value. Here, the Shapley value (by Pham























Due to the various possibilities in Case 2, one can imagine that there could also
exist di®erent ways dealing with the corresponding compensation and surplus sharing
problem. Here, we focus on a combined approach which seems suitable for this case.
The term of \combined" means that we take the case as one game3 and apply some
solution concept.
For example, Case 2 can be directly modelled as the following TU game so that we
can calculate the Shapley value.
Example 5.8.2 A TU game derived from Case 2.
a b c ab ac bc abc
5 3 2 12 8 5 20








A more complicated value is the consensus value, which is di®erent from the one
in TU games. Here, we take players' standing alone options as their reservation values
and apply the consensus idea to derive the corresponding solution.
Example 5.8.3 The consensus value
Consider the order of (b;a;c). b ¯rst gets 3. When a enters, b will get 2 due to the
negative externality. However, a can ensure himself with 8. If they cooperate with each
other, 12 will be generated. So, b and a should get 3 and 9, respectively. Finally, c
enters the scene. Without cooperation, coalition fabg can enjoy 13 while c gets 1. So,
3Note that it is not a regular game which we de¯ned previously. Here we do not give formal
de¯nition but only focus on the idea that may handle it.118 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
they should share the joint surplus 6(= 20¡13¡1) equally. Therefore, c gets 4 in the





(a b c) 11 5 4
(a c b) 9 6 5
(b a c) 11 5 4
(b c a) 14 41
2 11
2
(c a b) 9 6 5
(c b a) 14 41
2 11
2








5.8.3 An application: externality, e±ciency, and compensa-
tion
Based on the above discussion, we now apply the approaches to solve the compensation
problem in an economic situation characterized by externality and coordination for
e±ciency.
Suppose that three economic agents are located in an area, as depicted in Figure 5.1.
Imagine that a is a polluting ¯rm, b is a household who loves loud music, and c is a
gardener who makes slot 3 full of beautiful °owers.
Agent a produces output x so as to maximize pro¯t; agent b's utility depends on
the volume of music y; c's utility or pro¯t comes from the amount of °owers z he
plants. We further assume that the activity of each agent imposes externalities on the
others. In particular, their pro¯t or utility functions are
¼a;fa;b;cg = 6x ¡ 0:5x
2 ¡ 2y + z
¼b;fa;b;cg = 20y ¡ 5y
2 ¡ 2x + 3z
¼c;fa;b;cg = 10z ¡ z
2 ¡ x + 2y:
Here, ¼a;fa;b;cg denotes agent a's utility in the situation where all agents are located
in their slots without any collaboration. Now we can see that a's choice of output
imposes negative externalities on b and c; b produces negative externality on a but
positive externality on c; both a and b bene¯t from c's gardening activity. Agents
would maximize their pro¯ts or utilities, which yields that ¼¤
a;fa;b;cg = 19, ¼¤
b;fa;b;cg = 23,
and ¼¤
c;fa;b;cg = 23.5.8. From primeval games to cooperation 119
In order to attain e±ciency for the whole society, those agents may coordinate their
behavior. Then, they will have the following objective functions.
¼ab;fab;cg = 4x ¡ 0:5x
2 + 18y ¡ 5y
2 + 4z
¼c;fab;cg = 10z ¡ z
2 ¡ x + 2y
¼ac;fac;bg = 5x ¡ 0:5x
2 + 11z ¡ z
2
¼b;fac;bg = 20y ¡ 5y
2 ¡ 2x + 3z
¼bc;fbc;ag = 22y ¡ 5y
2 + 13z ¡ z
2 ¡ 3x
¼a;fbc;ag = 6x ¡ 0:5x
2 ¡ 2y + z
¼abc;fabcg = 3x ¡ 0:5x
2 + 20y ¡ 5y




The main problem involved in this situation is how to share the value 73:5 as the
result of cooperation?
The two-stage approach takes compensation for externalities and surplus sharing
for cooperation into consideration and provides an appropriate solution.
We ¯rst deduce those agents' pro¯t or utility functions based on their stand-alone
situations (i.e. only when one agent exists in that area):
¼a;fag = 6x ¡ 0:5x
2
¼b;fbg = 20y ¡ 5y
2
¼c;fcg = 10z ¡ z
2:
Similarly, we have the information about the other cases such as ¼b;fb;cg and ¼c;fb;cg, i.e.,
when b and c appear while a is absent. Thus, we obtain the corresponding primeval
game (N;u).
(a) (b) (c) (a;b) (a;c) (b;c) (a;b;c)
(18) (20) (25) (14;8) (23;19) (35;29) (19;23;23)
The Shapley value of this primeval game is ©(u) = (9:5;21:5;34). The consensus value
is C(u) = (14:25;22:25;28:5). The primeval value is ³(u) = (12;27;26).
Then, we consider the partition function form game (N;w).
(a;b;c) (ab;c) (ac;b) (bc;a) (abc)
(19;23;23) (44:2;24:6) (42:75;26:5) (48:45;20:1) (73:5)120 CHAPTER 5. EXTERNALITIES AND COMPENSATION
The Shapley value of w is ©(w) = (21:51;26:36;25:63). The consensus value is °(w) =
(21:43;26:45;25:62).
Finally, the two-stage approach may yield two solutions, one is (12:01;24:86;36:63)
by the Shapley value, and the other is (14:43;30:45;28:62) by the primeval value of
game (N;u) and the consensus value of game (N;w).
According to the combined approach, one can model the above situation as the
following TU game (N;v).
a b c ab ac bc abc
18 20 25 24:2 42:75 66:45 73:5
One can readily check that the Shapley value yields ©(v) = (12:01;24:86;36:63) and
the consensus value is °(v) = (16:755;24:18;32:565). If applying the method illustrated
in Example 5.8.3 to this case, we will get the consensus value (24:43;25:79;23:28).Chapter 6
Transition by experimentation: the
gradualist reform in China's
banking sector
\Crossing the river by touching the stones."
Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leader
6.1 Introduction
The transition from plan to market in former planned economies is one of the main
economic events of the 20th century. Not only does it a®ect the lives of approximately
1.65 billion people, but it is contributing to a shift in emphasis in economics from
standard price and monetary theory to contracting and its institutional environment.
In the study of economic transition, one of the most important issues is on transition
approaches or strategies. So far there are mainly two alternative transition approaches,
regarding the speed and sequence of transition reforms, being implemented in practice:
\shock therapy" (also termed the \big bang" or \radical approach") and \gradualism"
(or \conservative approach"). For the comparison between those two approaches, we
refer to Roland (2000). Despite the substantial studies on this issue, especially on the
\big bang" approach, we observe that there is no concise, yet deep-going summary
of the second approach: What are the key and fundamental features of gradualism
oriented transition? Since China is a major transition economy adopting such an
approach, this chapter1 focuses on Chinese experience and aims to give a satisfying
1This chapter is based on Ju (2003).
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answer. Moreover, instead of using the single word \gradualism" to name China's
transition approach, we would call it the strategy of \transition by experimentation".
As discussed later in the chapter, gradualism is only one element of the whole strategy.
Meanwhile, a practical role that the chapter can play is to provide the background
(knowledge) for chapter 7 which analyses the compensation problems in China's tran-
sition period and proposes an alternative transition approach, namely, \transition by
compensation".
China's economic reform towards a market-oriented economy, starting from 1978,
adopted a distinguished gradualist approach and has been recognized as essentially
successful. The average rate of growth of real GDP in the ¯rst two decades of reform
were about 9.6 percent annually according to o±cial statistics. To see how reform
worked in China is not only necessary for understanding the reality of the world econ-
omy but is also helpful for researchers to make theoretical explorations, as pointed
by Chow (1997), the gradualist reform and transition process in China issue ample
challenges for economic research. However, it is almost impossible to comprehensively
study and answer this \big" problem by writing one or two papers only. Therefore,
this chapter does not aim to provide a full view about China's economic reform, but
will focus on the banking sector to partially illustrate the measures of the reform and
the process of the transition so as to show exactly how the reform goes along a unique
way and reveal the ideas and features behind that.
Why is the banking sector chosen here? The main reason lies in its importance in
the economy and the urgency of reforming. The bottom-up approach and the sequence
of the economic reform|rural reform ! enterprise/city reform ! ¯nancial reform|
resulted in a long-term transition period. More and more challenges, even di±culties
have crowded into the road to further development since the mid-1990s: unemploy-
ment, de°ation, stagnating in the reform of the stated-owned enterprises (SOE) and
¯nancial reform, widening wealth disparity, disparity in district developments, and
so on. The banking sector, as the crucial component and late-reformed2 part of the
economy, attracts more attention nowadays. People expect the reform in this sector
would change its low e±ciency and diminish the huge amount of bad debts or non-
performing loans (NPLs), and so foster the economic development. Since the banking
sector is a good representative of the economy, it helps to portray the pro¯le of the
2The related indicators of structural reform and institutional quality can be found in EBRD Report
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reform. Besides, the clear boundary of the sector makes it easier to analyse and grasp
the essential of the problem.
Much work has been done in the ¯eld of China's reform and transition. Among
others, some important works which may closely relate to this chapter are as fol-
lows. Gregory C. Chow addresses every detail of China's economic reform in his book
China's Economic Transformation (2002). Roland (2000) provides an overview of cur-
rent research raised by transition and concludes the transition economics in his book
Transition and Economics, especially, of which the third part looks at the economic
behavior of ¯rms in the transition from state to private ownership and compares the
e®ects of privatization, restructuring, and ¯nancial reform. Dewatripont and Roland
(1992) analyse the virtues of gradualism and legitimacy in the transition and ex-
tensively examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans in a
next paper in the same year. Some economists regard China's gradualist approach as
self-defeating (Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1992)). Feltenstein and Nsouli (2001)
empirically analysed the strategy of gradualism in China. Other economists argue
that it is neither gradualism nor experimentation but rather China's unique initial
conditions|namely, a large agricultural labor force, low subsidies to the population,
and a rather decentralized economic system|that have contributed to China's success
(Qian and Xu (1993); Sachs and Woo (1994); Woo (1994)). Moreover and speci¯-
cally, Lau, Qian and Roland (2000) develop a simple model to analyse the dual-track
approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing e±cient Pareto-
improving economic reform. To further understand how reform works in a developing
and transition economy that has great growth potential, Qian (2001) suggests that
one should study how feasible, imperfect institutions have evolved to complement the
initial conditions and to function as stepping stones in the transition toward the goal.
However, there is a lack of study on the general and basic ideas and features of China's
reform which seem essential to understand the success of the transition process. This
chapter o®ers a fundamental but comprehensive perspective on the topic although only
relying on a case study of the banking sector. As for the analysis about the reform in
China's banking sector, especially from the market structure point of view, few work
can be found except some papers in Chinese which are helpful, e.g. Yu and Ju (1999,
2000), Pang and Ju (2000).
In addition to this section introducing the purpose of the chapter and reviewing the
literature brie°y, the remaining part is structured as follows. The next section presents124 CHAPTER 6. TRANSITION BY EXPERIMENTATION
a retrospectus about the reforms in the banking sector and provides a timeline of the
market evolution. Based on explaining the issue of \the river and the stones" and
showing the consistency between the banking sector reform and the whole economic
transition, the third section discusses and summarizes the basic ideas and features of
China's transition model. Concluding remarks follow in the last section.
6.2 From plan to market: reforms in the banking
sector
The P.R.China has nationalized after 1949, when it was established, all means of
production, including the banking system. It introduced a Planned Economy in which
¯nal decisions were centralized. From 1949 to 19783, the banking system was governed
by a national monopoly, called the People's Bank of China (PBC) which operated
all kinds of ¯nancial businesses with the primary function of serving government to
allocate capital resources through budgetary grants. As the ¯nancial businesses were
quite limited due to the planned economy itself, PBC simply provided credit needed
by the SOEs for their production plans and provided cash used principally to cover
labor costs and purchases of agricultural products. Obviously, the system was not
modern at all and played only a limited role in promoting economic growth.
Since 1978, the policy of reform and opening up has fundamentally changed China's
economy and society. As a crucial component of the economy, the banking sector has
also experienced a from-plan-to-market transition process and has gone through three
phases of reform.
The ¯rst phase of the banking reform, from 1979 to 1995, consisted of two parts.
The main part focused on the establishment of a two-tier banking system that com-
prised primarily a central bank and four state-owned specialized banks (Big-four): the
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), and China Construc-
tion Bank (CCB) which were established in 1979, and the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC) established in 1984. Although the market was still a (spe-
cialized) monopolistic one because of the identical ownership (wholly state-owned)
and the strict market segmentation and large market share (those four banks divided
the banking market into sub-markets with clear boundaries in terms of speci¯c bank-
ing businesses; one bank could hardly enter another bank's market and each bank
3The Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress, held December 18-22, 1978, is
considered a major turning point in modern Chinese political history.6.2. From plan to market: reforms in the banking sector 125
dominated its own market excluding the others from taking over: for instance, the
Agricultural Bank of China covered more than 95% of the rural banking business), it
was the ¯rst step to break the monopoly status of the PBC. Since 1986, the PBC has
gradually focused on its role as central bank by transferring its commercial banking
activities to the Big-four. In 1995, with the enacts of the Central Bank Law and the
Commercial Bank Law, the government completed the two-tier banking system. The
second part was the gradual removal of entry barrier, which resulted in an increasing
number of new entrants. Before 1987, a ¯rst attempt was made in this respect but
with a very limited scope. Besides the Big-four, only a few new banks were set up:
the state-owned China Investment Bank (1981), the joint-stock Bank of Communi-
cations (1986), CITIC Industrial Bank (1987) owned by China Investment and Trust
Cooperation, etc. From 1987, especially from 1992, three policy-lending banks, ten
commercial joint-stock banks and a large number of urban credit cooperatives and
rural credit cooperatives were established. As for the opening up policy in this sector,
we can also see it developed step by step. Since 1979, foreign ¯nancial institutions
started to set up representative agencies in China. In 1982, the government started
to license foreign banks to engage in banking businesses in China on an experimental
basis, and authorized a Hong Kong based bank, the Nanyang Commercial Bank, to
establish a branch in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ). In 1985, three other
SEZs were also opened to foreign ¯nancial institutions. By 1995, the number of cities
opening up increased to 24.
Clearly, the process of the banking reforms in this period was rather slow, especially
compared to other sectors in the economy. The reason is twofold. On the one side,
the role of banks in economic development was not signi¯cant and even overlooked as
China just started its marketization. On the other side, the emphases of the whole
reform in this phase were rural reform (1978-1986) and the SOE reform (1987-1997).
However, the domestic NPL problem of the state-owned banks (SOBs) and the ¯nancial
crisis in Southeast Asia made the government realize the importance and urgency of
accelerating the banking reforms in the next periods.
The second phase of banking reforms also had two major parts: further institutional
building and the management of NPLs. The former focused on the commercialization
of specialized banks and a separation between policy and commercial lending activities,
which were started from 1995. The measures included improving the management of
the SOBs by granting their managers autonomy and employees pro¯t incentives, re-
ducing local government intervention (e.g. the Central Bank system was re-organized126 CHAPTER 6. TRANSITION BY EXPERIMENTATION
by merging 31 provincial branches into 9 regional ones), the removal of credit alloca-
tion, limited interest rate deregulation, entry deregulation, a narrowing of the scope of
business4 and a gradual tightening of accounting and prudential regulations. Respon-
sibilities of ¯nancial regulation and supervision were separated into three mutually
independent regulatory agencies with the PBC responsible for bank supervision, the
China Securities and Regulatory Commission for equities market, and the China In-
surance Regulatory Commission for the insurance industry. The latter included the
recapitalization of the Big-four SOBs by injecting 270 billion RMB into them, the
disposal of NPLs held by SOBs through setting up four assets management companies
(as a result, 1.4 trillion RMB NPLs were carved out from the Big-four), the merger
and closure of problematic banks, the transformation of urban credit cooperatives into
city commercial banks, and the promotion of debt-equity swaps. Moreover, in 1999,
China abolished the geographic limitations on the establishment of business institu-
tions for foreign banks, but still with the limitation in operating speci¯c businesses.
Especially, local currency business was restricted to a few cities and banks. As of
2001, China's banking system consists of the Central Bank (PBC), the Big-four SOBs,
three policy-lending banks, 110 commercial banks (99 of which are city commercial
banks, one is home savings bank and the rest joint-stock commercial banks), about
3,000 urban credit cooperatives, some 42,000 rural credit cooperatives, and about 190
foreign banks with 164 branches and 233 representative o±ces.
As China o±cially joined the WTO on December 11, 2001, the third phase of
banking reforms started. A detailed timeline is given as below.
² December 11, 2001. The government removed restrictions on the foreign ex-
change clints of foreign banks and allowed them to conduct local currency (RMB)
business in four cities: Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian;
² December 1, 2002. Foreign-funded ¯nancial institutions would be allowed to
conduct RMB business in ¯ve more cities: Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Nanjing
and Wuhan;
² 2003. Foreign banks can serve Chinese enterprises;
² 2005. Foreign banks can conduct RMB business in 20 cities;
4In e®ect, the government has since adopted a Glass-Steagall Act to separate commercial banking
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² 2006. National treatment to foreign banks in China. Opening up in all dimen-
sions in the banking sector.
In 2006, the Chinese banking market will be open to foreign competition. Thus,
the third phase will stress the roles of the market structure and property right reform:
increasing the market competition by gradually removing barriers to entry, especially
for foreign banks and diversi¯cation of SOBs' ownership through introducing non-state
sources of capital so as to increase their competitiveness.
From the above, although there are still many problems left unsolved, we have to
admit that in the past twenty years or so, China's banking sector has evolved from
a planned and undeveloped system to a market-oriented and modern system through
the gradual reform.
6.3 The river, the stones and the strategy
6.3.1 A popular and perfect metaphor
China's approach of reform is indeed original and unique5. Although foreign advice is
frequently sought, China's reforms are genuinely homegrown, based on domestic actual
conditions and on learning by doing. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, the general
\designer" for China's reform and opening up, described the process as \crossing the
river by touching the stones6". This perfect metaphor vividly illustrates all the key
elements of the reform strategy in China.
No doubt, generally, the starting point on the one side of the river is the planned,
undeveloped and agriculture-based economy, while the opposite bank is a market-
oriented, developed and modern economy. The river is the division in between the two
sides. Crossing it implies the transition process from plan to market, from backward-
ness to modernization, from the poor to the wealthy and from isolation to opening
up.
However, on which exact place to start the \wading"? How to cross the river?
Shall we take the old stu® as crossing? How far is the opposite side? Where is shallow
to be easy for wading or where is deep and full of dangers? Which stones are ¯rm and
stable that can be relied on and which are loose? Where is the right point for berth
5Of course, it has in°uenced some other transition economies. For example, Vietnam has adopted
a similar strategy since early 1990s. The spill-over e®ect is greater and greater.
6A literal (Western) interpretation would be, \if you are on an unfamiliar course, look carefully
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on the other side? All these questions were not clear at all during the course of the
reform, especially in the beginning.
In reality, the initial \wading" started from rural sectors, which is the relatively
simple and e±cient program of economic liberalization as it immediately changed the
situation of shortage in agricultural products by reconstructing incentive mechanisms.
One of the most well-known \e®ective" \stones" was the \household responsibility
system". Farmers worked as a team consisting of some forty persons in the Commune
system in China before 1978. A farmer could not get extra reward by working harder
because all members of the team would share the additional output due to his addi-
tional labor. In the very severe situation of starvation, some farmers realized that if
they farmed separately the team could produce more in total and still delivered the
same amount of output required by the procurement system for government distribu-
tion of agricultural products in the economy. The Commune system was changed as
the team was reorganized by distributing its land to individual households to farm sep-
arately, each getting the additional reward for additional labor after delivering a ¯xed
amount of output to the team for delivery to the government procurement agencies.
Such practice was introduced and spread in many areas of the country and resulted
in a formal national policy named as above. Now when looking back at that period,
we might see that a correct starting point as the result justi¯ed it. However, that was
not the case in 1978. Farmers as well as local governments had no choice except this
way: it was not a well-designed blueprint.
The looking while going and learning by doing propelled the reform. The next step
is city and enterprise reform. As for the open door policy, in 1980, the government
¯rst established a special economic zone in Shenzhen as an experimental ¯eld for the
market-based activities such as international trade, foreign investment and setting up
new factories with non-state ownership. Later on, other four SEZs were set up. With
the successful experiences in those districts, the reform went further by opening 14
coastal cities. Nowadays, the open-door policy applies in the hinterland.
Gradual process in SOE reforms is more obvious. In contrast to Russia and the
Eastern European countries which adopted the \shock therapy" to privatize the state-
owned sectors over one night, China has not completed the SOE reforms until today.
The role of the dual-track approach (cf. Lau, Qian and Roland (2000)) is signi¯cant
and e±cient in this respect because of its Pareto-improving property: developing the
market track without a®ecting the plan track. In such a way, the reform accomplished
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ously. Similar to the above, the reform also went forward by touching the \stones".
The ¯rst and most common stone \touched" from the early 1980s was the so-called
contract responsibility system7, by which the management of SOEs were strengthened.
As later on it ran into trouble, a second stone found in the ¯rst half of the 1990s was
the separation between government and enterprises. Currently, the third stone which
may be considered as an obstacle as well is the ownership reform.
To further understand the ideas and features behind China's reform strategy, we
will go back to the example of the banking sector in the following to make some more
detailed investigation.
6.3.2 The philosophy of the reform
As shown in the second section, the practice of banking sector reforms is in line with
the whole economic reform. Investigating this sector provides a suitable window to
watch the panorama of China's reform and transition.
Apparently, the banking reform aims to go across the river between a planned,
backward and ine±cient system and a market-oriented, developed and e±cient system.
In order to ful¯ll the transition, the reform still explores the way by touching the stones,
step by step. The stones, the path and the direction show us the philosophy of the
reform.
- In process: gradualism
The basic feature of China's reform is gradualism, which is an approach or policy
of advancing toward the goal of constructing the market system by gradual, of-
ten slow stages. The steps of the transition process were taken one after another
and not all at once, in contrast to the so called \shock therapy" in the economic
literature. In fact, this gradualist strategy is naturally formed during the course
of processing rather than pre-designed. The ultimate goal of the reform evolved
over time and has only gradually come into sharper focus. In the very begin-
ning of the reform, nobody, at least no one in China or in the government that
formally started the reform, realized that the ¯nal target would be constructing
the market-oriented economy, simply because it was a bottom-up reform instead
of a top-down one. The ¯rst goal was rather direct: increasing the output of
7After paying a ¯xed tax to the government having jurisdiction over it, each SOE was allowed to
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agricultural products to get out of starvation. The second goal was still tempo-
rary: to construct a planned-based while market-supplemented economic system,
which corresponded to the dual-track system period. Only after a long time of
exploration and various kind of tests, did the ¯nal target come into being clearly.
The other side of the river is visible now.
As for the evidences in the banking sector, in addition to the general three phases
mentioned in section 2, four lines of the reforms further demonstrate this feature.
1. Market: Big-four ! new SOBs and Joint-stock banks ! foreign banks;
2. Measure: management reform ! ownership reform;
3. Opening up: SEZs ! coastal cities ! hinterland;
4. Foreign banking business: representative agency ! foreign currency busi-
ness ! local currency business.
The gradualist approach provides ample time and space for experimenting all
the measures related to reforms.
- In method: experimentalism
Here, experimentalism means using experimental methods to determine the va-
lidity of the measures of the reform. Each step of the transition process was
taken after drawing the experience of the previous step. The Chinese govern-
ment always tests a new reform measure in some districts, enterprises or sectors
before its formal and nationwide carrying out. Because it is prudential and
mistake-allowed, this idea has advantage in minimizing the cost of reform.
Some examples in banking reform show this feature. After accumulating enough
experience to supervisor foreign banks' activities in the SEZs, the government
would open other coastal cities, even western provinces to foreign entrants. When
introducing a kind of new business, the government always ¯rst issues license
to some bank(s) to take an experiment and see the e®ect and then determine
whether or not to apply and develop it. The event of the bankruptcy of China
Agricultural Trust and Investment Company made the government realize the
necessity of separating commercial banking from investment banking business.
As there is no well-designed blueprint and no former footprints can be referred
to, taking experimental methods is then a natural choice when confronting un-
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- In attitude: pragmatism
Pragmatism is a practical, matter-of-fact way of approaching or assessing situa-
tions or of solving problems. Gradualism and experimentalism has characterized
the practical attitude all through the reform.
Given the initial economic and political conditions, China had no basis to carry
out single-track full marketization in the banking sector. As a compromised and
pragmatic choice, the dual-track system helped to foster the transition from plan
to market as it minimizes political opposition to reform ex ante and maximizes
political opposition to reversal of reform ex post. In such a way, the market grad-
ually came into being without much instability or obvious obstruction. Another
example lies in the gradual removal of entry barriers and business restrictions
for foreign banks. This process provides enough time for the banks to make a
su±cient domestic competition as the rehearsal for the future international com-
petition through learning by doing. As the spill-over e®ect of know-how from
foreign banks strengthened the competitiveness of domestic banks, we can an-
ticipate that in 2006, when the door is fully open, the SOBs will grow up to a
highly competitive standard. So, the strategy is successful both in developing
the economy and in keeping social stability.
This feature can be further understood from another well-known saying by Deng
Xiaoping:\No matter whether it is black or white, a cat that catches mice is a
good cat." It re°ected that the government would explore a way by practice
rather than by dogmatism.
- In nature: evolutionism
Evolutionism in reform implies a belief that reform is a gradual process in which
the economy changes into a di®erent and usually better form through a devel-
oping and continuously revising way rather than a well pre-designed or one-shot
approach. Exactly speaking, this feature is not an approach but a belief and
conclusion.
Importantly and fortunately, evolutionism is not alone. The path-dependent
property and self-enforcing mechanism keep the reform go forward to the market
instead of backward to the planned economy. That is, once stepping on the road,
then no way back.
For instance, nobody was against the establishments of the Big-four and other132 CHAPTER 6. TRANSITION BY EXPERIMENTATION
new SOBs. A limited scope of experiment of joint-stock commercial banks and
foreign banks did not incur much objection either, as the existing interest groups
can be relatively protected. However, gradually, the competition from the new
track has forced the old system to make change and approach to the market
system. The entry to the WTO is a milestone. Even if someone wants to go
back, that is not possible, which guarantees the direction of the reform. The
external pressure and incentive provide new engines for the reform.
A natural question concerning those distinguishing features of China's reform and
transition is why it initially and mainly happened in China and not in the other tran-
sition economies? Economists usually look for explanations from the initial economic
and political constraints and actual conditions of the beginning of the reform in China.
Indeed, that is the direct reason. However, the cultural dimension and even the histor-
ical/traditional or philosophical dimension as the fundamental factors were neglected.
An excuse might be it is hard to introduce them into scienti¯c models. However,
cutting edge ¯ndings usually come from breakthroughs. Scienti¯c research needs the
spirit of \crossing the river by touching the stones" as well. In short, if taking the
doctrine of the mean of the Confucian school and China's more than two thousand
years' feudal history and stable social structure into consideration, we will ¯nd a more
reliable answer. Put it another way, why is it easier to practise the \big bang" strategy
in European countries? Fundamentally, it is easier to be understood and accepted by
the minds of the people living there.
6.4 Conclusion: transition by experimentation
While one can view the \big bang" strategies followed by the Soviet Union and many
former socialist countries in Eastern Europe as the approach of transition by coercion,
we might summarize the gradualist strategy so far adopted in China's transition to
a market-oriented economy as an approach of transition by experimentation. The
characteristics of this kind of transition approach are in fact the gradualism in process,
experimentalism in method, pragmatism in attitude and evolutionism in nature.
Besides the signi¯cant e®ects in the transition and development of China's econ-
omy and society, the gradualist reform has far reaching in°uences in two aspects at
least. First, the success sets an example for other countries, especially the transition
economies and developing countries. Vietnam took a similar gradualist strategy: the
sequencing of reforms in Vietnam is quite close to the one observed in China. Some6.4. Conclusion: transition by experimentation 133
CEE countries have already adopted the similar approaches and measures in speci¯c
sectors to slow down the radical paces. Even in North Korea, the government started
to set up the SEZs to make some experiments. Moreover, Japan also realized the
advantages of the strategy and started to learn from it for reforming its stagnant and
depressed economy. Another e®ect is in academic research: both in economics and
in the related social sciences, China's reform provides a platform and a new path to
explore the unknown world and to further update our knowledge. The Chinese ex-
perience has shown that the conventional view, i.e. reforming a socialist system in
a piecemeal manner cannot be successful, is not always true. Likewise, this experi-
ence has also falsi¯ed the claim that a political revolution is necessary for pushing
the reform into the transition stage. In addition, the practice as well as the di®erent
approaches of transition in various countries call for further study and explanations,
especially from the cultural and historical perspectives.
Here we want to note that this study does not make any prediction regarding the
eventual success or failure of China's transition. What could be the exact meaning of
\eventual" in respect of a societal evolution anyway? If prediction of events is also
important in the social sciences, the ¯rst priority in economics is understanding the
structures and explaining them to policy makers who shape the future events. Mean-
while, we are not in a position to assert that the gradualism or experimentation based
transition is better than \shock therapy" in general although it is con¯rmed that so
far the approach of experimentation has worked for China. Depending on di®erent
actual conditions of the transition economies, one might choose a way which is partic-
ularly suitable and e®ective in its own social and economic environments. Moreover,
even in China, transition by experimentation is not a panacea for all stages. As more
con°icts appear and social stability is jeopardized by implementing the structural and
ownership related reforms, compensating losers to obtain their support seems more
demanding for facilitating and ¯nalizing the transition. Hence, the experimentation
approach eventually gives way to the so-called \transition by compensation" approach.
Finally, we want to brie°y discuss the di®erent transition approaches re°ecting
di®erent attitudes to the compensation problems in the transition period. As Roland
(2002) puts, \we rarely observe e±ciency-enhancing reforms". Transition from one
economic system to another implies that someone might become a loser. Thus, com-
pensation problems necessarily arise. It is generally observed that the strategy of
\shock therapy" has hurt most people in the economy, and to compensate them was
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ods have been adopted, only small groups of people were hurt at every stage of the
reform process. Thus, compensating them was possible. We may say that this ap-
proach circumvented serious compensation problems as the basic social stability has
been secured and the general support for reforms has been obtained. But as being
noted above, to complete the transition to a market economy, China has to imple-
ment the structural and ownership related reforms. It requires a more sophisticated
approach. This is the subject of the last chapter.Chapter 7
Transition by compensation: the
political economy of demolition and
eviction in China
7.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the problem of compensation in China's transition period. We
discuss that an approach of transition by compensation, a method of facilitating and
realizing the transition process to a market-oriented system by means of compensating
(potential) losers to buy their acceptance and support for the reforms, could be par-
ticularly useful for the current stage of the transition process in China. Di®ering from
the existing studies (Lau, Qian and Roland (1997, 2000); Roland (2001)), we focus on
the micro-level of the compensation problem and propose fair compensation rules and
an e®ective compensation system which could be well applied in the economic reforms
in China. Based on a case study on the demolition and eviction in China's transition
period, we show implications for the whole economy.
It is well known that China adopts a gradualist reform strategy for the transition
to a market-oriented economy (see chapter 6). Although one may observe that the old
planned system and the new market system have coexisted and sometimes intertwined
in the economy since 1978, according to Qian (2000), the main line of the transition
process is clear: China's transition process evolved in two stages of which the ¯rst one
focused on improving incentives within the planned system and increasing the scope of
the market in resource allocation, and the second one mainly involved the construction
of the institutions supporting a market system. As shown in chapter 6, the transition
reforms in the ¯rst stage are dominated by the approach of \transition by experimen-
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tation". In contrast to the \big bang" strategy, the transition by experimentation is
an approach of learning by doing in economic reforms, which is featured by gradualism
in process, experimentalism in method, pragmatism in attitude, and evolutionism in
nature. However, as the goal of establishing the market-oriented economy has been
set down, and as more con°icts have appeared due to the abolishment of the plan-
track, the experimentation approach should give way to the so-called \transition by
compensation" approach because it is more suitable and demanding for the second
stage.
In this chapter, we ¯rst present the background for such a transition approach,
and then mainly analyse the issue of demolition and eviction as a case study to show
that the existing compensation rules are neither fair nor e®ective. We argue that the
cooperative game theory provides a suitable method to look into the compensation
problems. Based on that, the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the consensus value
(cf. chapter 2) for TU games can be applied to formulate fair compensation rules. We
further discuss the other elements to compose an e®ective compensation system.
Here, in particular, the consensus value is not only featured by its constructive
sharing process but is also characterized as the unique one-point solution concept for
TU games that satis¯es e±ciency1, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additiv-
ity. The classical dummy property requiring that a dummy player (who cannot make
any additional contributions to any coalition of agents except for his own individual
value) only gets his individual value is in fact a utilitarian or individualist dummy
property. The equal surplus solution (cf. Moulin (2003)) makes no di®erence between
a dummy player and non-dummies: each agent equally share the joint surplus of the
grand coalition, so the corresponding dummy property can be understood as an egal-
itarian or collectivist dummy property. As a hybrid case, the quasi dummy property
is an average of the above two and provides a more socially and morally acceptable
solution for determining the gain of a dummy player as it makes a fair compromise
between those two contrastive cases.
More speci¯cally, as the market economy is utilitarianism or individualism oriented
while the planned economy is featured by egalitarianism or collectivism, and since the
quasi dummy property well balances the trade-o® between those two extreme opin-
ions about the gain of a dummy player, the consensus value provides an appropriate
theoretical foundation to determine the exact (acceptable and fair) compensation for
1Here, the term e±ciency is a game theory based concept that can be understood as a balanced
budget property: the sum of all agents/players' ¯nal payo®s in a game equals to the value that is
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losers in the transition period.
In addition to this section introducing the chapter and reviewing the relevant fun-
damental works brie°y, the remaining part has the following structure. In the next
section, we present the background for implementing the approach of transition by
compensation in China. In section 3, we analyse the case of demolition and eviction
and its associated compensation problems. Section 4 studies the fair compensation rule
and the e®ective compensation system. The ¯nal section discusses the implications of
the rule as well as the compensation system for other sectors in the economy.
7.2 From Pareto-improvement to Pareto-neutrality
It is known that China adopts a gradualist strategy for the transition from plan to
market. Di®ering from the so-called \big bang" path, this gradual reform process
incrementally promoted liberalization and postponed privatization until recently but
circumvented the issue of democratization. It is because of such a pragmatic strategy
that China has made a remarkable success in transition so far. However, it is also
noted that greater challenges follow.
Qian (2000) holds that China's transition process evolved in two stages. In the
¯rst stage (1979-1993), the centrally planned system was reformed incrementally to
improve incentives and increase the scope of the market in resource allocation. In the
second stage (since 1994), new institutions supporting a market system are being built,
but before old institutions are destroyed.
In the ¯rst stage, reforms often featured schemes known as \particularistic con-
tracting"2, through which the incentives of economic agents were improved and at the
same time existing interests could also be protected. The ¯rst ¯fteen years of reform
changed the landscape of China's economy drastically compared to 1978 and succeeded
in substantially improving people's living standards on a broad basis. Reform received
solid and popular support. Moreover, the state sector was no longer the dominant
part of the economy, and most old revolutionaries were fading away from the political
scene. All of these changes did facilitate a strategic shift in the o±cial ideology to
completely abandon central planning and embrace a market-oriented system with pri-
vate ownership. Lau, Qian and Roland (2000) attribute the success of this stage to the
2The main characteristic of this scheme is that instead of standardized rules to be applied uniformly
to all units of the economy, ad hoc and selective arrangements evolve with the relevant unit. For
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\dual-track" approach (constructing the market-track while simultaneously protecting
the plan-track) as a mechanism for implementing e±cient Pareto-improving economic
reform, that is, reform achieving e±ciency without creating losers. To illustrate this,
consider the banking sector reform analysed in chapter 6 that also adopted the \dual-
track" approach: strengthening the existing banking system so as to achieve e±ciency
and well protect its existing interests, while simultaneously liberalizing the market.
Therefore, no one is a loser. On the other hand, it is also due to the \dual-track"
approach, or more precisely due to the gradualist reform itself, by the end of 1993,
that the economic system as a whole was still a half-way house between a plan and a
market economy. However, the track of plan has to be abolished in order to achieve
the goal of constructing a market-oriented system. Thus, a more profound structural
reform is needed.
Since 1994, particularistic contracting is being replaced by universalistic rules and
market-supporting institutions based on the rule of law and incorporating international
best practices are being established. The fourteenth Party Congress in September 1992
endorsed the \socialist market economy". Some further breakthroughs on ownership
issues were made by the Fifteenth Party Congress in September 1997 and by the Con-
stitutional Amendments of March 1999 and the Constitutional Amendments of March
2004, which strengthened the goal of transition to a market economy. The crucial task
of this stage is to privatize and restructure state-owned enterprises. Although the econ-
omy steps forward and attains e±ciency as a whole, it is no longer a Pareto-improving
stage: the society is mainly di®erentiated into two groups, some are bene¯tted from
the reforms in this stage while others su®er. For instance, due to the competition
pressure from the foreign banks after joining the WTO and the increasingly intensive
competition with domestic commercial banks, the big-four commercial banks in China
have to undertake stricter and tighter reform measures like laying o® redundant em-
ployees to strengthen their competitiveness. More examples can be found in the urban
reforms such as the changes in the free medical care system, housing system, etc. We
then ¯nd the reforms in the second stage are somehow Pareto-neutral. Here, the term
of Pareto-neutrality implies a Pareto-e±cient situation with a Pareto superior situa-
tion in view but the path to this superior situation is blocked. Put di®erently, it is a
Pareto-e±cient situation which can be improved if some compensation rule is applied
so that all agents are willing to move. Thus, to facilitate the reforms in this stage and
thereby fully establish the market economy, the losers are needed to be compensated
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There are more facts to account for the importance of compensation for China's
transition. With the largest population in the world, the society in China is very sen-
sitive to any reforms. Compensating losers is the only way to get a relatively stable
social environment as the prerequisite for implementing such a large-scale economic
transition process. In addition, the market economy calls for the protection of private
properties, which implies that compensation has to be given in case of any expropria-
tion of private properties during the transition period, although this was not explicitly
speci¯ed in the ¯rst stage of the transition. We want to note that there exist a spe-
cial group of losers in the transition period: people with vested interests from the
pre-reform system will lose their power and rents in the new system such as conser-
vative political leaders and bureaucracies with established interests. To make reform
acceptable, it is necessary to buy o® those people in power.
The issue of compensation in transition has been noted by the State (e.g. various
regulations of speci¯c reform measures). Especially, in the most recent Constitutional
Amendments, i.e., the Constitutional Amendments of March 2004, the inviolability
of legal private property was speci¯ed for the ¯rst time since 1949. Moreover, the
amendment adds \the State gives compensation" to the original stipulation that \for
public use, the State has the right to expropriate urban and rural land and citizens'
private properties."
Existing studies on the issue of compensation in transition mainly focus on the
macro-level. Among others, Lau, Qian and Roland (1997, 2000) show that the dual-
track strategy provides implicitly a set of feasible lump-sum transfers (transfers that
are independent of the actions of the individual economic agents) to compensate the
losers of the economic reforms. Roland (2001) addresses a strategy for easing political
constraints so that reforms can be enacted: building reform packages that give com-
pensating transfers to losers from reforms. He further explains why such transfers can
be di±cult to enact in the real world. A ¯rst di±culty is that redistributive trans-
fers must be ¯nanced by collecting revenues, which usually involves distortional costs.
A second di±culty involves asymmetric information about the losers from reforms.
A third di±culty is related to weak commitment power of decision-makes. La®ont
and Qian (1999) stress the constraints of enacting compensations in China: lack of
commitment and liquidity.
However, those di±culties or constraints are not the main problems any more.
Generally speaking, after more than twenty years of reform and development, China
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sible3. Meanwhile, market-oriented institutions built in the past ten years provide
guidelines for enacting the potential compensations and helps to overcome any com-
mitment problem. Therefore, the issue of compensation deserves more attention than
before.
Moreover, one may notice that there also lack studies on the micro-level of compen-
sations in the transition period. In the following sections, we focus on the questions
how to design a fair rule to compensate the potential losers from a reform and thereby
to help in enacting such a reform, and more systematically, what an e®ective compen-
sation system should be.
In principle, any sector in the economy where the reforms generate losers needs com-
pensations. Taking the case of demolition and eviction, we investigate the associated
compensation problems and draw policy implications for the issue of compensation in
transition as a whole.
7.3 Demolition and eviction, and the associated
compensation problems
7.3.1 (Forced) demolition and eviction
(Forced) demolition and eviction are the destruction of people's homes or the expro-
priation of their lands and the removal of those people from their places, which are
usually against their will. Governments are often actively involved in those activities.
Demolitions and evictions conducted or tolerated by governments are carried out in
a variety of circumstances and for a number of di®erent reasons. In China, the more
common rational of the central and local governments for demolition and eviction lies
amongst others in
² development and infrastructure projects (e.g. construction of dams and other
energy projects);
² prestigious international events (e.g. Olympics);
² urban redevelopment or city beauti¯cation project;
² commercial development (e.g. a foreign company invests and constructs a factory
in a city);
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² con°ict over land rights.
In fact, the issue of demolition and eviction in China has begun to receive attention
in o±cial and academic circles only since the 1990s. In the decades following the
establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, all lands were owned by
the state and ownership could not be transferred to private individuals or companies.
Individual citizens did not own private homes or work for private companies, but were
required to live in apartments located within the compound of the government work
unit where they were employed. Since no private property existed in the country,
basically governments had the right to allocate houses to people and also had the right
to remove them to other places when it was necessary to do so. Hence, there were no
real compensation problems involved even if people were asked to leave for somewhere
else; and moreover, it was not di±cult for people to accept such removals.
Since the late 1980s, China's rapid shift toward a market economy, the increasing
demand for private home ownership, the budget constraints of local governments for
providing houses, and the need of local governments for revenue, have resulted in a
thriving real estate market. More and more people bought their own apartments or
houses. Meanwhile, economic development called for various infrastructure construc-
tions and more activities that would lead to restructure cities and demolition and
eviction. Naturally, the associated compensation problem came into the scene. The
basic reason for compensation is clear: demolition and eviction expropriate citizens'
private property and cause losses on them.
A typical process of demolition and eviction and the actors who might be involved
in such a process can be described as follows.
² Developers who acquire a parcel of land and wish to build on a site must apply
for and obtain a series of permits from demolition and eviction management
departments;
² The demolition and eviction management departments in municipal gov-
ernments process the applications for demolition permits, collect the necessary
fees, and are responsible for the process of demolition and eviction;
² The developers, or the government departments acting on their behalf, are re-
quired by law to approach the existing residents at each site, whether home-
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² Developers subcontract a private demolition company, which specializes in
the demolition and clearing of sites for construction.
According to the law, once all parties have signed a compensation agreement, the
resident must relocate. The demolition and eviction management department can also
arbitrate disputes between developers and residents over compensation, and may give
developers approval to proceed with \forced demolition and eviction" if the resident
refuses to move. China's Regulations for the Management of Urban Residential Demo-
lition and Eviction speci¯es the procedures through which cities may evict residents.4
And most local legislatures have passed implementing regulations that generally copy
the language of national regulations with only minor modi¯cations. Here, in particu-
lar, when developers and residents fail to reach a compensation agreement, regulations
permit developers to apply for permission from the demolition and eviction depart-
ment to proceed with forced eviction.5 Needless to say, this permission is critical for
generating so many cases of forced evictions and the corresponding consequences like
protests, violence, and other social problems.
This is a brief introduction about the issue of demolition and eviction in China.
For a detailed summary, we refer to Human Rights Watch (2004).
7.3.2 Current compensation rules
Disputes between developers and residents often arise over low rates of compensation
and poor resettlement options. Once they learn that their home will be demolished,
residents generally have little option to prevent it, and instead attempt to negotiate
with the development company over the amount of compensation. According to the
national demolition regulations, developers must pay evictees compensation equal to
the full market value of their properties, with an added (although unspeci¯ed) amount
of compensation for business loss in the case of non-residential properties. Regardless
of the regulations, it is also noted that the amount of compensation may in some
instances be unilaterally decided by the developers or the demolition companies. It
may be set far below market value, with little or no account taken for loss of income
in the case of properties used for family businesses.6
4Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli (Regulations for the Management of Urban Residential
Demolition and Eviction), published by the State Council on March 22, 1991; and a modi¯ed new
version with the same title was published on June 13, 2001, and implemented from November 1, 2001.
5Regulations for the Management of Urban Residential Demolition and Eviction, art. 17.
6Wang Xiaoxia, Chaiqian Cheng Raomin Gongcheng, Zhuanjia Jianyi Tigao Buchang Biaozhun
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From the third chapter of the Regulations for the Management of Urban Residen-
tial Demolition and Eviction, one could ¯nd that it actually presents a guideline for
compensation to evictees. In the practice of demolition and eviction, there are three
speci¯c types of compensation rules that are applied.
² Generic rule.
The generic rule is determined by will or by arbitrary preference or based on
general judgement, but not by reason or principle. Since the current regulations
leave too much room to the authorities, they can arbitrarily determine some
part of the compensation for resettlement. Sometimes the authorities even ma-
nipulate circumstances in order to get a generic rule. According to an article in
Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), residents in Jinhua city, Zhejiang, said
authorities claimed in a demolition notice that they were being relocated to make
way for a \green belt". Authorities used this reason to justify low compensation
for the eviction and the refusal of residents' request that they be resettled in
the same neighborhood.7 Although it is clear that this rule is not fair mainly
because it does not cover the true losses of the involved parties and it does not
distinguish the speci¯c individual situations, it is widely applied in practice since
it is relatively easy and costless to determine.
² Cost-based compensation rule.
The cost-based compensation rule is exactly in the spirit of the Regulations for
the Management of Urban Residential Demolition and Eviction. In the practice
of demolition and resettlement, some speci¯c measures follow Article 24 such that
the sum of the compensation money will be determined based on the location,
use, construction area and other factors, and by using the appraised real estate
market price of the demolished home.
² Negotiation rule.
This rule means that the involved parties can negotiate with each other on the
amount of compensation. In cases that the evictee party is a strong group (like
the government itself), the developer (like a private company) may o®er a very
attractive compensation proposal with the standard much higher than the cost.
dard), China Economic Times, November 12, 2003.
7Cheng Gong, Zhi Chaiqian Zhi Tong (Treat the Pains of Demolition and Eviction), Southern
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However, in most cases when the evictee party is composed of weak groups like
low income social groups, the compensation could be very low.
Unfortunately but clearly, the current regulations of demolition and eviction do not
work well although there are some compensation rules as above. The following ¯gures
may account for this fact. According to the national Ministry of Construction, of 1,730
petitions ¯led from January to August 2003, about 70 percent were about problems
with forced evictions.8 In some cases, tenants' rights advocates organized petitions
signed by large numbers of people. For example, in 2000, over 10,000 petitioners
¯led a civil suit against demolition and eviction at the Intermediate People's Court in
Beijing.9
A fair compensation rule as well as an e®ective compensation system for demolition
and eviction are in great need.
7.4 Towards an e®ective compensation system
Some scholars summarized the key problems of demolition and eviction as lack of rights
for evictees, lack of any organized system for resettlement, generally low compensa-
tion, and di±culties in obtaining legal redress.10 Instead of addressing every possible
problem in demolition and eviction, we aim to ¯nd the crucial step in the whole process
and propose a systematic remedy.
In our opinion, the main problem is a lack of an e®ective compensation system
while all the other problems are either derived from it or relatively marginal. That
is, once an e®ective compensation system is constructed, evicted people will get fair
compensation, and the whole process will be facilitated. The reason is simple, almost
all problems involved in demolition and eviction in the transition period in China are
related to the low or unfair compensations to evictees.
An e®ective compensation system means a fair compensation rule which can be
generally accepted by all parties involved in demolition and eviction so that it smoothes
out the possible con°icts, plus a credible procedure to implement this rule. Therefore,
in order to set up such an e®ective compensation system, at least three objectives
should be achieved:
8Zhao Ling, Bude Bu Zhongshi De Wenti (A Problem That Merits Serious Attention), Southern
Weekend, September 4, 2003.
9Zhao Ling, A Problem That Merits Serious Attention, Southern Weekend, September 4, 2003.
10cf. Zhao Ling, Chaiqian Shinian Beixiju (The Decade-long Drama of Demolition and Eviction),
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² Formulating and implementing a fair compensation rule;
² Establishing an independent and impartial agency that evaluates the losses
of the evictees and other factors determining compensations and supervises the
implementation of the rule;
² Revising the current regulations so that they match for the new compensa-
tion rule and the associated measures and strengthening judicial indepen-
dence in China's court system.
Among those three objectives, the fundamental issue is to set up and implement
a fair compensation rule. Here, we ¯rst analyse the inappropriateness of the current
compensation rules, and then propose a new rule.
Obviously, the generic compensation rule is too simple and does not work right as
it does not rely on a reasonable basis.
The cost-based rule is more appealing. However, we still observe resistances for
reforms even if the evictees get compensated according to their costs, or more exactly,
get the compensation based on the market price of their homes and other cost factors.
Then, a question arises naturally: why is the cost-based rule not e®ective?
There are at least two reasons that may account for the failure of the cost-based
compensation rule. Firstly, the options for resettling in the direct neighborhood are
too few. For instance, there are many cases that the new buildings only o®er higher
standard and larger apartments or houses while the evictee is unable to a®ord it. As a
result, he may be forced to resettle in the developing suburbs where the living standard
is low, employment is di±cult to ¯nd, traveling cost becomes a burden, etc. Secondly,
this cost-based rule is still relatively simple and only cares about the physical costs that
the eviction might incur. In fact, the human cost and trauma of (forced) demolition
and eviction on individuals, families and communities can not be over-emphasized.
Evicted persons not only lose their homes and neighborhoods but sometimes are also
forced to relinquish personal possessions. Evictees often also lose key relationships,
those which provide a social safety net or survival network of protection and which
allow many daily tasks to be shared. In most cases, evictees ¯nd themselves in worse
conditions than before the eviction even if their conditions were less than ideal in the
¯rst place.
As for the bargaining rule, it is a®ected by the comparison of the strength between
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In order to ¯nd a fair compensation rule, we ¯rst turn back to see the nature of
demolition and eviction. The three main actors in the process are the developer, the
resident, and the management agency. The management agency can be seen as a
court to judge and supervise the activity. The whole process is in fact a cooperative
game. The developer and the resident have their own reservation or stand-alone values,
which are the payo®s or utilities when they do not cooperate. If they cooperate with
each other (the resident accepts the demolition of his house and moves to somewhere
else, and thus the developer can carry out his planned project there), the value of the
coalition will be generated. Such a game is supposed to be superadditive, i.e., the joint
payo® generated by the collaboration between two agents is greater than the sum of
their stand-alone payo®s, otherwise there is no reason for cooperation.
The two well de¯ned and justi¯ed solution concepts for cooperative games, the
Shapley value and the consensus value, provide a rationale to determine the compen-
sation. Since both of the two values satisfy the individual rationality for superadditive
games, the corresponding solutions ensure that every player at least gets his reserva-
tion value. Thus, the resident's interest is protected as his cost can be fully covered.
Moreover, the resident will get a share of the joint surplus of the game, which implies
that the ¯nal total compensation is greater than his loss/cost. This can be well jus-
ti¯ed: if we put the developer and the resident in equal positions, there is no reason
that the former should get the whole surplus of the cooperation.
As the two values yield di®erent solutions for n-person games with n ¸ 3, one
might wonder which one is more appropriate.
Since the Shapley value is characterized as the unique function that satis¯es e±-
ciency, symmetry, the dummy property and additivity for TU games, it is more suitable
for the competitive environments where the involved parties are all commercial entities.
The consensus value is featured by its constructive process for sharing the joint
gains and is characterized as the unique one-point solution concept for TU games that
satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By the quasi
dummy property, the consensus value makes a fair compromise between utilitarian-
ism/individualism and egalitarianism/collectivism, which makes the solution socially
and morally more acceptable. Therefore, this solution concept could be appropriate
for the regular cases of demolition and eviction in which the evictees are individual
citizens while the developers are for-pro¯t entities. Of course, depending on the degree
to which the utilitarianism/individualism or egalitarianism/collectivism is preferred by
the society, a speci¯c generalized consensus value can be applied.7.4. Towards an e®ective compensation system 147
Obviously, in the case that the demolition and eviction are caused by public uses,
it is supposed that no extra pro¯t is generated, and thus the cost-based rule coincides
with the Shapley value or the consensus value based rule, which implies that the cost-
based compensation is still useful in certain environments.
Similar to the coercing party that decides the sharing rule of the game, an impartial
agency is indispensable for evaluating the costs of the residents and the potential
gain of the developer so as to determine the compensation. The members of the
agency should be constituted by experts in the speci¯c cases and are detached from
the interest groups involved in the process. Besides, such an agency can help to solve
the asymmetric information problem about the losses from reforms.
Moreover, to ensure the implementation of the compensation rule, we need an in-
dependent and well functioning judicial system, which will strengthen the credibility
of the compensation system.
Here we provide an illustrative example to show how much a loser can get based
on the compensation rule introduced above.
Imagine that a city designs an economic development zone in its suburb. For
simplicity, we assume that two potential ¯rms are interested in entering this area to
construct new plants to make pro¯ts. Then, there are three economic agents: ¯rm a,
¯rm b, and a group of farmers or households understood as agent c living in that area.
Firm a would expand its scale of production, which requires the appropriation of the
land owned by agent c. Firm b also plans to initiate a project there. In any case, agent
c is confronted with the issue of demolition and eviction if the city government decides
to carry out the development plan. We can model this situation by the following TU
game.
S fag fbg fcg fa;bg fa;cg fb;cg fa;b;cg
v(S) 80 30 20 160 120 70 280
In practice, it is very common that agent c will only get 20 to compensate the loss
of his house by the generic rule or the cost-based compensation rule. However, think
of a situation that the cheapest house that c might ¯nd on the market that could give
him the same utility as his old house costs him 25. Then no doubt c is a loser in this
reform. Even if under the bargaining rule c might get 25, it is not necessarily a fair
amount in terms of compensation since one can ask a question like: why the ¯rms can
grab all the surplus?148 CHAPTER 7. TRANSITION BY COMPENSATION
According to the Shapley value, we have ©(v) = (135;85;60). The consensus value
yields that °(v) = (132:5;82:5;65). Obviously, implementing the compensation rule
based on a cooperative game approach and the two solution concepts will facilitate the
reform to a great degree as c will also get a share from the surplus of the cooperation.
7.5 Concluding remarks: implications for the tran-
sition reform
As one may observe, the compensation problems exist in various sectors of the transi-
tion economy in China. The analysis of the e®ective compensation system for demo-
lition and eviction can be applied to those sectors and the associated issues.
² Layo® and compensation
China's enterprise reform has resulted in large-scale layo® of workers from state
and collective owned enterprises. In the 1980s there was virtually full employment in
the urban sector. But since 1993, urban unemployment has been growing rapidly. By
1997, about 18.5 million workers had been laid o® from state-owned enterprises and
urban collective enterprises, raising the actual urban unemployment rate to as high as
about 10 percent (ZGFB (1998)).
Although there is a so-called three-line security system for laid o® workers in China
(Li and Zax (2003)), it is very di±cult for most of the laid o® workers to be re-employed
or ¯nd other jobs. One crucial reason is that those workers are eliminated through
the restructuring of the SOEs and do not match for the new technology any more.
Moreover, since the layo® bene¯t is relatively low, many of the laid o® workers are
living in poverty, which, as a result, generated large number of protests and social
unrest.
While most existing studies on China's urban layo®s focus on the macroeconomic
policy, the establishment of reemployment service and associated institutions, and
improvement of the labor market (cf. Gu (1999); Yang (1999)), we would stress the
issue of compensation for layo®s in the same spirit as the case of demolition and
eviction.
According to the three-line security system for laid o® workers, for the ¯rst three
years after being laid o®, the workers will still keep their employment relation with
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after three years, if those workers do not ¯nd a job, they need to terminate their em-
ployment relation with their ¯rms and will receive unemployment compensation (from
government) for two years; thereafter, the workers will stop getting unemployment
compensation and will receive income assistance from the government to maintain a
minimum living standard.
We would say that the current compensation rule for layo®s might be suitable for
the general cases of unemployment but it is not a fair rule for layo®s from SOEs.
The basic reason lies in the relationship between the workers and the SOEs. In
the planned economy, once a person was employed by a state-owned enterprise, he got
a permanent position. Now it is the transition of the whole economy to the market
system that changed the situations of those SOEs. It is true that they have to lay some
redundant workers o® in order to survive in the market-oriented economy. However,
the interests of those workers should be well protected by the society/government as
it is not their responsibility for such a change. Consider a worker who specialized in
a speci¯c technique and was hired by a state-owned enterprise in the planned time.
Now this enterprise is carrying out a reform to be adapt to the competitive market
environment and will change into another profession. As a result, this worker becomes
redundant and will be ¯red by the enterprise. Who should pay for his loss? The
enterprise, exactly speaking, the government as the owner of the enterprise, because
it breaches the contract with the worker. Therefore, such a compensation for layo®s
should be di®erent from the conventional views about the unemployment bene¯t, but
is the compensation for the breach of contracts in nature. In addition, the rules,
especially the speci¯cations about unemployment compensation and income assistance
are generic rules, which increases the unfairness of the compensation.
To formulate a practical compensation rule, the Shapley value and in particular, the
consensus value will be very useful. Firstly, one can take the process as a cooperative
game. The cooperation means that those workers agreed to be laid o® from the
enterprise, and consequently more pro¯t will be generated by the enterprise. To justify
the consensus value in this case, one may consider the quasi dummy property. Since
a dummy player/worker in a state-owned enterprise is \created" by the transition
process, e.g. one becomes a dummy player because the enterprise changed into a new
profession, he should receive a share which is more than his individual value. More
generally, as a fair compromise between individualism and collectivism, the consensus
value can be well accepted by the layo®s and the SOEs in the transition period.
² Compensation facilitates transition150 CHAPTER 7. TRANSITION BY COMPENSATION
Compensation plays an important role in the privatization reforms of public utilities
such as water, gas, and so on. Because of the budget constraint of the government and
the increasing demand of the economy, and sometimes for the reason of providing a
better service based on an advanced technology or management, privatizing the public
utilities is introduced to the economy. Obviously, the losers need to be compensated.
Speci¯c compensation rules can be formulated in such sectors according to the above
analysis.
In fact, compensation is not only intended for weak groups in the transition period,
but also works for some strong groups. Compensating the interest-established groups
to buy their concession or acceptance sometimes is a practical and necessary strategy
to help in enacting a reform.
More generally, the approach of transition by compensation also provides solutions
to ease social instabilities for the countries in Eastern Europe adopting the \big bang"
strategies which are somehow an approach of transition by coercion.
² Compensation a®ects innovation
Concerning fairness, more compensation would be desirable. However, that may
imply more protection to established groups, which may hinder innovation. For in-
stance, the more compensation a worker receives, the less incentives he may have to
accept a new job; and the more a compensator has to pay, the less reward for inno-
vation remains. Hence, compensation may lower the incentive for innovation. Due to
this tradeo®, it is not a simple task to ¯nd a fair as well as e±cient compensation rule.
One possible solution is the generalized consensus value. Depending on the political
realities, the degree to which individualism (here maybe innovation or economic e±-
ciency) or collectivism (here may be protection or fairness) is preferred in a society or
by an authority may be adapted as the µ-dummy property (see chapter 2) suggests.
The corresponding compensation rule follows.Bibliography
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CoÄ operatie, Competitie en Transitie
CoÄ operatie speelt een fundamentele rol in maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen. Dit maakt
het bestuderen van coÄ operatie tot een zinvolle bezigheid. Het feit dat economische
agenten zich competitief en coÄ operatief kunnen gedragen, wordt weerspiegeld in mod-
ellen van competitief en coÄ operatief gedrag binnen de speltheorie, een moderne tak
van de wiskunde. De coÄ operatieve speltheorie betreft onderwerpen als coalitie for-
matie tussen spelers, rationele onderhandelingen over gemeenschappelijke acties en
oplossingsmethoden voor de verdeling van baten uit samenwerking. Vooral dit laatste
onderwerp is essentieel voor de samenwerking zelf. De reden is simpel: zonder een goed
onderbouwde verdelingsregel zal samenwerking niet van de grond komen. CoÄ operatieve
speltheorie bevat veel verschillende modellen en oplossingsconcepten. Het meest bek-
end is het model van spelen met overdraagbaar nut, geÄ ³ntroduceerd door von Neumann
en Morgenstern (1944). Men kan een dergelijk spel beschouwen als een surplus verdel-
ingsprobleem waarin een geldbedrag (zoals de netto winst van een groep spelers) onder
de spelers verdeeld wordt zonder rekening te houden met de mogelijkheid dat spelers
verschillende waarden kunnen toekennen aan een zelfde geldbedrag.
Compensatie is een bijzonder aspect van een surplus verdelingsprobleem dat aan
agenten de mogelijkheid biedt om hun eigen directe belangen voor een moment te ver-
geten om een hogere opbrengst voor de coalitie als geheel te verkrijgen. Zo opgevat
kan een compensatieprobleem bestudeerd worden binnen het kader van de coperatieve
speltheorie. In de werkelijkheid vormt het verscha®en van een redelijk bedrag aan com-
pensatie aan spelers een praktische strategie om de noodzakelijke middelen te verkri-
jgen om e±cintie te bereiken voor de gehele groep. Compensatie is echter nauwelijks
expliciet bestudeerd in de literatuur en soms volledig genegeerd. In de klassieke be-
nadering van externe e®ecten in de literatuur, bijvoorbeeld, wordt de aandacht alleen
op e±cintie gericht, zonder de mogelijkheid te bieden om bepaalde agenten die te lijden
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hebben onder een uitkomst te kunnen compenseren.
Men kan dus coperatie makkelijker maken door compensatie te bieden aan bepaalde
spelers. Dit idee vindt natuurlijk vaak toepassing in de praktijk. In de politieke
economie vormt het concept \transitie door compensatie" een belangrijke methode.
Immers, men kan een transitie proces beschouwen als een soort samenwerking van de
hele maatschappij, waarbij bepaalde agenten compensatie ontvangen om hun medew-
erking te verkrijgen bij het realiseren van hervormingen en daardoor sociale stabiliteit
te handhaven.
In het eerste deel van het proefschrift (de hoofdstukken 2 en 3) worden verschil-
lende oplossingsconcepten van coÄ operatieve spelen behandeld. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt
een nieuw oplossingsconcept geÄ ³ntroduceerd, de consensuswaarde. Het is gebaseerd op
een paper van Ju, Borm en Ruys (2004). De consensuswaarde is de unieke verdeelregel
die wordt gekarakteriseerd door vier eigenschappen: e±ciÄ entie, symmetrie, de quasi-
dummy eigenschap en additiviteit. Middels de transfer eigenschap wordt een tweede
karakterisering gegeven. Een recursieve formule voor deze waarde volgt uit de formu-
lering van een adequaat gereduceerd spel. De consensuswaarde blijkt het gemiddelde
van de Shapley-waarde en de egalitaire oplossing. Bij wijze van voorbeeld wordt de
consensuswaarde toegepast op het probleem van fusies in netwerkindustrien.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de consensuswaarde gegeneraliseerd tot de klasse van spelen
in partitiefunctievorm. Deze waarde wordt gekarakteriseerd als een unieke verdeelregel
met de eigenschappen: e±ciÄ entie, complete symmetrie, de quasi-nulspeler eigenschap
en additiviteit. Een tweede karakterisering volgt met behulp van de transfer eigen-
schap. Verder wordt aangetoond dat deze waarde onder bepaalde voorwaarden vol-
doet aan de eigenschap individuele rationaliteit en een mooi uitgebalanceerde oploss-
ing biedt in de afweging tussen coalitionele e®ecten en externe e®ecten. Ook hier kan
een recursieve formule worden afgeleid door een herformulering via gereduceerde spe-
len. Verdere generaliseringmogelijkheden worden bediscussieerd. Tenslotte wordt deze
waarde toegepast op twee voorbeelden: op oligopolie spelen in partitiefunctievorm en
op incentive problemen bij free-rider situaties.
Het tweede deel is gewijd aan het thema compensatie en introduceert daarnaast
nieuwe samenwerkingsmodellen. Hoofdstuk 4 ontwikkelt een algemeen kader voor
compensatie en coperatie: de zogenaamde project-allocatie situaties. Verder worden
toepassingen van de consensuswaarde op problemen van verliescompensatie en win-
stdeling onderzocht. Hoofdstuk 5 ontwerpt een nieuw model om externaliteiten te
bestuderen met het daarbij horende compensatieprobleem. Er worden diverse speci-SAMENVATTING 159
¯eke oplossingen voorgesteld.
Door het introduceren van de begrippen \project" en \aandelen" in hoofdstuk 4,
zoals in een paper van Ju, Ruys en Borm (2004), kan een nieuwe klasse van economi-
sche omgevingen worden geanalyseerd. Deze klasse, de zogenaamde project-allocatie
situaties, is relevant als de maatschappij als geheel pro¯jt kan hebben van samenwerk-
ing tussen agenten. Voorwaarde hierbij is echter dat agenten bereid zijn tot reallocatie
van de aandelen die zij bezitten. Voor dit doel wordt een corresponderend project-
allocatie spel geconstrueerd en een verwant stelsel van spelen die het onderliggende
coÄ operatieve proces expliciet modelleren. Ook in het kader van de project-allocatie
situaties blijkt de consensuswaarde uitstekend te voldoen.
In afwijking van de klassieke literatuur, waaronder Pigou (1920), Coase (1960),
Arrow (1970) en meer recente auteurs, zie Varian (1994), die het externaliteiten-
probleem uitsluitend met e±ciÄ entie verbinden, wordt in hoofdstuk 5 ook het com-
pensatieprobleem in dit verband aan de orde gesteld. Daarbij worden normatieve
compensatieregels gegeven in de context van externaliteiten. Door rekening te houden
met zogenaamde \stand-alone" situaties van agenten kan een nieuw type spel ontwor-
pen worden, de \oerspelen" (primeval games). Deze oerspelen kunnen eigenschappen
van inter-individuele externaliteiten goed beschrijven en maken het mogelijk de ver-
wante compensatieproblemen goed te analyseren. In dit hoofdstuk worden verschil-
lende oplossingsconcepten gentroduceerd die als benchmark kunnen dienen voor het
oplossing van zulke problemen. Eerst wordt de Shapley waarde voor dit kader gegener-
aliseerd en wordt een aangepaste Shapley waarde verkregen. Door een bilateraal stand-
punt in te nemen inzake de gevolgen van externaliteiten wordt de consensuswaarde
voor oerspelen gede¯nieerd. Voor beide oplossingsconcepten worden karakteriseringen
gegeven. Verder suggereert dit hoofdstuk een meer context-speci¯ek oplossingsconcept,
de oerwaarde. Een analyse van enkele eigenschappen van deze waarde volgt. Tenslotte
worden mogelijke verbanden tussen dit nieuwe kader en de klassieke coÄ operatieve spe-
len bediscussieerd.
Het derde deel is een toepassing van de eerste twee delen op compensatieproble-
men in transitie-economieÄ en. Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert de geleidelijke transitie hervorm-
ing in China. Geconstateerd wordt dat China eigenlijk een \experimentele" methode
gehanteerd heeft voor het transitieproces. Het samenstel van hervormingen in de
banksector in China wordt als pars pro toto voor de gehele economische hervorming
in China beschouwd. Deze hervorming re°ecteert de basis ideeÄ en van China's transi-
tiemodel: gradueel in proces, experimenteel in methode, pragmatisch in houding en160 SAMENVATTING
evolutionair van aard. Door in het kort terug te zien op deze hervormingen en de
verschillende maatregelen te analyseren, verschaft dit hoofdstuk een venster waardoor
we in de unieke ¯loso¯e van China's hervormingen kunnen kijken, welke samengevat
wordt door de \transitie door experimenteren" benadering.
Hoofdstuk 7 is gewijd aan beleidsimplicaties van de theoretische analyses in de
voorgaande hoofdstukken. In dit hoofdstuk wordt voorgesteld van nu af aan een alter-
natieve methode voor het transitieproces in China te hanteren, namelijk de \transitie
met compensatie". In het algemeen kan gesteld worden dat de overgang van een
economie van een toestand naar een andere nauwelijks geÄ ³mplementeerd kan worden
zonder adequate compensaties van die partijen welke verliezen lijden, privileges moeten
opgeven, verworven rechten moeten opgeven of andere belangen hebben bij de status-
quo. Beargumenteerd wordt dat de \transitie door compensatie" methode bij uitstek
geschikt is om van nu af aan op het Chinese transitie proces toegepast te worden.
Deze methode is gebaseerd op oplossingsbegrippen voor coperatieve spelen en le-vert
eerlijke compensatieregels op. De analyse concentreert zich op een case study omtrent
afbraak en uitwijzing in China, maar de implicaties ervan strekken zich over de hele
economie uit.